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RE: CE RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.




Graham,

At 10:51 AM 8/30/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
>Adam,
>         .       First I need to amend my previous comment, here. I want to
>make it clear that everyone's contributions to the CE site, and to the
>SUO­CE/SUO­MRE discussion before that should be candidate material for any
>further work on a semi­natural language aspect of the SUO.
>
>         .       What I'm really suggesting is to let's build on what's
>already been contributed, rather than ignoring that work.

I agree, but I thought we were addressing a different issue which has what 
ontology *content* to build on that we might state in English 
sentences.  Creating a more formal version of a restricted English grammar 
(as opposed to collecting statement in such a grammar) is a task I support, 
but a separate point.

>         .       Matching the work to SUMO and/or IFF needs people literate
>in them to get involved.
>
>
>
>         .       Someone (I forget who ­ Matthew??) started a process of
>explaining the SUMO to the rest of us a few months ago. That would have
>helped, but it didn't progress very far.

We've had a number of attempts along these lines.  We're glad to do 
more.  what do you think of the breakdown of the sections of SUMO we've 
provided at <http://ontology.teknowledge.com/rsigma/arch.html>

>         .       It seemed that shortly after (and, regretfully, possibly
>because) I expressed a real concern about some physics aspects, that the
>exposition work stopped. To me such a process would be an important
>development phase, whereby the feedback that would naturally flow from the
>exposition could be most profitably used to refine the product through
>rectification of shortcomings, and incorporation of enhancements, identified
>by others of us.
>
>         .       Possibly realisation of the effort required for such a phase
>meant that it was seen as too daunting. I don't know.
>
>
>         .       Btw, have people stopped using the SUO-CE site? It's still
>working, because I am receiving my messages back from it, but no-one else's.
>'

I received recent messages from you and David.  It's been silent just 
because no one is posting I think.

Adam



>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
>Sent:   Thursday, 30 August 2001 7:21
>To:     Horn, Graham; SUO-CE (E-mail); cassidy@micra.com
>Cc:     standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org; Sowa John (E-mail); Chris
>Partridge; West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
>Subject:        RE: CE RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>Graham,
>    I was making more of a suggestion for the future.  I don't think we do
>have much from the past where crisp sentences also reference SUMO terms.
>
>Adam
>
>At 02:23 PM 8/29/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
>Hi Adam,
>         .               What material did we gather so far. I am aware of
>some on the SUO-CE site.
>
>         .       I also posted other material previous to it being set up.
>
>         .       Let's see if we can consolidate and progress from there.
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
><mailto:[mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]>
>Sent:   Tuesday, 28 August 2001 23:55
>To:     Horn, Graham; cassidy@micra.com <mailto:cassidy@micra.com>
>Cc:     standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;>  Sowa John (E-mail); Chris
>Partridge; West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
>Subject:        RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>
>Graham,
>    In whatever time you do have available, we might still be able to make
>progress with a sort of informal restricted English.  As long as you use
>terms from SUMO which are still consistent with their definitions, folks
>that are more conversant with logic could translate them.  That might also
>have the benefit that as you see your sentences translated, you may pick up
>logic, much as watching foreign TV with subtitles can be a way to learn a
>new language.  My statements about "Joe's arm" were a sort of restricted
>English.
>
>Adam
>
>
>
>At 03:33 PM 8/28/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
>Pat and Adam,
>         .               I agree there is a need for a formalisation for this
>principle. What's more, you are correct in implying that this is a very
>important aspect.
>
>         .       Unfortunately, I am not up on the logic practices well
>enough to be able to suggest which formalisations comply with current
>standard approaches, and would need to put quite a few hours into studying
>the area in order to come up with one. I'm afraid I just don't have the time
>to do this, much as I would, in an ideal world, love to take it on and be
>employed in such an area.
>
>         .       All I can volunteer at this stage is that I see this as
>another of the principles I see as part of a sound approach, along with my
>recent contributions about metaphor and breaking categorisations down into
>orthogonal conceptual structures. (I'll try to find the contributions, and
>attach them at the bottom, separated by double rows of +++++++++++++s.)
>
>         .       Basically,  my thoughts about information management over
>the decades have come to a view that we can usually make most progress by
>exploiting the principles and devices human­ and animal­kind have devised
>and evolved over the past few million years. (Actually it's much longer than
>that, as some of them I observe in reptiles and even arthropods.) These have
>evidently already withstood considerable tests of time, and so are
>demonstrably quite robust.
>
>         .       The ones I mention above are some of the more useful ones I
>see for this stage of development. Others will be appropriate in the more
>esoteric areas I hinted at below, but also include the evolution of emotions
>and emotional responses.
>
>         .       So, I suggest the best approach is to mimic how the
>principles I suggested are most consistently, logically and successfully
>implemented among various societies of the genus of Homo Sapiens Sapiens.
>
>         .       Incidentally, with a bit of thought, you should be able to
>see from this why I was such a strong advocate of a modified and restricted
>version of English for the project. That's also part of the same principle.
>
>         .       Sorry I can't give a more nuts and bolts answer.
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
><mailto:[mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]>
>Sent:   Tuesday, 28 August 2001 13:57
>To:     cassidy@micra.com; <mailto:cassidy@micra.com;>  Horn, Graham
>Cc:     standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;>  'John F. Sowa'; Chris Partridge;
>West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
>Subject:        Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>Graham and Pat,
>I agree with Graham's message as well as Pat's interest in suggestions for
>formalization.
>Adam
>At 11:07 PM 8/27/2001 -0400, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
>Graham-
>I agree that the use of approximation and stated tolerances for quantitative
>measures (which, however, could be zero in an ideal abstraction) must be an
>essential part of the SUO.  I would be interested in how you think it should
>be formalized.
>Pat Cassidy
>======================
>
>"Horn, Graham" wrote:
>Dear all,
>         .         Let me suggest a conceptual approach for looking at this,
>and many other problematic areas in development of practical ontologies for
>everyday use.
>
>         .       The fact is, of course, that the world is quite complicated.
>Naturally there are issues like the longevity of items (3­D vs 4­D), when
>all physical objects transform over time, not to mention issues like
>time­space etc.  Also, there are issues of purity, corrosion, deformation
>form the ideal shape and so forth. And I haven't even touched on more
>esoteric areas like reasoning and motives, etc.
>
>         .       The nature of human endeavour is evidently that mankind
>makes hypothetical models about the universe that seem to explain
>observations and facilitate planning, etc. We then modify these, generally
>to more complicated models, as shortcomings are found in the earlier ones.
>Of course some, such as Phlogiston being replaced by Oxygen, are abandoned
>as erroneous. Others, such as the geological principles of vulcanism,
>sedimentarianism and metamorphism, are incorporated side by side, once
>recognised as portions of an overarching system rather than the competing
>alternatives they were originally seen to be.
>
>         .       Furthermore, the earlier and simpler models often provide
>convenient approximations that suit many purposes. Newtonian physics is a
>classic example used by most engineers, even though we know the truer model
>is Einsteinian. Classical chemistry vs nuclear physics vs quantum physics is
>another.
>
>         .       So, I suggest that the ontology, to be practically useful,
>will need to accommodate approximation.
>
>         .       I suggest the above little word picture as an initial
>suggestion for a basis for this. I would be happy for it to be modified,
>corrected, etc, by what the group feels makes it more accurate and/or
>practical.
>
>         .       Again, at the risk of attracting the vehement ire of some
>participants, what do others think?
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent:   Tuesday, 28 August 2001 9:43
>To:     Chris Partridge
>Cc:     Adam Pease; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;>  West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK;
>'pat hayes'
>Subject:        Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>
>Chris and Adam,
>
>This is another of the very many reasons why the goal of a monolithic
>ontology is hopeless:
>
> > I never suggested - or hoped I did not - that there was a simple
> > single answer to this question. Philosophers will be arguing about
> > this for decades - they have a vested interest in doing so - and
> > one of the standard arguments will be that the distinction is
> > misguided. My point is that the issue is well enough understood to
> > recognize some of its important features - one of which is that there
> > are serious problems in having a single consistent way of talking
> > about 3D and 4D - along with a variety of other metaphysical
> > positions. And that deciding on these points is a particularly
> > important aspect of any top ontology.
>
>I believe that there are strong arguments for both sides (and maybe there
>are even more than just 2 options on this and many related issues).  The
>lattice of all theories very nicely accommodates all of these views; it can
>show exactly what axioms are common to both, and what axioms are
>contradictory.
>
>All the effort spent in arguing over these issues could have been much more
>profitably spent in making a clean division of the axioms for both
>approaches and giving developers a choice.
>
>John Sowa
>
>
>============================================
>Patrick Cassidy
>MICRA, Inc.                      || (908) 561-3416
>735 Belvidere Ave.               || (908) 668-5252 (if no answer)
>Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054        || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
>
>internet:   cassidy@micra.com <mailto:cassidy@micra.com>
>============================================
>
>Adam Pease
>Teknowledge
>(650) 424-0500 x571
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Horn, Graham
>Sent:   Wednesday, 15 August 2001 21:57
>To:     'John F. Sowa'; 'standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org'; 'cg@cs.uah.edu'
>Cc:     'phayes@ai.uwf.edu'; West SSI-GREA-UK Matthew (E-mail)
>Subject:        RE: Foundations for ontology
>
>John,
>         .       In my previous response I inadvertently omitted the word
>"more".
>
>         .       I have had a chance to go through the presentations at home
>last night.
>
>         .       I see a major shortcoming in the lack of preparedness to
>accommodate more sophisticated meaning analyses and interpretations. In
>particular, most of the examples of multiple meanings you quoted amounted to
>metaphorical ones.
>
>         .       I realise that having an information processing paradigm
>that separates out the metaphorical applications implies processing, rather
>than just database access. Nevertheless, it greatly simplifies the basic
>vocabulary. With computer power ever expanding, I suggest that processing
>can be accommodated.
>
>         .       The advantage is that most word have only a single basic
>meaning, and the application of metaphor is then assessed separately.
>Furthermore, I suggest there aren't overly many common metaphorical
>transmutations.
>
>         .       This is a bit like my criticism of your examples of
>conceptual graphs many months ago, whereby I felt you weren't breaking the
>options down by fundamental and orthogonal categories. If one does apply
>such information management approaches, the task is significantly
>simplified, though it does require assessment by logical thinkers, rather
>than just anybody. (I have included my e­mail on this below yours). I feel
>that in part, because the CG I commented on then is the same as in your two
>latest papers.
>
>         .       Furthermore, I suggest orthogonal analysis, including
>separation of basic and metaphorical meanings, lends itself to automation.
>
>         .       I feel significant leverage is being lost through lack of a
>willingness to undertake this sort of systematic analysis.
>
>         .       For you to ponder and possibly respond.
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Horn, Graham
>Sent:   Monday, 13 August 2001 14:18
>To:     'John F. Sowa'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;>  cg@cs.uah.edu
><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
>Cc:     phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
>Subject:        RE: Foundations for ontology
>
>John,
>         .       I wish I could spend time digesting the work you have done.
>It is evidently significant and perspicacious.
>
>         .       Might I suggest you put a motion to the SUO group (or a
>modification to an existing one) for us to consider.
>
>         .       I suspect you are bringing issues to the forum that
>transcend the considerations most of us have made to date.
>
>         .       I believe we would be well served by considering our way
>ahead in terms of the issues you have raised, as well as considering your
>recommendations.
>
>         .       What do others think?
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent:   Monday, 13 August 2001 13:42
>To:     standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;>  cg@cs.uah.edu
><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
>Cc:     phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
>Subject:        SUO: Foundations for ontology
>
>
>As I have said in many notes to SUO list, I have some concerns about any
>ontology that is developed by hand.  In two recent talks, I presented my
>views of how ontologies should be developed.  The first talk, which I
>presented at ICCS on August 3, surveys the philosophical foundations.
>Following are the slides:
>
>    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm
><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm>
>
>The second talk, which I presented at an IJCAI workshop on knowledge
>discovery on August 6, suggests automated or semiautomated methods of aiding
>in ontology development.  Following are the slides for that talk:
>
>    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm
><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm>
>
>I had originally intended to make this one talk, but as it kept getting
>longer, I split it in two.  There will also be a paper, which I'll announce
>later (when it is finished).
>
>At IJCAI, I also attended a talk by Stuart Shapiro.  The paper for that talk
>included some comments about Cyc, which are very relevant to ontology
>development by hand.  The problems with keeping Cyc consistent indicate why
>I believe that more autotmated and semiautomated tools are essential for
>ontology development. I scanned the paragraphs about Cyc from the paper and
>included them at the end of this note.
>
>As I said at the SUO workshop at IJCAI, I believe that something along the
>lines that Robert Kent has been proposing for IFF is a necessary component
>of any ontology project.  I would prefer to see SUMO split up into multiple
>smaller theories that could be combined by belief revision methods.
>
>John Sowa
>
>                       Some Observations about Cyc
>
>[The following comments on Cyc have been extracted from a paper that was
>presented by Stuart Shapiro at an IJCAI Workshop (citation below). The
>evaluation of Cyc is based on Cycorp documentation and on experience by the
>first author (Frances Johnson) during a Cyc training course.]
>
>Doug Lenat and Cycorp have developed Cyc [Cycorp, 200la] -- a large
>knowledge base and inferencing system that is built upon a core of over a
>million hand-entered assertions or rules about the world and how it works.
>This system attempts to perform commonsense reasoning with the help of this
>large corpus of beliefs (mostly default with some that are monotonic).  It
>divides its knowledge base into smaller contexts called micro­theories which
>contain specialized information regarding specific areas (such as troop
>movement, physics, movies, etc.).  Belief revision is performed within
>micro­theories or within a small group of micro­theories that are working
>together, and the system is only concerned with maintaining consistency
>within that small group (as opposed to across the entire belief space).  For
>example:  in an everyday context, a table is solid, but within a physics
>context, it is mostly space  (between atoms).
>
>A belief can have only one truth value, so no microtheory can contain both p
>and ~p.  For example, ~p could be expressed as the proposition p with a
>truth value of false.  The technique for maintaining consistency is to check
>for contradictory arguments whenever a proposition is derived or asserted
>into a microtheory.  When contradictions are found, their arguments are
>analyzed, and a decision is made regarding the truth value of the
>propositions involved.  Rankings of beliefs, however, is not a part of the
>system -- it uses specificity to determine the truth value of a default
>belief.  For example:  Opus the penguin does not fly, even though he is a
>bird, because penguins don't fly.  If there can be no decision based on
>specificity, the truth value of the default belief is unknown.  A default
>belief loses out to a monotonic one.  And, lastly, according to Cyc trainers
>and other contacts, contradictions that are purely monotonic bring the
>system to a halt until they are fixed.  During Cyc training, Johnson
>attempted to prove this last statement and failed -- revision was performed.
>The instructors were surprised, but thought the training interface might be
>the cause.  We plan to explore this further, but it is an example of a
>system behaving differently than it is described.
>
>As mentioned [above], Cyc did not perform as described, and there must be
>some question as to other possible differences from design theory. Most
>specifically, Cyc literature [Cycorp, 2001b] claims to keep the
>micro­theories consistent, for lack of a better word.  When asked, contacts
>agreed that, in spite of a cursory check, it was possible that unknown
>contradictions might exist that had not, yet, been derived.  In this sense,
>Cyc can only guarantee that its microtheories are not known to be
>inconsistent (or KS-consistent).  Ideal terminology, such as consistent and
>derivable, is often not appropriate for use with a large or complex
>implemented system.
>
>References
>
>Cycorp [2001a] _Cycorp, Creators of the Cyc Knowledge Base_,
>http://cyc.com <http://cyc.com>
>
>Cycorp [2001b] _Features of CycL_, http://cyc.com/cycl.html
><http://cyc.com/cycl.html>
>
>The original article from which these paragraphs were extracted:
>
>Frances L. Johnson and Stuart C. Shapiro, "Redefining belief change
>terminology for implemented systems," _Inconsistency in Data and Knowledge_,
>Working Notes from IJCAI'01, Seattle, Washington, 6 August 2001, pp. 11-21
>
>
>
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   Horn, Graham
>Sent:   Wednesday, 3 January 2001 13:06
>To:     'John F. Sowa'; pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
>standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
>Cc:     Awbrey Jon (E-mail); Fuchs E. Norbert (E-mail); Whitten David
>(E-mail)
>Subject:        SUO: Ontology Structure & Content
>
>John,
>         .       Your mention of lattices at the bottom of your e-mail below
>prompted me to return to your "Mathematical Background" at
>www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm
><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm> . I continue to be frustrated
>at the apparent lack of comprehension by anyone in the SUO group at what I
>have been speaking of as "conceptual dimensionality" and the like.
>
>         .       Taking your Section 7, I see something close to what I am
>addressing.
>
>         .       Basically, I would group Erdmann and your beverage types in
>a different way. The basic attributes I see are:
>*       temperature,
>*       constituents:
>*       minerals,
>*       plant extracts:
>*       leaf,
>*       fruit,
>*       bean,
>*       wood,
>*       bark, and
>*       root,
>*       animal extracts:
>*       meat, and
>*       milk,
>*       brewed extracts:
>*       alcohol, and
>*       bacilli; and
>*       "aeration":
>*       "fizz", and
>*       froth.
>
>         .       This provides a far more comprehensive structure, without
>even ranging beyond the beverages you mentioned other than to add the
>logical additional alternatives. It allows further elaboration, such as from
>what species the extracts derived, and what particular extract compositions
>are involved. It would thus more readily accommodate such beverages as
>cappuccino, cocoa, soy milk, Irish coffee, kava, Bovril, yoghurt and so on,
>even flat beer and champagne.
>
>         .       This involves breaking things up into logical groups that
>are independent of each other, and goes into multiple layers of depth.
>
>         .       The next problem comes when one begins looking at various
>perspectives. For example some people may wish to look at stimulant
>categories, and wish to group caffeine and taeine together even though one
>is a bean extract (coffee, cola, etc), and the other a leaf extract (tea).
>(Alternatively, sugar can be either a wood or root extract.) So, does one
>break down along the above structure - in which the next level would be the
>species of plant from which the stimulant derived, or should one go directly
>from the next higher level, and then branch directly into extract types?
>Even with this simple example, one can get different structures for such a
>reason.
>
>         .       However, this structural difficulty can be reduced if one is
>prepared to allow multiple branchings. For example, the constituents
>category above could instead be broken directly down into chemical
>categories (eg. some plant extracts are actually minerals, and some
>biologically based industrial processes deliberately exploit such an
>approach). This would be able to be visualised as the second branching
>coming off the page at right angles, because the issue of chemical
>composition is conceptually independent of the issue of extraction source.
>The two issues are conceptually "orthogonal".
>
>         .       Please note that this approach does not inherently simplify
>the whole universe into a nice easy to read structure. After all, most
>beverages are artificial, and we are really breaking out portions of the
>ontologies (is this term appropriate here?) of the animal, plant and mineral
>kingdoms, etc., at our convenience. Really we should have developed those
>more fundamental ontologies, and then chosen to exploit them and their
>structures for this beverage classification exercise.
>
>         .       But I hope this shows some of the power I suggest we can be
>using to structure and populate the SUO in a reasonably optimal way.
>
>         .       Reactions welcomed (Gees, I must be a masochist, going by
>the previous reactions I have gotten with this project).
>
>
>
>Cheers                                  Graham Horn
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone:          02.6244.1094
>Fax:            02.6244.1199
>E­mail:         Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:   John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent:   Friday, December 22, 2000 9:52 PM
>To:     pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
>standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
>Subject:        RE: SUO: More KIF-ified Ontology Content
>
>
>Matthew and Pat,
>
>I believe that you have both made some very important points.  Rather than
>criticizing the ideas I don't fully agree with, I will comment on some that
>I like very much.
>Then I'll present my preferred way of viewing things, which allows for
>multiple viewpoints to coexist (even when they couldn't be simultaneously
>asserted without contradiction).
> >MW: It is my experience that indeed the things people argue about the most
> >are at the highest levels, where as the day to day things people find
>easier
> >to agree on, because we can point at things to see whether we mean the same
> >thing or not. So for example, I doubt if any difficulty we might have on
> >agreeing what we meant by "red" would have anything to do with whether we
> >saw it as a property, that things could take up, or as a class whose
>members
> >were states, either individuals, or temporal parts of individuals. I would
> >expect the discussion to be around where the border was between red and
> >other adjacent colours. So "red" can fit into different frameworks with
> >different ways of understanding what being red means.
>
>This is a very clear statement of a position, which I agree with, but which
>is more often expressed in a more muddled way, which I don't agree with.
>The simpler, more muddled, and to my mind, more dangerous way is the
>following:
>It is easier for people to agree on the lower-level concepts than on the
>higher-level ones.  Therefore, the high-level concepts aren't important, and
>it doesn't matter if we haven't done a good job on the top levels.
>The point where I stop agreeing in such an enthusiastic way is at the next
>sentence:
> >MW: I would further expect
> >to be able to translate between the different frameworks.
>
>Pat has stated my concerns very nicely:
> >PH: Obviously the interesting case is where they are referring to
> >different concepts. But the difficult case is where A's concept
> >cannot even be expressed in B's overall ontological framework, and
> >vice versa.
>
>I also like Pat's succinct summary of an important distinction, which I use
>as one of the top three in my top-level ontology:
> >PH: In the
> >continuant/occurent way of thinking, one refers to existence *at a
> >time*. This means that the four-dimensional entities simply do not
> >exist in this ontology. A continuant is something which continues to
> >exist through time and retains its identity through time, and is such
> >that (this is the characterising property) all its parts are present
> >whenever it is present. Thus a person is a continuant, since if I am
> >here then all my parts are here (now), while a race, say, is not a
> >continuant - it is in fact an occurrent - since it has parts which
> >are temporally distinguished: it has a beginning, a middle and an
> >end. The distinction is like that between a person (a continuant) and
> >that person's life (an occurrent).
>
>And this is a good summary of the problem:
> >PH: Both occurrents and continuants 'map' into 4-d entities in the 4-d
> >histories ontology, but there is no principled way there to
> >distinguish them. The nearest you can get is to say that continuants
> >have isotemporal parts while occurents have isospatial parts, but in
> >the 4-d histories ontology one can cut 'parts' any way one chooses,
> >including along boundaries which slant in time (ie which are
> >'moving', as someone who thinks non-4-dimensionally would say.) And
> >the defining criteria for the distinction in the other ontology is
> >literally incoherent in the 4-d ontology, since *nothing* is such
> >that all its parts are present whenever it is present: the 'whenever'
> >here is meaningless in the 4d ontology.
>
> >As evidence for the idea of a continuant in intuitive thinking,
> >consider the claim that I am the same person I was 10 years ago. This
> >is literally false in the 4-d ontology (it can be expressed there by
> >saying that me-now and me-1990 are both slices of the me-history, but
> >that raises the question of what distinguishes one history from
> >another, since these are also both slices of completely unrelated
> >histories) Statements like this seem to depend on the idea of
> >something retaining its identity through time, even though its
> >properties may change. This 'locus of identity' is what constitutes
> >the basic idea of a continuant, I think.
>
>To summarize:
>1.      Pat says that the 4-D viewpoint allows ways of cutting up the
>universe that cannot be mapped into the viewpoint of 3-D plus time.
>2.      Matthew points out that it is easier to map the 3-D plus time
>viewpoint into the 4-D viewpoint.
>
>I agree with both, but only with the caveat that "easier" does not imply
>"possible to translate each and every distinction that anyone would ever
>want to make."
>         >>MW: Until recently I used as my baseline a viewpoint that said
>that there
>         >>were individual things like you, my car, classes, and
>associations, where
>         >>an association is a relationship that understands that it lasts
>for a period
>         >>of time. I have moved to a 4D approach, replacing individual
>things with
>         >>spatio-temporal extents, and associations with timeless relations.
>However,
>         >>I know very well how to take something from my old model and
>represent it
>         >>in the new model, and vice-versa.
>
>But Pat points out the problem some distinctions vanish in the 4-D ontology,
>and I agree:
> >I wonder if you really can do this, if you think hard about it. Ive
> >been living within a 4-d ontology for a long time and mapping other
> >ontologies to it, and what I find is that many distinctions simply
> >vanish, rather than being 'translated'. This is fine with me, of
> >course, but it tends to get the other folk a little upset, especially
> >when they have written entire books about these distinctions. And in
> >the other direction, I find that perfectly reasonable-seeming things
> >in my ontology, like 'moving' (sloping in space/time) boundaries,
> >simply cannot be admitted into the other ontologies without producing
> >unacceptable confusions.
>
>I also agree very strongly with the following:
> >PH: I think that what seems to me to be overoptimism about the
> > prospects of the SUO among some folk might arise from their failure
> > to appreciate that such incompatible conceptualizations can even
> > exist, let alone all have their uses.
>
>I agree with Matthew's last sentence, but not the first one:
> >MW: I have a simple attitude towards incompatible conceptualisations: they
> >mean we do not understand the world around us. The world around us is not
> >incompatible with itself.
>
>There may be very good reasons for using incompatible representations even
>when a single unified one is understood, as Pat explained with his example
>of quantum electrodynamics.  I also believe that there are a very large
>number of other examples that one could use, as I tried to explain in the
>Knowledge Soup chapter of my KR book.
>Although I agree with a great deal of what Pat says, I would quibble with
>the following:
> >PH: the
> >world around us IS incompatible with itself, in that we have to use
> >two incompatible ways of conceptualizing it in order to fully
> >describe it.  There is no single underlying theory of the world, and
> >some of the best minds who have thought about the matter during the
> >last century have concluded that there is no way to produce one.
>
>On the contrary, quantum electrodynamics is a single coherent
>conceptualization, and it is possible (at least in principle) to use it to
>solve problems without breaking it apart in incompatible ways.
>Unfortunately, for most practical problems, QED is so computationally
>difficult that different (and incompatible) simplifications are necessary to
>get useful results in an acceptable amount of time.
>I strongly agree with Pat's point:
> >PH: I think that you believe that there is a single, universally
> >acceptable, ontology, and that all others can be mapped into it. I
> >think this will happen only when science stops.
>
>But I still believe that there is something useful that we can
>accomplish even before science stops.  My best cut at what
>that may be is summarized in the Knowledge Soup chapter of
>my KR book.  Summarizing even more briefly,
>1.      An open-ended lattice of theories, which could be extended
>arbitrarily far to accommodate any possible way of conceptualizing the world
>in any finite set of concepts.  A complete lattice would have to be
>infinite, but any particular version that might be implemented at any one
>time is finite.  However, there is no restriction on what anyone might add
>to it, given enough time, effort, and ingenuity.
>2.      Methods for navigating the lattice to find theories that are
>approximately true or "good enough" for many problems, and with methods for
>revising and extending theories to make them better adapted to solving new
>problems.
>
>For more about the lattice of theories, see Section 6 of my paper on
>processes and causality:
>http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm
><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm>
>And by the way, I believe that causality is a very important concept that is
>central to a large number of issues in the SUO.  But that is another topic.
>John Sowa
>
>
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Adam Pease
Teknowledge
(650) 424-0500 x571