ONT Re: Verities Of Likely Stories
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VOLS. Note 14
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| Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal;
| for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because
| Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though
| the particular statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot
| be reduced to syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign
| that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child
| because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is
| a 'tekmerion'; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument
| irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the particular,
| for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever,
| because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also
| can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to breathe hard without having
| a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary
| sign, and the difference between them; in the 'Analytics' we have defined
| them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted into logical
| syllogisms, while others cannot.
|
| Aristotle, "Art of Rhetoric", 1.2.18
|
| Aristotle, "The 'Art' of Rhetoric",
| John Henry Freese (trans.), in:
|'Aristotle, Volume 22', G.P. Goold (ed.),
| William Heinemann, London, UK, 1926, 1982.
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