ONT Re: What Is Information That A Sign May Bear It?
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WIS Discussion. Note 5
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FK = Frances Catherine Kelly
Re: WIS 2. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05296.html
In: WIS. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd19.html#04317
Cf: Sign Relations. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11162.html
FK = Frances responds to Jon Awbrey on his semiotical notes ...
FK: Just a few curiosities.
FK: 1. Do you hold that a sign with any amount of information
must partake in communication to be a sign?
Whenever I want to figure out whether something is a sign,
I usually go by one of Peirce's defintions of a sign that
I regard as the clearest and the most complete definition
that he ever gave, just by my own lights, you understand.
That would be this definition, that comes in two minor
variations of emphasis:
| A sign is something, 'A',
| which brings something, 'B',
| its 'interpretant' sign
| determined or created by it,
| into the same sort of correspondence
| with something, 'C', its 'object',
| as that in which itself stands to 'C'.
|
| C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, pp. 20-21, cf. p. 54, also available here:
| http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/L75.htm
More details on how the definition of a sign relation bears on
the definition of logic are given in the contexts of this text:
| On the Definition of Logic [Version 1]
|
| Logic will here be defined as 'formal semiotic'.
| A definition of a sign will be given which no more
| refers to human thought than does the definition
| of a line as the place which a particle occupies,
| part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely,
| a sign is something, 'A', which brings something,
| 'B', its 'interpretant' sign determined or created
| by it, into the same sort of correspondence with
| something, 'C', its 'object', as that in which it
| itself stands to 'C'. It is from this definition,
| together with a definition of "formal", that I
| deduce mathematically the principles of logic.
| I also make a historical review of all the
| definitions and conceptions of logic, and show,
| not merely that my definition is no novelty, but
| that my non-psychological conception of logic has
| 'virtually' been quite generally held, though not
| generally recognized. (CSP, NEM 4, 20-21).
|
| On the Definition of Logic [Version 2]
|
| Logic is 'formal semiotic'. A sign is something,
| 'A', which brings something, 'B', its 'interpretant'
| sign, determined or created by it, into the same
| sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort)
| with something, 'C', its 'object', as that in
| which itself stands to 'C'. This definition no
| more involves any reference to human thought than
| does the definition of a line as the place within
| which a particle lies during a lapse of time.
| It is from this definition that I deduce the
| principles of logic by mathematical reasoning,
| and by mathematical reasoning that, I aver, will
| support criticism of Weierstrassian severity, and
| that is perfectly evident. The word "formal" in
| the definition is also defined. (CSP, NEM 4, 54).
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|'The New Elements of Mathematics', Volume 4,
| Edited by Carolyn Eisele, Mouton, The Hague, 1976.
When it comes to the question of how much information a sign bears,
it seems that we can begin by examining the closely related quality
of determination that Peirce mentions in his definition, but whether
that is enough I am not sure. Just speaking off the cuff, it does at
first appear as if we would have to say more about the actual context
of interpretation in order to set a well-posed question, but that may
also be necessary to fill out the form of determination, so maybe the
two questions amount to the same thing in the end. I will think on it.
The word "communication" is open to interpretation.
Do we use it in the sense of "communing with nature"?
Do we use it in the sense of "dialogue with oneself"?
FK: 2. Do you hold that only humans or perhaps organisms can
use signs, to the exclusion of say mechanisms of matter?
The definition that I use for words like "machine" and "mechanism" is one
that I learned in classical cybernetics, as used by Ashby, for instance.
A machine or a mechanism is a "law governed system". Nothing there
says what kind of law it must be, or that we know what the law is,
only that there is some law that governs the system in question.
Consequently, I have no way of drawing that kind of a line
between human beings, organisms, matter, and mechanisms.
Mostly I don't know, in any moderately complete way,
the laws that might govern any of them, though I do
keep faith with the hypothesis that there are such
laws, if only for the sake of continuing inquiry,
if nothing else.
FK: 3. Since signs are 3-adic, how in a logical relation can
they be reduced to and identified as being only 2-adic?
I'm not sure that I'm reading your intent here.
There are of course "degenerate" sign relations,
as with icons and indices, but that doesn't seem
to be what you are asking about, is it?
Jon Awbrey
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http://www.cs.bsu.edu/homepages/mighty/history.html
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