ONT Re: Inquiry Driven Systems
- To: Ontology <ontology@ieee.org>
- Subject: ONT Re: Inquiry Driven Systems
- From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
- Date: Sun, 28 Jul 2002 23:42:42 -0400
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Note 8
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Here is an excerpt from a paper that I wrote a few years ago
on some relationships that exist between inquiry and analogy
in Peirce's way of analyzing their component phases over the
three types of inference. Specifically, in a first approach,
he treats reasoning by analogy, just as Aristotle before him,
as a combination of deduction and induction, while the first
two stages of the inquiry process are tantamount to the dual
of this link-up, bringing into train abduction and deduction.
In this excerpt I consider the "Example of the Three Wisdoms"
from CSP's Harvard Lectures "On the Logic of Science" (1865).
Inquiry & Analogy
| Author: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
| Version: Draft 3.24
| Created: 01 Jan 1995
| Revised: 28 Jul 2002
| Faculty: F. Mili, M.A. Zohdy
| Setting: Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
| Excerpt: Subdivision 1.2 (Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce)
1.2 Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce
Here we present one of Peirce's earliest treatments of
the three types of reasoning, from his Harvard Lectures
of 1865 "On the Logic of Science". It illustrates how
one and the same proposition might be reached from three
different directions, as the end result of an inference
in each of the three modes.
| We have then three different kinds of inference:
|
| Deduction or inference 'à priori',
|
| Induction or inference 'à particularis',
|
| Hypothesis or inference 'à posteriori'.
|
| CSP, CE 1, page 267.
| If I reason that certain conduct is wise
| because it has a character which belongs
| 'only' to wise things, I reason 'à priori'.
|
| If I think it is wise because it once turned out
| to be wise, that is, if I infer that it is wise on
| this occasion because it was wise on that occasion,
| I reason inductively ['à particularis'].
|
| But if I think it is wise because a wise man does it,
| I then make the pure hypothesis that he does it
| because he is wise, and I reason 'à posteriori'.
|
| CSP, CE 1, page 180.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science' (1865)",
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
Suppose we make the following assignments:
A = "Wisdom",
B = "a certain character",
C = "a certain conduct",
D = "done by a wise man",
E = "a certain occasion".
Recognizing that a little more concreteness will aid the understanding,
let us make the following substitutions in Peirce's example:
B = "Benevolence", a certain character,
C = "Contributes to Charity", a certain conduct,
E = "Earlier today", a certain occasion.
The converging operation of all three reasonings is shown in Figure 1.
o---------------------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| D ("done by a wise man") |
| o |
| \* |
| \ * |
| \ * |
| \ * |
| \ * |
| \ * |
| \ * A ("a wise act") |
| \ o |
| \ /| * |
| \ / | * |
| \ / | * |
| . | o B ("benevolence", a certain character) |
| / \ | * |
| / \ | * |
| / \| * |
| / o |
| / * C ("contributes to charity", a certain conduct) |
| / * |
| / * |
| / * |
| / * |
| / * |
| /* |
| o |
| E ("earlier today", a certain occasion) |
| |
o---------------------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1. A Thrice Wise Act
The common proposition that concludes each argument
is AC, to wit, "contributing to charity is wise".
Deduction could have obtained the Fact AC from
the Rule AB, "benevolence is wisdom", along with
the Case BC, "contributing to charity is benevolent".
Induction could have gathered the Rule AC, after a manner of
saying that "contributing to charity is exemplary of wisdom",
from the Fact AE, "the act of earlier today is wise", along
with the Case CE, "the act of earlier today was an instance
of contributing to charity".
Abduction could have guessed the Case AC, in a style of expression
stating that "contributing to charity is explained by wisdom", from
the Fact DC, "contributing to charity is done by this wise man", and
the Rule DA, "everything that is wise is done by this wise man". Thus,
a wise man, who happens to do all of the wise things that there are to
do, may nevertheless contribute to charity for no good reason, and even
be known to be charitable to a fault. But all of this notwithstanding,
on seeing the wise man contribute to charity we may find it natural to
conjecture, in effect, to consider it as a possibility worth examining
further, that charity is indeed a mark of his wisdom, and not just the
accidental trait or the immaterial peculiarity of his character -- in
essence, that wisdom is the "reason" that he contributes to charity.
Jon Awbrey
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