RE: ONT Re: De In Esse Predication
Jon:
Is Peirce saying here that there is necessity de dicto, but not de re? Is he
saying that there are no Aristotelian essences? Is he distinguishing various
kinds of necessity? For example, one might argue that physical causality is
necessity de re, and is not influenced by how much information we have about
physical processes.
Tom
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
[mailto:owner-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 3:53 PM
To: Ontology; SemioCom; Inquiry
Subject: ONT Re: De In Esse Predication
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DEIP. Note 12
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| It must be remembered that
| possibility and necessity
| are relative to the state
| of information.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 4.517,
|"The Gamma Part of Existential Graphs",
|"Lowell Lectures of 1903", Lecture 4.
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