ONT Re: Doctrine of Individuals
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| Individual (1, cont.)
|
| This definition does not prevent two distinct individuals from being
| precisely similar, since they may be distinguished by their hecceities
| (or determinations not of a generalizable nature); so that Leibniz's
| principle of indiscernibles is not involved in this definition.
|
| Although the principles of contradiction and excluded middle may be regarded
| as together constituting the definition of the relation expressed by "not",
| yet they also imply that whatever exists consists of individuals. This,
| however, does not seem to be an identical proposition or necessity of
| thought; for Kant's Law of Specification ('Krit. d. reinen Vernunft',
| 1st ed., 656, 2nd ed., 684; but it is requisite to read the whole
| section to understand his meaning), which has been widely accepted,
| treats logical quantity as a continuum in Kant's sense, i.e., that
| every part of which is composed of parts. Though this law is only
| regulative, it is supposed to be demanded by reason, and its wide
| acceptance as so demanded is a strong argument in favour of the
| conceivability of a world without individuals in the sense of
| the definition now considered.
|
| Besides, since it is not in the nature of concepts adequately
| to define individuals, it would seem that a world from which
| they were eliminated would only be the more intelligible.
|
| A new discussion of the matter, on a level with
| modern mathematical thought and with exact logic,
| is a desideratum. A highly important contribution
| is contained in Schroeder's 'Logik', iii, Vorles. 10.
| What Scotus says ('Quaest. in Met.', VII 9, xiii & xv)
| is worth consideration.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.612
|
|'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology',
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), Macmillan, New York, NY,
| Volume 1, pp. 537-538, 2nd edition 1911.
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