ONT Re: Inquiry Into Inquiry
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Howard Pattee wrote (HP):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):
John Collier wrote (JC):
HP: It really makes no difference to physicists if philosophers like
Peirce, Wittgenstein, Barwise and Perry, or anyone else, supports
or rejects their normative strategy of separating syntax and semantics,
that is, separating the formal mathematical expression of laws and the
interpretation of laws (including measurement of initial conditions).
Nobody believes that perfect objectivity and totally meaningless and
precise formalization are attainable, anyway, so that is not an issue.
But that does not make these ideals a bad normative strategy. Just
because absolute beauty, truth, and justice don't exist does not make
striving for them a bad normative strategy.
JC: Much as I agree with the gist of what you wrote in what followed,
I think it does matter for two reasons. The first is simply that
I think it is important to understand what scientists are actually
doing, not just what they think they are doing, or what they are
trying to do.
HP: I retract my apparent dismissal of philosophers.
Of course, it is their job to aggressively question
all assumptions and principles. What I should have
said is that the separation of the (formal, syntactical,
computational) mathematical expression of universal laws
from the observer's conditional local measurements is
at present the only way physicists know to approach
the ideal of objectivity. Alternatives should be
considered, but there are none I know of at the
moment. Do you know of any others?
JA: Where I left off here was asking Howard what he meant by "strict separation"
of syntax and semantics, and I have yet to get an answer to this.
HP: "Separation" is not the right word. Perhaps "clear distinction" is better.
Jon's example of the x and y axes is appropriate. One does not really separate them, but
a clear distinction is essential. I often think of complementarity of descriptions meaning
that both descriptions are essential, but neither can be derived from nor reduced to the other.
So it is with laws and initial/boundary/constraint conditions, symbol vehicle (syntax) and
symbol meaning (semantics), the observed and the observer, continuous and discrete,
wave and particle, motions and objects, deterministic and stochastic,
reversible and irreversible, and so on.
Okay, then, with that understanding I think that I can finally afford the risk
of saying that Peirce draws clear distinctions among the syntactic axis <S>,
the semantic plane <O, S>, the semiotic plane <S, I>, and the solid body of
the sign relation L c OxSxI. This is a local, nominal, provisional risk.
Whether we can afford to maintain it in the global, real, and long-run
situation is a thing that all depends on the meaning that we are bound
to find ourselves forced to attach to this all too fond word, "depend".
Jon Awbrey
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤