ONT Re: Inquiry Driven Systems
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
JA = Jon Awbrey
SR = Seth Russell
JA: to turn the impressed image into an imaginary action on my own behalf,
and thenceforward, if i can find the means whereby, into a schedule
for its implementation.
SR: Interesting ... this smacks of something that I have been working on.
A signing frequently has no embedded intention.
that's not how it would be in pragmatic semiotics.
let's say you look up "pragma" in a greek lexicon:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/resolveform
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/resolveform?lookup=pragma
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3D%2327224
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3D%2386113
this will give you a sense of how all objects (pragmata) are at root intentional objects,
that is, are inextricably, except in absent-minded pretense, linked up with our aims,
annoyances, biases, businesses, circumstances, concerns, desires, ends, fortunes,
functions, goals, hindrances, intentions, interests, objectives, obstacles,
purposes, troubles, and so on.
SR: For example: if chief Seattle points to the distant mountain in
his domain and says "Rainier" then a signing may have taken place.
Yet there is no embedded intention in this signing except of course
to establish the sign relation itself.
if there is such a thing as an object in the world that is not related
and cannot be related, however remotely, to some conceivable objective
of ours, then most likely we will be unaware of it, and will remain so.
SR: But there are signings which have embedded intention.
For example if I advertise in the local newspaper the
fact that I have a Ford-Station-Wagon for sale. In such
cases we intend that the sign itself interact somehow in
its environment to produce some desired objective. There
are many examples of intentional signs in biology: for
example hunger, fear, etc ... these signings having taken
place during the evolutionary process.
i think that if you examine any act of communication or even observation --
observation serves to create a sign, a datum of the senses, in ourselves --
you will find that it does not occur without due cause, motive, purpose,
indeed, without its sufficient reason.
SR: Progress so far:
SR: 1) There must be some mechanism (algorithm) existing in
the environment for intentional signs to function.
SR: 2) We should be able to identify some corresponding properties
of the signs of the intended objective. In the example of
the Ford-Station-Wagon the corresponding properties are
a "wanted to sell" and a "wanted to buy" which are
properties of any car which would catalyze the
intended transaction.
SR: The question is: What is the most general algorithm
to implement intentional signs in some environment?
well, i still take "intentional sign" to be a near tautology.
the objects of a sign relation are always intentional objects,
so signs and interpretants are always related to this intention.
and i already view a program as a sign with things to do, that is,
a sign that denotes, more or less well, a computable function as its
intended object. so i will think about what remains of the question.
SR: a very rough working mentograph:
http://robustai.net/mentography/semicule_algorithm.gif
SR: this is a continuation on the idea of "StickyCyberMolecules"
http://robustai.net/MyNetwork/StickeyCyberMolecules.html
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤