ONT Re: De In Esse Predication
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DEIP. Note 16
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| Introduction to the Logic of Quantity (cont.)
|
| In respect to the ideal world we are virtually omniscient; that is
| to say, there is nothing but lack of time, of perseverance, and of
| activity of mind to prevent our making the requisite experiments
| to ascertain positively whether a given combination occurs or not.
| Thus, every proposition about the ideal world can be ascertained
| to be true or false. A description of thing which occurs in that
| world is 'possible, in the substantive logical sense'.
|
| Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves
| no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility, 'essential',
| or 'formal', logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility;
| for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another may both
| be severally possible, although their combination is not possible.
|
| That is to say each is 'vaguely', not 'distinctly', possible. [note, 1908].
|
| But in the 'substantive' sense, the contradictory of a possible proposition
| is impossible, because we are virtually omniscient in regard to the ideal
| world. For example, there is no contradiction in supposing that only
| four, or any other number, of independent atoms exist. But it is
| made clear to us by ideal experimentation, that five atoms are
| to be found in the ideal world. Whether all five are to be
| found in the sensible world or not, to say there are only
| four in the ideal world is a proposition absolutely to be
| rejected, notwithstanding its involving no contradiction.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.527,
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'Monist', vol. 7,
| pp. 161-217, 1897.
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