Re: ONT RE: Ontology case study
On Wed, May 29, 2002 at 10:03:30PM +0200, Chris Partridge wrote:
> I also note, in passing, that FOL as it stands cannot do what Aristotle
> called ?practical reasoning? ? no amount of logical/inferential processing
> will result in an action. This is not a problem in database systems.
Well, if you take the "conclusion" of a practical syllogism to be an
action, as Aristotle and others have sometimes suggested, then *no*
logic can "do" practical reasoning, as actions are not the components of
arguments, and it is with arguments that logic has to do. If, however,
you simply take a practical syllogism to end in a conclusion that
*specifies* an action, or a judgment or decision about a course of
action, then of course FOL can "do" practical reasoning, e.g.,
John wishes to slake his thirst.
John believes that by taking a drink he'll slake his thirst.
Therefore, John takes (or decides to take, or ought to take) a drink.
> This leads onto another problem with what this discussion has labelled
> "ontologies." The strong roots in predicate logic particularly FOL. As
> is well known (see e.g. p. 48 of Lowe?s latest book) predicate logic
> was developed for mathematic applications and so is not well crafted
> for more mundane uses.
That really doesn't seem to follow on the face of it. Surely it depends
upon the "mundane" uses you have in mind; what do you have in mind? And
I'm sure Lowe provides some arguments; can you summarize any of them?
> For example, if you believe in a distinction between exemplification
> and attribution,
What might that distinction be?
> this is not well marked, and, at the very least, the temporality of
> predication needs some explaining.
"temporality of predication"? Definition please.
-chris