[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
Graham,
I was making more of a suggestion for the future. I don't think we do
have much from the past where crisp sentences also reference SUMO terms.
Adam
At 02:23 PM 8/29/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
>Hi Adam,
> . What material did we gather so far. I am aware of
>some on the SUO-CE site.
>
> . I also posted other material previous to it being set up.
>
> . Let's see if we can consolidate and progress from there.
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
>Sent: Tuesday, 28 August 2001 23:55
>To: Horn, Graham; cassidy@micra.com
>Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org; Sowa John (E-mail); Chris
>Partridge; West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
>Subject: RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>
>Graham,
> In whatever time you do have available, we might still be able to make
>progress with a sort of informal restricted English. As long as you use
>terms from SUMO which are still consistent with their definitions, folks
>that are more conversant with logic could translate them. That might also
>have the benefit that as you see your sentences translated, you may pick up
>logic, much as watching foreign TV with subtitles can be a way to learn a
>new language. My statements about "Joe's arm" were a sort of restricted
>English.
>
>Adam
>
>
>
>At 03:33 PM 8/28/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
> >Pat and Adam,
> > . I agree there is a need for a formalisation for
>this
> >principle. What's more, you are correct in implying that this is a very
> >important aspect.
> >
> > . Unfortunately, I am not up on the logic practices well
> >enough to be able to suggest which formalisations comply with current
> >standard approaches, and would need to put quite a few hours into studying
> >the area in order to come up with one. I'm afraid I just don't have the
>time
> >to do this, much as I would, in an ideal world, love to take it on and be
> >employed in such an area.
> >
> > . All I can volunteer at this stage is that I see this as
> >another of the principles I see as part of a sound approach, along with my
> >recent contributions about metaphor and breaking categorisations down into
> >orthogonal conceptual structures. (I'll try to find the contributions, and
> >attach them at the bottom, separated by double rows of +++++++++++++s.)
> >
> > . Basically, my thoughts about information management over
> >the decades have come to a view that we can usually make most progress by
> >exploiting the principles and devices human and animalkind have devised
> >and evolved over the past few million years. (Actually it's much longer
>than
> >that, as some of them I observe in reptiles and even arthropods.) These
>have
> >evidently already withstood considerable tests of time, and so are
> >demonstrably quite robust.
> >
> > . The ones I mention above are some of the more useful ones
>I
> >see for this stage of development. Others will be appropriate in the more
> >esoteric areas I hinted at below, but also include the evolution of
>emotions
> >and emotional responses.
> >
> > . So, I suggest the best approach is to mimic how the
> >principles I suggested are most consistently, logically and successfully
> >implemented among various societies of the genus of Homo Sapiens Sapiens.
> >
> > . Incidentally, with a bit of thought, you should be able to
> >see from this why I was such a strong advocate of a modified and restricted
> >version of English for the project. That's also part of the same principle.
> >
> > . Sorry I can't give a more nuts and bolts answer.
> >
> >
> >
> >Cheers Graham Horn
> >National Data Standards Unit
> >Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> >================================================
> >Phone: 02.6244.1094
> >Fax: 02.6244.1199
> >Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
> >Sent: Tuesday, 28 August 2001 13:57
> >To: cassidy@micra.com; Horn, Graham
> >Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org; 'John F. Sowa'; Chris Partridge;
> >West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
> >Subject: Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
> >
> >Graham and Pat,
> >I agree with Graham's message as well as Pat's interest in suggestions for
> >formalization.
> >Adam
> >At 11:07 PM 8/27/2001 -0400, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
> >Graham-
> >I agree that the use of approximation and stated tolerances for
>quantitative
> >measures (which, however, could be zero in an ideal abstraction) must be an
> >essential part of the SUO. I would be interested in how you think it
>should
> >be formalized.
> >Pat Cassidy
> >======================
> >
> >"Horn, Graham" wrote:
> >Dear all,
> > . Let me suggest a conceptual approach for looking at
>this,
> >and many other problematic areas in development of practical ontologies for
> >everyday use.
> >
> > . The fact is, of course, that the world is quite
>complicated.
> >Naturally there are issues like the longevity of items (3D vs 4D), when
> >all physical objects transform over time, not to mention issues like
> >timespace etc. Also, there are issues of purity, corrosion, deformation
> >form the ideal shape and so forth. And I haven't even touched on more
> >esoteric areas like reasoning and motives, etc.
> >
> > . The nature of human endeavour is evidently that mankind
> >makes hypothetical models about the universe that seem to explain
> >observations and facilitate planning, etc. We then modify these, generally
> >to more complicated models, as shortcomings are found in the earlier ones.
> >Of course some, such as Phlogiston being replaced by Oxygen, are abandoned
> >as erroneous. Others, such as the geological principles of vulcanism,
> >sedimentarianism and metamorphism, are incorporated side by side, once
> >recognised as portions of an overarching system rather than the competing
> >alternatives they were originally seen to be.
> >
> > . Furthermore, the earlier and simpler models often provide
> >convenient approximations that suit many purposes. Newtonian physics is a
> >classic example used by most engineers, even though we know the truer model
> >is Einsteinian. Classical chemistry vs nuclear physics vs quantum physics
>is
> >another.
> >
> > . So, I suggest that the ontology, to be practically useful,
> >will need to accommodate approximation.
> >
> > . I suggest the above little word picture as an initial
> >suggestion for a basis for this. I would be happy for it to be modified,
> >corrected, etc, by what the group feels makes it more accurate and/or
> >practical.
> >
> > . Again, at the risk of attracting the vehement ire of some
> >participants, what do others think?
> >
> >
> >
> >Cheers Graham Horn
> >National Data Standards Unit
> >Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> >================================================
> >Phone: 02.6244.1094
> >Fax: 02.6244.1199
> >Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> ><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
> >Sent: Tuesday, 28 August 2001 9:43
> >To: Chris Partridge
> >Cc: Adam Pease; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
> ><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK;
> >'pat hayes'
> >Subject: Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
> >
> >
> >Chris and Adam,
> >
> >This is another of the very many reasons why the goal of a monolithic
> >ontology is hopeless:
> >
> > > I never suggested - or hoped I did not - that there was a simple
> > > single answer to this question. Philosophers will be arguing about
> > > this for decades - they have a vested interest in doing so - and
> > > one of the standard arguments will be that the distinction is
> > > misguided. My point is that the issue is well enough understood to
> > > recognize some of its important features - one of which is that there
> > > are serious problems in having a single consistent way of talking
> > > about 3D and 4D - along with a variety of other metaphysical
> > > positions. And that deciding on these points is a particularly
> > > important aspect of any top ontology.
> >
> >I believe that there are strong arguments for both sides (and maybe there
> >are even more than just 2 options on this and many related issues). The
> >lattice of all theories very nicely accommodates all of these views; it can
> >show exactly what axioms are common to both, and what axioms are
> >contradictory.
> >
> >All the effort spent in arguing over these issues could have been much more
> >profitably spent in making a clean division of the axioms for both
> >approaches and giving developers a choice.
> >
> >John Sowa
> >
> >
> >============================================
> >Patrick Cassidy
> >MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
> >735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if no answer)
> >Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
> >
> >internet: cassidy@micra.com <mailto:cassidy@micra.com>
> >============================================
> >
> >Adam Pease
> >Teknowledge
> >(650) 424-0500 x571
> >
> >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Horn, Graham
> >Sent: Wednesday, 15 August 2001 21:57
> >To: 'John F. Sowa'; 'standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org'; 'cg@cs.uah.edu'
> >Cc: 'phayes@ai.uwf.edu'; West SSI-GREA-UK Matthew (E-mail)
> >Subject: RE: Foundations for ontology
> >
> >John,
> > . In my previous response I inadvertently omitted the word
> >"more".
> >
> > . I have had a chance to go through the presentations at
>home
> >last night.
> >
> > . I see a major shortcoming in the lack of preparedness to
> >accommodate more sophisticated meaning analyses and interpretations. In
> >particular, most of the examples of multiple meanings you quoted amounted
>to
> >metaphorical ones.
> >
> > . I realise that having an information processing paradigm
> >that separates out the metaphorical applications implies processing, rather
> >than just database access. Nevertheless, it greatly simplifies the basic
> >vocabulary. With computer power ever expanding, I suggest that processing
> >can be accommodated.
> >
> > . The advantage is that most word have only a single basic
> >meaning, and the application of metaphor is then assessed separately.
> >Furthermore, I suggest there aren't overly many common metaphorical
> >transmutations.
> >
> > . This is a bit like my criticism of your examples of
> >conceptual graphs many months ago, whereby I felt you weren't breaking the
> >options down by fundamental and orthogonal categories. If one does apply
> >such information management approaches, the task is significantly
> >simplified, though it does require assessment by logical thinkers, rather
> >than just anybody. (I have included my email on this below yours). I feel
> >that in part, because the CG I commented on then is the same as in your two
> >latest papers.
> >
> > . Furthermore, I suggest orthogonal analysis, including
> >separation of basic and metaphorical meanings, lends itself to automation.
> >
> > . I feel significant leverage is being lost through lack of
>a
> >willingness to undertake this sort of systematic analysis.
> >
> > . For you to ponder and possibly respond.
> >
> >
> >
> >Cheers Graham Horn
> >National Data Standards Unit
> >Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> >================================================
> >Phone: 02.6244.1094
> >Fax: 02.6244.1199
> >Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Horn, Graham
> >Sent: Monday, 13 August 2001 14:18
> >To: 'John F. Sowa'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
> ><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> cg@cs.uah.edu
> ><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
> >Cc: phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
> >Subject: RE: Foundations for ontology
> >
> >John,
> > . I wish I could spend time digesting the work you have
>done.
> >It is evidently significant and perspicacious.
> >
> > . Might I suggest you put a motion to the SUO group (or a
> >modification to an existing one) for us to consider.
> >
> > . I suspect you are bringing issues to the forum that
> >transcend the considerations most of us have made to date.
> >
> > . I believe we would be well served by considering our way
> >ahead in terms of the issues you have raised, as well as considering your
> >recommendations.
> >
> > . What do others think?
> >
> >
> >
> >Cheers Graham Horn
> >National Data Standards Unit
> >Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> >================================================
> >Phone: 02.6244.1094
> >Fax: 02.6244.1199
> >Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> ><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
> >Sent: Monday, 13 August 2001 13:42
> >To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
> ><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> cg@cs.uah.edu
> ><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
> >Cc: phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
> >Subject: SUO: Foundations for ontology
> >
> >
> >As I have said in many notes to SUO list, I have some concerns about any
> >ontology that is developed by hand. In two recent talks, I presented my
> >views of how ontologies should be developed. The first talk, which I
> >presented at ICCS on August 3, surveys the philosophical foundations.
> >Following are the slides:
> >
> > http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm
> ><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm>
> >
> >The second talk, which I presented at an IJCAI workshop on knowledge
> >discovery on August 6, suggests automated or semiautomated methods of
>aiding
> >in ontology development. Following are the slides for that talk:
> >
> > http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm
> ><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm>
> >
> >I had originally intended to make this one talk, but as it kept getting
> >longer, I split it in two. There will also be a paper, which I'll announce
> >later (when it is finished).
> >
> >At IJCAI, I also attended a talk by Stuart Shapiro. The paper for that
>talk
> >included some comments about Cyc, which are very relevant to ontology
> >development by hand. The problems with keeping Cyc consistent indicate why
> >I believe that more autotmated and semiautomated tools are essential for
> >ontology development. I scanned the paragraphs about Cyc from the paper and
> >included them at the end of this note.
> >
> >As I said at the SUO workshop at IJCAI, I believe that something along the
> >lines that Robert Kent has been proposing for IFF is a necessary component
> >of any ontology project. I would prefer to see SUMO split up into multiple
> >smaller theories that could be combined by belief revision methods.
> >
> >John Sowa
> >
> > Some Observations about Cyc
> >
> >[The following comments on Cyc have been extracted from a paper that was
> >presented by Stuart Shapiro at an IJCAI Workshop (citation below). The
> >evaluation of Cyc is based on Cycorp documentation and on experience by the
> >first author (Frances Johnson) during a Cyc training course.]
> >
> >Doug Lenat and Cycorp have developed Cyc [Cycorp, 200la] -- a large
> >knowledge base and inferencing system that is built upon a core of over a
> >million hand-entered assertions or rules about the world and how it works.
> >This system attempts to perform commonsense reasoning with the help of this
> >large corpus of beliefs (mostly default with some that are monotonic). It
> >divides its knowledge base into smaller contexts called microtheories
>which
> >contain specialized information regarding specific areas (such as troop
> >movement, physics, movies, etc.). Belief revision is performed within
> >microtheories or within a small group of microtheories that are working
> >together, and the system is only concerned with maintaining consistency
> >within that small group (as opposed to across the entire belief space).
>For
> >example: in an everyday context, a table is solid, but within a physics
> >context, it is mostly space (between atoms).
> >
> >A belief can have only one truth value, so no microtheory can contain both
>p
> >and ~p. For example, ~p could be expressed as the proposition p with a
> >truth value of false. The technique for maintaining consistency is to
>check
> >for contradictory arguments whenever a proposition is derived or asserted
> >into a microtheory. When contradictions are found, their arguments are
> >analyzed, and a decision is made regarding the truth value of the
> >propositions involved. Rankings of beliefs, however, is not a part of the
> >system -- it uses specificity to determine the truth value of a default
> >belief. For example: Opus the penguin does not fly, even though he is a
> >bird, because penguins don't fly. If there can be no decision based on
> >specificity, the truth value of the default belief is unknown. A default
> >belief loses out to a monotonic one. And, lastly, according to Cyc
>trainers
> >and other contacts, contradictions that are purely monotonic bring the
> >system to a halt until they are fixed. During Cyc training, Johnson
> >attempted to prove this last statement and failed -- revision was
>performed.
> >The instructors were surprised, but thought the training interface might be
> >the cause. We plan to explore this further, but it is an example of a
> >system behaving differently than it is described.
> >
> >As mentioned [above], Cyc did not perform as described, and there must be
> >some question as to other possible differences from design theory. Most
> >specifically, Cyc literature [Cycorp, 2001b] claims to keep the
> >microtheories consistent, for lack of a better word. When asked, contacts
> >agreed that, in spite of a cursory check, it was possible that unknown
> >contradictions might exist that had not, yet, been derived. In this sense,
> >Cyc can only guarantee that its microtheories are not known to be
> >inconsistent (or KS-consistent). Ideal terminology, such as consistent and
> >derivable, is often not appropriate for use with a large or complex
> >implemented system.
> >
> >References
> >
> >Cycorp [2001a] _Cycorp, Creators of the Cyc Knowledge Base_,
> >http://cyc.com <http://cyc.com>
> >
> >Cycorp [2001b] _Features of CycL_, http://cyc.com/cycl.html
> ><http://cyc.com/cycl.html>
> >
> >The original article from which these paragraphs were extracted:
> >
> >Frances L. Johnson and Stuart C. Shapiro, "Redefining belief change
> >terminology for implemented systems," _Inconsistency in Data and
>Knowledge_,
> >Working Notes from IJCAI'01, Seattle, Washington, 6 August 2001, pp. 11-21
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Horn, Graham
> >Sent: Wednesday, 3 January 2001 13:06
> >To: 'John F. Sowa'; pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
> >standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> ><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
> >Cc: Awbrey Jon (E-mail); Fuchs E. Norbert (E-mail); Whitten David
> >(E-mail)
> >Subject: SUO: Ontology Structure & Content
> >
> >John,
> > . Your mention of lattices at the bottom of your e-mail
>below
> >prompted me to return to your "Mathematical Background" at
> >www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm
> ><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm> . I continue to be frustrated
> >at the apparent lack of comprehension by anyone in the SUO group at what I
> >have been speaking of as "conceptual dimensionality" and the like.
> >
> > . Taking your Section 7, I see something close to what I am
> >addressing.
> >
> > . Basically, I would group Erdmann and your beverage types
>in
> >a different way. The basic attributes I see are:
> >* temperature,
> >* constituents:
> >* minerals,
> >* plant extracts:
> >* leaf,
> >* fruit,
> >* bean,
> >* wood,
> >* bark, and
> >* root,
> >* animal extracts:
> >* meat, and
> >* milk,
> >* brewed extracts:
> >* alcohol, and
> >* bacilli; and
> >* "aeration":
> >* "fizz", and
> >* froth.
> >
> > . This provides a far more comprehensive structure, without
> >even ranging beyond the beverages you mentioned other than to add the
> >logical additional alternatives. It allows further elaboration, such as
>from
> >what species the extracts derived, and what particular extract compositions
> >are involved. It would thus more readily accommodate such beverages as
> >cappuccino, cocoa, soy milk, Irish coffee, kava, Bovril, yoghurt and so on,
> >even flat beer and champagne.
> >
> > . This involves breaking things up into logical groups that
> >are independent of each other, and goes into multiple layers of depth.
> >
> > . The next problem comes when one begins looking at various
> >perspectives. For example some people may wish to look at stimulant
> >categories, and wish to group caffeine and taeine together even though one
> >is a bean extract (coffee, cola, etc), and the other a leaf extract (tea).
> >(Alternatively, sugar can be either a wood or root extract.) So, does one
> >break down along the above structure - in which the next level would be the
> >species of plant from which the stimulant derived, or should one go
>directly
> >from the next higher level, and then branch directly into extract types?
> >Even with this simple example, one can get different structures for such a
> >reason.
> >
> > . However, this structural difficulty can be reduced if one
>is
> >prepared to allow multiple branchings. For example, the constituents
> >category above could instead be broken directly down into chemical
> >categories (eg. some plant extracts are actually minerals, and some
> >biologically based industrial processes deliberately exploit such an
> >approach). This would be able to be visualised as the second branching
> >coming off the page at right angles, because the issue of chemical
> >composition is conceptually independent of the issue of extraction source.
> >The two issues are conceptually "orthogonal".
> >
> > . Please note that this approach does not inherently
>simplify
> >the whole universe into a nice easy to read structure. After all, most
> >beverages are artificial, and we are really breaking out portions of the
> >ontologies (is this term appropriate here?) of the animal, plant and
>mineral
> >kingdoms, etc., at our convenience. Really we should have developed those
> >more fundamental ontologies, and then chosen to exploit them and their
> >structures for this beverage classification exercise.
> >
> > . But I hope this shows some of the power I suggest we can
>be
> >using to structure and populate the SUO in a reasonably optimal way.
> >
> > . Reactions welcomed (Gees, I must be a masochist, going by
> >the previous reactions I have gotten with this project).
> >
> >
> >
> >Cheers Graham Horn
> >Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> >================================================
> >Phone: 02.6244.1094
> >Fax: 02.6244.1199
> >Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> ><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
> >Sent: Friday, December 22, 2000 9:52 PM
> >To: pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
> >standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> ><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
> >Subject: RE: SUO: More KIF-ified Ontology Content
> >
> >
> >Matthew and Pat,
> >
> >I believe that you have both made some very important points. Rather than
> >criticizing the ideas I don't fully agree with, I will comment on some that
> >I like very much.
> >Then I'll present my preferred way of viewing things, which allows for
> >multiple viewpoints to coexist (even when they couldn't be simultaneously
> >asserted without contradiction).
> > >MW: It is my experience that indeed the things people argue about the
>most
> > >are at the highest levels, where as the day to day things people find
> >easier
> > >to agree on, because we can point at things to see whether we mean the
>same
> > >thing or not. So for example, I doubt if any difficulty we might have on
> > >agreeing what we meant by "red" would have anything to do with whether we
> > >saw it as a property, that things could take up, or as a class whose
> >members
> > >were states, either individuals, or temporal parts of individuals. I
>would
> > >expect the discussion to be around where the border was between red and
> > >other adjacent colours. So "red" can fit into different frameworks with
> > >different ways of understanding what being red means.
> >
> >This is a very clear statement of a position, which I agree with, but which
> >is more often expressed in a more muddled way, which I don't agree with.
> >The simpler, more muddled, and to my mind, more dangerous way is the
> >following:
> >It is easier for people to agree on the lower-level concepts than on the
> >higher-level ones. Therefore, the high-level concepts aren't important,
>and
> >it doesn't matter if we haven't done a good job on the top levels.
> >The point where I stop agreeing in such an enthusiastic way is at the next
> >sentence:
> > >MW: I would further expect
> > >to be able to translate between the different frameworks.
> >
> >Pat has stated my concerns very nicely:
> > >PH: Obviously the interesting case is where they are referring to
> > >different concepts. But the difficult case is where A's concept
> > >cannot even be expressed in B's overall ontological framework, and
> > >vice versa.
> >
> >I also like Pat's succinct summary of an important distinction, which I use
> >as one of the top three in my top-level ontology:
> > >PH: In the
> > >continuant/occurent way of thinking, one refers to existence *at a
> > >time*. This means that the four-dimensional entities simply do not
> > >exist in this ontology. A continuant is something which continues to
> > >exist through time and retains its identity through time, and is such
> > >that (this is the characterising property) all its parts are present
> > >whenever it is present. Thus a person is a continuant, since if I am
> > >here then all my parts are here (now), while a race, say, is not a
> > >continuant - it is in fact an occurrent - since it has parts which
> > >are temporally distinguished: it has a beginning, a middle and an
> > >end. The distinction is like that between a person (a continuant) and
> > >that person's life (an occurrent).
> >
> >And this is a good summary of the problem:
> > >PH: Both occurrents and continuants 'map' into 4-d entities in the 4-d
> > >histories ontology, but there is no principled way there to
> > >distinguish them. The nearest you can get is to say that continuants
> > >have isotemporal parts while occurents have isospatial parts, but in
> > >the 4-d histories ontology one can cut 'parts' any way one chooses,
> > >including along boundaries which slant in time (ie which are
> > >'moving', as someone who thinks non-4-dimensionally would say.) And
> > >the defining criteria for the distinction in the other ontology is
> > >literally incoherent in the 4-d ontology, since *nothing* is such
> > >that all its parts are present whenever it is present: the 'whenever'
> > >here is meaningless in the 4d ontology.
> >
> > >As evidence for the idea of a continuant in intuitive thinking,
> > >consider the claim that I am the same person I was 10 years ago. This
> > >is literally false in the 4-d ontology (it can be expressed there by
> > >saying that me-now and me-1990 are both slices of the me-history, but
> > >that raises the question of what distinguishes one history from
> > >another, since these are also both slices of completely unrelated
> > >histories) Statements like this seem to depend on the idea of
> > >something retaining its identity through time, even though its
> > >properties may change. This 'locus of identity' is what constitutes
> > >the basic idea of a continuant, I think.
> >
> >To summarize:
> >1. Pat says that the 4-D viewpoint allows ways of cutting up the
> >universe that cannot be mapped into the viewpoint of 3-D plus time.
> >2. Matthew points out that it is easier to map the 3-D plus time
> >viewpoint into the 4-D viewpoint.
> >
> >I agree with both, but only with the caveat that "easier" does not imply
> >"possible to translate each and every distinction that anyone would ever
> >want to make."
> > >>MW: Until recently I used as my baseline a viewpoint that said
> >that there
> > >>were individual things like you, my car, classes, and
> >associations, where
> > >>an association is a relationship that understands that it lasts
> >for a period
> > >>of time. I have moved to a 4D approach, replacing individual
> >things with
> > >>spatio-temporal extents, and associations with timeless
>relations.
> >However,
> > >>I know very well how to take something from my old model and
> >represent it
> > >>in the new model, and vice-versa.
> >
> >But Pat points out the problem some distinctions vanish in the 4-D
>ontology,
> >and I agree:
> > >I wonder if you really can do this, if you think hard about it. Ive
> > >been living within a 4-d ontology for a long time and mapping other
> > >ontologies to it, and what I find is that many distinctions simply
> > >vanish, rather than being 'translated'. This is fine with me, of
> > >course, but it tends to get the other folk a little upset, especially
> > >when they have written entire books about these distinctions. And in
> > >the other direction, I find that perfectly reasonable-seeming things
> > >in my ontology, like 'moving' (sloping in space/time) boundaries,
> > >simply cannot be admitted into the other ontologies without producing
> > >unacceptable confusions.
> >
> >I also agree very strongly with the following:
> > >PH: I think that what seems to me to be overoptimism about the
> > > prospects of the SUO among some folk might arise from their failure
> > > to appreciate that such incompatible conceptualizations can even
> > > exist, let alone all have their uses.
> >
> >I agree with Matthew's last sentence, but not the first one:
> > >MW: I have a simple attitude towards incompatible conceptualisations:
>they
> > >mean we do not understand the world around us. The world around us is not
> > >incompatible with itself.
> >
> >There may be very good reasons for using incompatible representations even
> >when a single unified one is understood, as Pat explained with his example
> >of quantum electrodynamics. I also believe that there are a very large
> >number of other examples that one could use, as I tried to explain in the
> >Knowledge Soup chapter of my KR book.
> >Although I agree with a great deal of what Pat says, I would quibble with
> >the following:
> > >PH: the
> > >world around us IS incompatible with itself, in that we have to use
> > >two incompatible ways of conceptualizing it in order to fully
> > >describe it. There is no single underlying theory of the world, and
> > >some of the best minds who have thought about the matter during the
> > >last century have concluded that there is no way to produce one.
> >
> >On the contrary, quantum electrodynamics is a single coherent
> >conceptualization, and it is possible (at least in principle) to use it to
> >solve problems without breaking it apart in incompatible ways.
> >Unfortunately, for most practical problems, QED is so computationally
> >difficult that different (and incompatible) simplifications are necessary
>to
> >get useful results in an acceptable amount of time.
> >I strongly agree with Pat's point:
> > >PH: I think that you believe that there is a single, universally
> > >acceptable, ontology, and that all others can be mapped into it. I
> > >think this will happen only when science stops.
> >
> >But I still believe that there is something useful that we can
> >accomplish even before science stops. My best cut at what
> >that may be is summarized in the Knowledge Soup chapter of
> >my KR book. Summarizing even more briefly,
> >1. An open-ended lattice of theories, which could be extended
> >arbitrarily far to accommodate any possible way of conceptualizing the
>world
> >in any finite set of concepts. A complete lattice would have to be
> >infinite, but any particular version that might be implemented at any one
> >time is finite. However, there is no restriction on what anyone might add
> >to it, given enough time, effort, and ingenuity.
> >2. Methods for navigating the lattice to find theories that are
> >approximately true or "good enough" for many problems, and with methods for
> >revising and extending theories to make them better adapted to solving new
> >problems.
> >
> >For more about the lattice of theories, see Section 6 of my paper on
> >processes and causality:
> >http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm
> ><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm>
> >And by the way, I believe that causality is a very important concept that
>is
> >central to a large number of issues in the SUO. But that is another topic.
> >John Sowa
> >
> >
> >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Adam Pease
>Teknowledge
>(650) 424-0500 x571
Adam Pease
Teknowledge
(650) 424-0500 x571