ONT Re: Russell -- Philosophy Of Logical Atomism
POLA. Note 16
| 4. Propositions and Facts with More than One Verb: Beliefs, Etc. (cont.)
| Now I want to point out today that the facts that occur when one
| believes or wishes or wills have a different logical form from
| the atomic facts containing a single verb which I dealt with
| in my second lecture. (There are, of course, a good many
| forms that facts that may have, a strictly infinite number,
| and I do not wish you to suppose that I pretend to deal
| with all of them.)
| Suppose you take any actual occurrence of a belief. I want you to
| understand that I am not talking about beliefs in the sort of way
| in which judgment is spoken of in theory of knowledge, in which
| you would say there is 'the' judgment that two and two are four.
| I am talking of the actual occurrence of a belief in a particular
| person's mind at a particular moment, and discussing what sort of
| fact that is.
| If I say "What day of the week is this?" and you say "Tuesday",
| there occurs in your mind at that moment the belief that this is
| Tuesday. The thing I want to deal with today is the question:
| What is the form of the fact which occurs when a person has a belief?
| Russell, POLA, pp. 80-81.
| Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 35-155
| in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', edited with an introduction
| by David Pears, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985. First published 1918.