RE: ONT Re: Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
Dear Jon,
A question of clarification below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@oakland.edu]
> Sent: 07 March 2003 19:36
> To: Inquiry; Ontology
> Subject: ONT Re: Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems
>
>
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> INT. Note 11
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>
> 1.5. Inquiry Driven Systems (concl.)
>
> An inquiry driven system, in the simplest cases worth talking about,
> requires at least three different modalities of knowledge component,
> referred to as "expectations", "intentions", and "observations" of
> the system. Each of these components has the status of a theory,
> that is, a propositional code that the agent of the system carries
> along and maintains with itself through all of its changes of state,
> possibly updating it as the need arises in experience. However, all
> of these theories have reference to a common world, and they indicate
> under their varying lights more or less overlapping regions in the
> state space of the system, or in some derivative or extension of
> the basic state space.
MW: "reference to a common world" is the question. We would probably
all agree that there is one "common world" that we all experience, but
there is good evidence that we don't all experience it the same way,
e.g. 3D 4D that even discriminate different objects.
Now in a system, you only have a reference to the real world, so my
point of clarification is when you say "common world" do you mean
"common reference"? Either way it would be useful to say something
about the link between perception and reality here.
>
> The inquiry process is driven by the nature, the degree, and
> the extent
> of the differences that exist at any time among its operative
> theories,
> for example, the differences among the expectations, the
> intentions, and
> the observations of the inquiry agent or the relevant
> community of inquiry.
> These discrepancies are evidenced by differences in the
> assemblies of models,
> empirical or theoretical, that are held to satisfy the
> respective theories.
> Normally, human beings experience a high level of disparity
> among these
> theories as a dissatisfying situation, a condition of
> cognitive discord.
> For people, the incongruity of cognitive elements is accompanied by an
> unsettled affective state, in Peirce's phrase, the
> "irritation of doubt".
> A person in this situation is usually motivated to reduce the annoying
> disturbance by some action, all of which activities we may classify
> under the heading of inquiry processes.
>
> Without insisting on strict determinism, we may say that the
> inquiry process is
> lawful if there is any kind of informative relationship
> connecting the state of
> cognitive discord at each time with the ensuing state
> transitions of the system.
> Expressed in human terms, a difference between expectations
> and observations is
> experienced as a surprise to be explained, a difference
> between intentions and
> observations is experienced as a problem to be solved. We
> begin to understand
> a particular example of inquiry when we can describe the
> relation between the
> momentary intellectual state of its agent and the subsequent
> action that the
> agent undertakes.
>
> These simple facts, the features of inquiry outlined above,
> already raise
> a number of issues, some of which are open problems that my
> research will
> have to address. Given the goal of constructing supports for
> inquiry on
> the grounds of systems theory, each of these difficulties is
> an obstacle
> to progress in the chosen direction, to understanding the capacity for
> inquiry as a systems property.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
>