ONT Re: Apposite Purposes Of Logical Languages Objectified (APOLLO)
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
A question that I often ask is,
"What is the pragma of logic?",
using the word "pragma" in the
triadic sense of aims and ends
and, by the way, the obstacles
that we bump into on the orbit
that we plot from aims to ends.
It's the sort of question that is difficult to ask,
much less to answer, outside of a suitable context,
that can lend it the semblance of a sensible sense.
If you identify logic with reason itself, then you
may have trouble seeing how you can get an outside
perspective, without abandoning rationality itself.
But things are not as bad as all that.
From the pragmatic point of view, logic is a branch of the theory of signs,
that which attends to the formal, the normative, or what is the same thing,
the "quasi-necessary" properties of signs, and so we can securely stand on
the ground of a preliminary study of signs in general, "general semiotics",
in order to acquire a perspective on their more specialized normative uses.
Among other things, this involves critical reflections on the relationship
of logical languages and logical procedures to the assumed object of logic.
Assumed object of logic?
To be continued ...
Jon Awbrey
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~ARCHIVE~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
| Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another
| name for 'semiotic' [Greek: 'semeiotike'], the quasi-necessary, or formal,
| doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary", or
| formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know,
| and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to
| naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and
| therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what 'must be' the
| characters of all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say,
| by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that process of
| abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation. The faculty which I call
| abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize,
| but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room.
| It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something
| quite beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the question,
| "Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?"
| To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term
| an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram,
| or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state
| of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is,
| 'observes' what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to
| be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical
| reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what 'would be' true of signs in all
| cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. (CP 2.227).
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.227,
| Editors' Note: From An Unidentified Fragment, c. 1897.
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~EVIHCRA~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤