ONT Re: Differential Logic A -- Discussion
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DLOG A. Discussion Note 7
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| Consider what effects that might conceivably
| have practical bearings you conceive the
| objects of your conception to have. Then,
| your conception of those effects is the
| whole of your conception of the object.
|
| Peirce, "Maxim of Pragmatism",
| 'Collected Papers', CP 5.438.
Back to the picture that we had last time:
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If my "recursive interpretation of the maxim of pragmatic thinking" (RIOTMOPT)
is suited to work out, then it would have to be the case that the "effects" of
an object are somehow simpler than the object itself, and simpler in the sense
that their concept is easier to conceive than the concept of the object itself.
After all, that is just the sort of recourse that one has in recursion, namely,
that one's attempt to answer a harder question has "recourse" to the resources
of one's answers to easier but related questions.
It seems that we must inquire further into the precise nature of these
effects, of the sort that "might conceivably have practical bearings".
Introducing a variant formulation of the pragmatic maxim,
Peirce puts a gloss on the theme of "practical bearings":
| Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts
| certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory
| perceptions. Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines
| of conduct will entail certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what
| is called a "practical consideration". Hence is justified the maxim,
| belief in which constitutes pragmatism; namely,
|
| In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should
| consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity
| from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will
| constitute the entire meaning of the conception.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Pragmatism" (c. 1905), 'Collected Papers', CP 5.9.
Very roughly, then, let's try to formalize "effects" as referring to
ordered pairs of the form <Volition, Perception>, one might even say,
to invert a 2-gone paradigm, pairs of the shape <Response, Stimulus>,
Taking up Peirce's more developed description of the subject matter,
I will attempt to represent a practical consideration of effects,
or an effect that an agent conceives to have practical bearings,
as a comprehensive connection between a domain of conduct and
a domain of experience, or even just an extensive collection
of ordered pairs between certain "lines of conduct" (LOC's)
and certain "kinds of inevitable experiences" (KOIE's).
Jon Awbrey
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http://www.cs.bsu.edu/homepages/mighty/history.html
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