ONT Re: Apposite Purposes Of Logical Languages Objectified (APOLLO)
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The reader is thinking, "Hey, wait a minute!"
The writer is writing, "I heard that!"
I know that my reader is too polite to bring it up,
but is nonetheless supecting that I am trying to pull
a bit of a fast one here. I started out talking, more
or less sensibly, about using logic to describe a world,
and now I am trying to tell you that the object of this
propositional portion of logic is an abstract family of
abstract objects, called "lattices" or "partial orders".
What's up with that?
Well, I am glad that you were watching carefully as I tried
to pull this trick, because what you have just seen is very
typical of how mathematics achieves its particular style of
magic, via the strategic placing of hypostatic distractions
between the rigamarole of its formal spiel and the real aim
of its mystical manipulations. In the trade, the trick can
be seen to be explained by means of a diagram like this one:
| Abstractive
| Hypostation
| o
| ^ \
| / \
| / \
| / \
| / \
| / v
| Object World o------------>o Formal Signs
It begins as soon as we learn to count,
at least, with any bit of abstractness
in our fashion of formal comprehension,
when we defer to abstract hypostations
like "numbers" to supply the preferred
reference for signs counted "numerals",
all aside from the worlds of concreter
things that we were wont once to count.
Speaking of counting, it's time for that second cup ...
Jon Awbrey
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