RE: ONT RE: Ontology case study
ChrisM - my comments below marked CP> - ChrisM
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
[mailto:owner-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of Chris Menzel
Sent: 30 May 2002 00:31
To: Chris Partridge
Cc: ontology@ieee.org
Subject: Re: ONT RE: Ontology case study
On Wed, May 29, 2002 at 10:03:30PM +0200, Chris Partridge wrote:
> I also note, in passing, that FOL as it stands cannot do what Aristotle
> called ?practical reasoning? ? no amount of logical/inferential processing
> will result in an action. This is not a problem in database systems.
Well, if you take the "conclusion" of a practical syllogism to be an
action, as Aristotle and others have sometimes suggested, then *no*
logic can "do" practical reasoning, as actions are not the components of
arguments, and it is with arguments that logic has to do.
CP>Agreed. It is certainly true that computer systems (not just databases)
result in actions - so the conclusion must be, I suppose, that they have
something more than logic.
If, however,
you simply take a practical syllogism to end in a conclusion that
*specifies* an action, or a judgment or decision about a course of
action, then of course FOL can "do" practical reasoning, e.g.,
John wishes to slake his thirst.
John believes that by taking a drink he'll slake his thirst.
Therefore, John takes (or decides to take, or ought to take) a drink.
CP>This seems to me not good enough. One needs to distinguish between what I
(i.e. the system) must do and what other things must do - and also that I
actually do it. Though I suppose a feature of computer systems (ignoring
bugs etc.) is that they do what they ought to do. I am not arguing that this
cannot be done somehow in a logical system, but that it is a kind of
workaround. And that in a typical commercial system this is not - action is
natural.
> This leads onto another problem with what this discussion has labelled
> "ontologies." The strong roots in predicate logic particularly FOL. As
> is well known (see e.g. p. 48 of Lowe?s latest book) predicate logic
> was developed for mathematic applications and so is not well crafted
> for more mundane uses.
That really doesn't seem to follow on the face of it. Surely it depends
upon the "mundane" uses you have in mind; what do you have in mind? And
I'm sure Lowe provides some arguments; can you summarize any of them?
CP> Lowe's arguments involve distinguishing between the possession of
properties in time in the those where time is not a concern. Eternal
(mathematical) truths such as 2 + 3 = 5 do not seem to involve time. We do
not say two plus three is five now - or two plus three was five last week.
This is not true for the state of ones overdraft - which we can at least
hope will at some time be zero. Anyway to quote "But modern logic was
designed with the language of mathematics largely in mind, so it would not
be surprising if the conception of predication, or property ascription,
which it encourages is a fundamentally tenseless one. Philosophers trained
in modern logic may feel there is something either obscure or else
superficial in the notion of irreducibly tensed predication. They may tend,
even if not deliberately, to model the possession of properties by
time-bound objects on the possession of properties by abstract, timeless
objects."
CP> Note that databases were designed specifically for time-bound objects
and actions - however ill conceived the design was.
CP> For example, as far as I can see (probably not very far) SUMO does not
have a straightforward distinction between properties that are time-bound
and properties that are not.
> For example, if you believe in a distinction between exemplification
> and attribution,
What might that distinction be?
CP> See above.
> this is not well marked, and, at the very least, the temporality of
> predication needs some explaining.
"temporality of predication"? Definition please.
CP>The attribute of time-bound properties to objects.
-chris