ONT Just In Time Logic
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
JITL. Note 1
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| [On Time and Thought, MS 215, 08 Mar 1873]
|
| Every mind which passes from doubt to belief must have ideas which follow
| after one another in time. Every mind which reasons must have ideas which
| not only follow after others but are caused by them. Every mind which is
| capable of logical criticism of its inferences, must be aware of this
| determination of its ideas by previous ideas. But is it pre-supposed
| in the conception of a logical mind, that the temporal succession in
| its ideas is continuous, and not by discrete steps? A continuum such
| as we suppose time and space to be, is defined as something any part
| of which itself has parts of the same kind. So that the point of time
| or the point of space is nothing but the ideal limit towards which we
| approach, but which we can never reach in dividing time or space; and
| consequently nothing is true of a point which is not true of a space or
| a time. A discrete quantum, on the other hand, has ultimate parts which
| differ from any other part of the quantum in their absolute separation from
| one another. If the succession of images in the mind is by discrete steps,
| time for that mind will be made up of indivisible instants. Any one idea
| will be absolutely distinguished from every other idea by its being present
| only in the passing moment. And the same idea can not exist in two different
| moments, however similar the ideas felt in the two different moments may, for
| the sake of argument, be allowed to be. Now an idea exists only so far as the
| mind thinks it; and only when it is present to the mind. An idea therefore
| has no characters or qualities but what the mind thinks of it at the time
| when it is present to the mind. It follows from this that if the succession
| of time were by separate steps, no idea could resemble another; for these
| ideas if they are distinct, are present to the mind at different times.
| Therefore at no time when one is present to the mind, is the other present.
| Consequently the mind never compares them nor thinks them to be alike; and
| consequently they are not alike; since they are only what they are thought
| to be at the time when they are present. It may be objected that though the
| mind does not directly think them to be alike; yet it may think together
| reproductions of them, and thus think them to be alike. This would be a
| valid objection were it not necessary, in the first place, in order that
| one idea should be the representative of another, that it should resemble
| that idea, which it could only do by means of some representation of it
| again, and so on to infinity; the link which is to bind the first two
| together which are to be pronounced alike, never being found. In short
| the resemblance of ideas implies that some two ideas are to be thought
| together which are present to the mind at different times. And this
| never can be, if instants are separated from one another by absolute
| steps. This conception is therefore to be abandoned, and it must be
| acknowledged to be already presupposed in the conception of a logical
| mind that the flow of time should be continuous. Let us consider then
| how we are to conceive what is present to the mind. We are accustomed
| to say that nothing is present but a fleeting instant, a point of time.
| But this is a wrong view of the matter because a point differs in no
| respect from a space of time, except that it is the ideal limit which,
| in the division of time, we never reach. It can not therefore be that
| it differs from an interval of time in this respect that what is present
| is only in a fleeting instant, and does not occupy a whole interval of
| time, unless what is present be an ideal something which can never be
| reached, and not something real. The true conception is, that ideas
| which succeed one another during an interval of time, become present
| to the mind through the successive presence of the ideas which occupy
| the parts of that time. So that the ideas which are present in each
| of these parts are more immediately present, or rather less mediately
| present than those of the whole time. And this division may be carried
| to any extent. But you never reach an idea which is quite immediately
| present to the mind, and is not made present by the ideas which occupy
| the parts of the time that it occupies. Accordingly, it takes time
| for ideas to be present to the mind. They are present during a time.
| And they are present by means of the presence of the ideas which are
| in the parts of that time. Nothing is therefore present to the mind
| in an instant, but only during a time. The events of a day are less
| mediately present to the mind than the events of a year; the events
| of a second less mediately present than the events of a day.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CE 3, pp. 68-70.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, MS 215, 1873, ["On Time and Thought"], pages 68-71 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3, 1872-1878',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1986.
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o