ONT Re: Apposite Purposes Of Logical Languages Objectified (APOLLO)
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It seems that our inquiry into logic cannot begin but through the office
of our power to reflect on certain forms, to wit, the forms that exhibit
the variety of their wares in a patent forum of experience, to wit again,
our experience of a specific form of conduct, the conduct of our thought.
Does that brand our entire inquiry as a species of psychology? Does the
bare contingency of using a brain to think about something mean that one
is doing neuroscience or cognitive psychology, or turning one's brain to
think about either subject? No, the mere fact that we are reflecting on
on a subject does not mean that we are involved in psychological inquiry,
nor does it mean that the descriptive discipline of psychology itself is
the subject of our reflections. The primitive circumstance that we have
an ability to reflect on the forms, the abstract shapes, and the generic
flows of our thinking process, in so far as it can be mediated by signs,
is the critical factor. This means that we can take our own experience
of thinking as exemplary but not definitive of logical process, where
exemplary may include both good and bad examples.
Jon Awbrey
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