ONT Re: the tao is coi
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
JA = Jon Awbrey
JC = John Collier
KK = Kirsty Kitto
JA: Once again, from a pragmatic perspective, Peircean style, logics are not
autonomous systems, sui generis, laws unto themselves, but normative and
speculative branches on the tree of semiotics, and thus, by Biblical and
Shakespearean principles of "measure for measure", subject to evaluation
in accord with the objective that logic in general is conceived to serve.
It is from this setting that one can judge a nonsense, or else be judged
by evolution for failing to do so, and from this POV that one always had
the axis, the fulcrum, the lever, and the moment of force that is needed
to pivot through sundry degrees of freedom in one's selection of logical
and semiotic systems.
JC: I am sympathetic to this view, inasmuch as I understand it.
We are certainly getting more clear about where we differ,
which is progress. I still regard logic as transcendent,
and would be very reluctant to give this up.
JA: I do not use the word "transcendent" in this context very much,
but that is mostly because of conflicting claims from too many
different directions. But I think that a proper understanding
of "formal", in the sense of "quasi-necessary", and a grokking
of the ways that norms are defined in terms of limit processes,
might just cover most of what is desirable in that inclination.
JC: It may be an article of faith for me, but it is a very small amount of faith
in terms of the propositions one must accept. The view you describe as Peirce's
I would agree provides the meaning (in the sense of 'sense' or grasp) of logic,
but not, I think its object (reference or being).
JA: It is the purpose of a sign relational framework to provide room for both reference and sense.
Whether that room gets filled is another sort of question. I gave you an example of a logical
proposition that has empirical content, as any proposition that is successfully interpreted to
describe an object reality does. How does this propositional expression acquire that virtue?
Much in the way that any sign does, because a "community of interpretation" (COI) uses it
as a part of its "try at objectivity" (TAO) to describe a pragma of concern or interest
to them. That, plus all of the "standard operating procedures" (SOP's) that it takes
to assay construct validity and to test intercoder reliability. Standard stuff.
While a certain sort worries about "grounding symbols" the world goes on using
these symbols to get a grip on reality in just the way that it evolved to do.
JC: In particular, I am not convinced that sense exhausts meaning,
which is my residual and pretty minimal rationalism speaking.
I think that there are important things that one cannot
represent fully. But I have already said this.
JA: I cannot even imagine, after all this time, why you might think
that a pragmatician would ever say that "sense exhausts meaning" --
or why you think that there is a choice between empiricism and
rationalism that is somehow implied by the pragmatic maxim.
JC: Well, I don't think that. But I also don't agree with the notion
that truth is an idealized limit. I think we can experience aspects
of truth directly. Also with other values. Nonetheless, I believe we
can also be very, very wrong in any situation that involves judgement.
Even in the ideal limit.
We seem to be using the root words "limit" and "norm"
at variance from each other -- surprise, surprise.
When I say that "X is a normative science of the form of conduct Y whose object is Z",
I mean that "X is a study of ways to do Y, with an eye to ways that one may attain Z".
A normative science that arrogates itself to any degree of success will embody claims
to have knowledge (Latin "scientia") as to how one who aims for Z ought to conduct Y.
These knowledge claims are often expressed in pieces of advice called "heuristics",
"maxims", "norms of conduct", "precepts", and so on. I recognize that there are
those who would consider this to be a "cheap utilitarian" form of a norm, but
it's my story and I'm sticking to it.
A normative science may have one or more descriptive sciences as components
that contribute to it, but its aim, "what it's for", is quite distinct.
For example, Hertz gave us a description of "How I Think",
that may be more or less true as an account of its object,
but suppose someone points to this description of conduct and
recommends it as a universal ideal, a categorical imperative,
or as a much more modest model for our emulation, as Howard
has done, or as Kirsty did recently in these fine words:
KK: | To me Hertz's statement embodies the way a good
| physicist should think about their enterprise.
Then we have the normative use of a descriptive account.
It is usually implicit in the recommendation of a norm
like this that the recommender is assuming a particular
ordering among the various forms of conduct that fall
under review, to wit:
Ideal >>> Recommender >>> Recommendees.
That is to say, why recommend unless you think that
your addressees are further from the ideal in the
measure of their conduct than you yourself are?
These are the orders of considerations that go into my speaking
"of the ways that norms are defined in terms of limit processes".
Jon Awbrey
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤