ONT Re: Effective Logical Formalism -- Literature Notes
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ELF. Literature Note 13
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GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: How I got into this was that Murray said he was interested in LBase,
I remembered that there was something I liked at the beginning of it,
and that other than that it seemed like a fairly standard presentation
of "classical model theory", the model theory of first order logic, and
I said that I would read through it with him, as long as he participated
actively enough to keep me from falling asleep and to let me be guided by
what in particular he wanted to do with it. I started with the words and
sentences that were there in the text, and I will return to that as soon
as we get some common ground, and I merely introduced a bit of my own
interpretive apparatus, in part by way of preparing for the sort of
comparative study that I believe Murray has in mind. So naturally
there will be some compromise formations of sundry nomenclatures.
GR: Being a "full-time warrior", I'm sure Murray
will continue this inquiry with you. I have
found it quite valuable so far, and cogently
discussed considering the difficulty of the
subject matter.
GR: There is also a strong suggestion of an important ongoing
inquiry in your consideration of especially the question
of "interpretation" theory, with implications not only
for semiotic (which I'm most interested in, of course),
but also hermeneutic more generally. (I will get to
the Gallagher and Palmer links should I have some
time in the next week, which now seems unlikely,
I'm afraid :-( )
GR: (Btw, I hope I'm not only a weekend warrior, but I am
thinking that I am also not EVEN a weekend warrior as
I have so many obligations and even types of obligations
these days that I can't always respond "in a timely fashion"
as I go about "earning an earning". In short, whereas Murray
is a stimulant, I may prove to be a soporific (all by way of
explaining why it's taken me time to get back to you, Murray,
and others).
GR: These "compromise formations" seem to
suggest a further study, wouldn't you
say (maybe a part of rhetoric as method?)
It's a term of art from psychoanalysis, I think --
memories like strawberries, though, too long in
the fridge. But I descry a nurtural connection
to rhetoric, via, what else? -- interpretation.
GR: As noted, I've been following your analysis as best I can, and
find considerable merit in it, for example, in your analysis of
the Guha-Hayes model-theoretic semantic material, your tenth
reading which rendered (as something of a conclusion).
Translation
Source Language o---------->o Target Language
\ /
\ /
\ /
\ /
v v
o
World
GR: This is certainly preferable to the first common-sensical diagram
and makes complete sense to me now. So, I am, of course, eagerly
awaiting your 11th reading! We who are neither logicians nor
mathematicians are always especially pleased to read clear
explications of ideas in words and diagrams as intuitive
as your recent ones have been.
Thanks, Gary, that duel sense -- nice typo, I think I'll stet it --
of "interpretation" is utterly standard in model theory, and so
I'll hang onto it, too. It's just a matter of proper tining.
GR: I keep hoping the collaborative intelligence
is evolutionary in the Engelbartian sense.
JA: Hope springs eternal ...
GR: But also, as Peirce notes, despair, lack of hope, is illogical
I think he implies somewhere (maybe in a letter to Viola Welby)
that all its (despair's) inferences -- if it can even be said to
have any (for what's the "leading principle" but something like,
"'it' all doesn't mean anything, anyhow", are invalid, go nowhere,
do nothing, certainly do not evidence signs of evolution, or even
of growth.
Did you ever look up the etymology of "nirvana"?
Jon Awbrey
GR: Peirce further comments that not only hope, but also,
and perhaps especially, sacrifice in relation to the
community is essential in logic.
| He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole
| world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively.
| So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.*
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.354.
GR: I've appended to this message a group of longer passages from which
the quotation directly above is excerpted; also, a summary, by way
of even briefer excepts from the appended passages -- one from each
of the paragraphs quoted -- directly below:
| Peirce: CP 5.354 He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the
| whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the
| social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.*
| To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of fact, they
| are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful prosecution of
| one's desires is a different thing from selfishness.
| Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should himself be
| capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is sufficient that he
| should recognize the possibility of it, should perceive that only
| that man's inferences who has it are really logical, and should
| consequently regard his own as being only so far valid as they
| would be accepted by the hero. So far as he thus refers his
| inferences to that standard, he becomes identified with such
| a mind.
| This makes logicality attainable enough.
| Sometimes we can personally attain to heroism.
| But all this requires a conceived identification of
| one's interests with those of an unlimited community.
| It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely,
| interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of
| this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance
| of intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet,
| when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt,
| which, as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion, and that,
| furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is
| that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social
| impulse, why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed
| in reasoning?
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.655.
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