ONT Re: "social sentiment presupposed in reasoning"
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Gary,
> > Peirce: CP 5.354 He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save
> > the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively.
> > So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.*
I'm not sure why, but it seems that I am constantly having to point out
the rather obvious distinction between "the whole world", that is to say,
in a metonymous way, the ultimate community, and any one actual community.
Perhaps it is because the members of so many actual and very mean time
communities are constantly confusing the special interests of their
special interest groups with the general interest of the ultimate.
Just A Guess,
Jon Awbrey
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Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> >How I got into this was that Murray said he was interested in LBase,
> >[which seems to you]like a fairly standard presentation
> >of "classical model theory", the model theory of first order logic, and
> >I said that I would read through it with him, as long as he participated
> >actively enough to keep me from falling asleep and to let me be guided by
> >what in particular he wanted to do with it.
>
> Hi Jon,
>
> Being a "full-time warrior," I'm sure Murray
> will continue this inquiry with you. I have
> found it quite valuable so far, and cogently
> discussed considering the difficulty of the
> subject matter.
>
> There is also a strong suggestion of an important
> on going inquiry in your consideration
> of especially the question of "interpretation"
> theory, with implications not only for semiotic
> (which I'm most interested in, of course), but
> also hermeneutic more generally. (I will get to
> the Gallagher and Palmer links should I have
> some time in the next week, which now seems
> unlikely, I'm afraid :-( )
>
> (Btw, I hope I'm not only a weekend warrior,
> but I am thinking that I am also not
> EVEN a weekend warrior as I have so
> many obligations and even types of
> obligations these days that I
> can't always respond "in a
> timely fashion" as I go about "earning an earning."
> In short, whereas Murray is a stimulant, I may
> prove to be a soporific (all by way of explaining
> why it's taken me time to get back to you, Murray,
> and others).
>
> You continued.
>
> >. . . I merely introduced a bit of my own
> >interpretive apparatus, in part by way of preparing for the sort of
> >comparative study that I believe Murray has in mind. So naturally
> >there will be some compromise formations of sundry nomenclatures.
>
> These "compromise formations" seem to suggest a
> further study, wouldn't you say (maybe a part of
> rhetoric as method?)
>
> As noted, I've been following your analysis as
> best I can, and find considerable merit in it,
> for example, in your analysis of the
> Guha-Hayes model-theoretic semantic
> material, your tenth reading which rendered
> (as something of a conclusion).
>
> Translation
>
> Source Language o---------->o Target Language
> \ /
> \ /
> \ /
> \ /
> v v
> o
> World
>
> This is certainly preferable to the first common-
> sensical diagram and makes complete sense to me now.
> so, I am, of course, eagerly awaiting your 11th reading!
> We who are neither logicians nor mathematicians are
> always especially pleased to read clear explications
> of ideas in words and diagrams as intuitive as your
> recent ones have been.
>
> >GR: I keep hoping the collaborative intelligence is evolutionary in the
> > Engelbartian sense.
> >
> >JA: Hope springs eternal ...
>
> But also, as Peirce notes, despair, lack of hope, is illogical
> I think he implies somewhere (maybe in a letter to Viola Welby)
> that all its (despair's) inferences--if it can even be said to have
> any (for what's the "leading principle" but something like, " 'it' all
> doesn't mean anything, anyhow", are invalid, go nowhere, do nothing,
> certainly do not evidence signs of evolution, or even of growth.
>
> Peirce further comments that not only hope, but also, and perhaps
> especially, sacrifice in relation to the community is essential in logic.
>
> >Peirce: CP 5.354 He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the
> >whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the
> >social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.*
>
> [I've appended to this message a group of longer passages from which
> the quotation directly above is excerpted; also, a summary, by way of
> even briefer excepts from the appended passages--one from each of the
> paragraphs quoted-- directly below my name]:
>
> Gary,
>
> >Peirce: CP 5.354 He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the
> >whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the
> >social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.*
> >
> > To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of fact, they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful prosecution of one's desires is a different thing from selfishness.
>
> > Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it, should perceive that only that man's inferences who has it are really logical, and should consequently regard his own as being only so far valid as they would be accepted by the hero. So far as he thus refers his inferences to that standard, he becomes identified with such a mind.
>
> >This makes logicality attainable enough. Sometimes we can personally attain to heroism.
>
> >But all this requires a conceived identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community.
>
> >Peirce: CP 2.655
> > It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet, when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse, why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasoning?
>
> Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
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> >
> >ELF. Literature Note 8
> >
> >o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> >
> >GH = Guha & Hayes
> >GR = Gary Richmond
> >JA = Jon Awbrey
> >MA = Murray Altheim
> >
> >MA: . . . do we need to tie down any intermediate layers between
> > objects and [...] and signs? Or are we simply talking about
> > the whole category of interpretation/representation relations?
> >
> >GR: I too am a bit confused about the about distinction
> > Jon seems to be making, since the triadic relationship
> > sign/object/interpretant would appear to already include
> > the object.
> >
> >Hi Gary,
> >
> >How I got into this was that Murray said he was interested in LBase,
> >I remembered that there was something I liked at the beginning of it,
> >and that other than that it seemed like a fairly standard presentation
> >of "classical model theory", the model theory of first order logic, and
> >I said that I would read through it with him, as long as he participated
> >actively enough to keep me from falling asleep and to let me be guided by
> >what in particular he wanted to do with it. I started with the words and
> >sentences that were there in the text, and I will return to that as soon
> >as we get some common ground, and I merely introduced a bit of my own
> >interpretive apparatus, in part by way of preparing for the sort of
> >comparative study that I believe Murray has in mind. So naturally
> >there will be some compromise formations of sundry nomenclatures.
> >
> >GR: But perhaps I should revisit the paper Jon linked
> > us to, which he wrote with his wife, Susan.
> >
> >JA:| Jon Awbrey and Susan Awbrey,
> > |"Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry",
> > | http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html
> >
> >GR: When I was having trouble getting through Jon's dissertation
> > in progress, a few years ago, I printed out a copy and read
> > it to advantage.
> >
> >Thanks, Gary. My immediate purpose in citing that paper was
> >to provide some deep background for the following statement:
> >
> >GH: | A particular world is called an interpretation,
> > | so that model theory might be better called
> > | 'interpretation theory'.
> >
> >The question that suggests itself -- sure, let's all blame the question! --
> >is to compare and contrast the "interpretation theory" of Guha and Hayes
> >with the "interpretation theory" of their venerable precursor, Aristotle.
> >
> >In the process of beginning to do that, one immediately observes
> >a host of different interpretations for the word "interpretation".
> >
> >I'd planned at this point to provide some further
> >links to the contemporary study of "hermeneutics":
> >
> >Hermeneutics Resources:
> >
> >1. Shaun Gallagher's "Applied Hermeneutics" web site:
> >
> > http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallaghr/ah.html -- with frames
> > http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallaghr/ahnf.html -- sans frames
> >
> > Additional info:
> >
> > http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallaghr/her.html
> >
> >2. Richard Palmer's "mostly hermeneutics" home page:
> >
> > http://www.mac.edu/faculty/richardpalmer/
> >
> > Especially these two papers:
> >
> > http://www.mac.edu/faculty/richardpalmer/relevance.html
> > http://www.mac.edu/faculty/richardpalmer/liminality.html
> >
> >GR: I am, however, currently reading John Deely's extended essay,
> > "What Distinguishes Human Understanding?", and am immersed in
> > such questions as: Does semiotics "have a footing on both sides
> > of the divide between reveries of thought and the brute secondness
> > of nature in its material and physical being?" (Deely, op. cit, 18)
> > and am presently tending to see a triadic integrity of sign action
> > in our understanding of things.
> >
> >GR: I've just read Jon's response to you, but will have to consider it
> > later. Well, this conversation is semiosis -- sign action -- itself.
> > I keep hoping the collaborative intelligence is evolutionary in the
> > Engelbartian sense. :-)
> >
> >Hope springs eternal ...
> >
> >Jon Awbrey
> >
> >o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> >
> note: some may find this passage a bit too "Christian" for their tastes.
> But
> for me it is as eminently buddhistic (perhaps also sufic, and even vedic)
> as it it christic. Well it ought be if logic is a gift of the universal God
> (to paraphrase John Sowa)
>
> Peirce: CP 2.654
> But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death must happen to some man. At the same time, death makes the number of our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely great. We are thus landed in the same difficulty as before, and I can see but one solution of it. It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Lo!
gic is
> rooted in the social principle.
> Peirce: CP 2.654
> To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of fact, they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful prosecution of one's desires is a different thing from selfishness. The miser is not selfish; his money does him no good, and he cares for what shall become of it after his death. We are constantly speaking of our possessions on the Pacific, and of our destiny as a republic, where no personal interests are involved, in a way which shows that we have wider ones. We discuss with anxiety the possible exhaustion of coal in some hundreds of years, or the cooling-off of the sun in some millions, and show in the most popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive the possibility of a man's descending into hell for the salvation of his fellows.
> Peirce: CP 2.654
> Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it, should perceive that only that man's inferences who has it are really logical, and should consequently regard his own as being only so far valid as they would be accepted by the hero. So far as he thus refers his inferences to that standard, he becomes identified with such a mind.
> Peirce: CP 2.654
> This makes logicality attainable enough. Sometimes we can personally attain to heroism. The soldier who runs to scale a wall knows that he will probably be shot, but that is not all he cares for. He also knows that if all the regiment, with whom in feeling he identifies himself, rush forward at once, the fort will be taken. In other cases we can only imitate the virtue. The man whom we have supposed as having to draw from the two packs, who if he is not a logician will draw from the red pack from mere habit, will see, if he is logician enough, that he cannot be logical so long as he is concerned only with his own fate, but that that man who should care equally for what was to happen in all possible cases of the sort could act logically, and would draw from the pack with the most red cards, and thus, though incapable himself of such sublimity, our logician would imitate the effect of that man's courage in order to share his logicality.
> Peirce:
> But all this requires a conceived identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community. Now, there exist no reasons, and a later discussion will show that there can be no reasons, for thinking that the human race, or any intellectual race, will exist forever. On the other hand, there can be no reason against it; and, fortunately, as the whole requirement is that we should have certain sentiments, there is nothing in the facts to forbid our having a hope, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community may last beyond any assignable date.
> Peirce: CP 2.655
> 655. It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet, when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse, why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasoning? As for the other two sentiments which I find necessary, they are so only as supports and accessories of that. It interests me to notice that these three sentiments seem to be pretty much the same as that famous trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, which, in the estimation of St. Paul, are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts. Ne!
ither Old nor New Testament is a textbook of the logic of science, but the latter is certainly the highest existing authority in regard to the dispositions of heart which a man ought to have.
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