ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
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Mishtu Banerjee wrote (MB):
MB: Deduction and Induction can be formalized and mechanized or automated.
Thus we can construct theorem provers, and we can construct pattern
recognizer algorithms. As mechanical procedures, neither involves
creativity (though the construction of the actual algorithms may
indeed require much creativity)
MB: But can we construct formal or mechanical procedures for abduction?
The abduction step seems to be the formation of an image, after
which induction and deduction can follow. Darwin had a great line,
"every observation is for or against some theory".
MB: How do we, indeed can we, provide a description of
this image formation stage, the initial creative act?
MB: It seems that any discussion of inquiry must begin here, with abduction.
Without an image, there is no "motive" to inquire further, and our inquiries
are a succession (sometimes cycling and repeating through time) of how to view
the world, and an exploration of the logical and material consequents of the image.
Let's try to be pragmatic and sensible about this. When we say "automation" and "formalization",
what we mean, pragmatically and sensibly, is "partial automation" and "partial formalization".
What we are really talking about here, if we are talking very much sense at all, is a form
of "facilitation and support tool" (FAST) for inquiry, a catalytic medium, if you will.
Jon Awbrey
MB: Now, what is the nature of an image? Is it qualia (a hunch, a feeling)?
Is it indexical (an ordering or correspondance)? Is it mediating
(a transformation operator bringing one thing into another)?
MB: An image (the object) being the consequent of imagine (a verb transitive).
Which probably just answered my question above -- to imagine is to mediate
or thirdness, a transforming act. The image resulting is the iconic.
This all is psychological. So, why would Peirce so severly disagree
with James and state that signs are not Psychological. Because he
positied that one must go further than the image, and examine its
consequents in the world. Not all images are equal to the scientist.
We seek those that have external referrents and correspondences.
What is the image, that has consequents in nature? A picture of
a state of affairs, to misquote Wittgenstein. In this case,
signs are "out there" not merely "in here". The image is
an apprehension of a state of affairs, but for it to be so,
the state of affairs must precede the act of imagination
that percieved it. The sign was out there all along.
MB: I believe this is also what John is getting at,
when he states that information objectively exists,
independant of us.
MB: Do material bodies in motion make distinctions?
Based on distinctions, can combinatorial arrangments be made?
If so, they create logics. If distinctions depend on scales
(interaction strengths), it is possible for multiple logics
to co-exist. Logic is the algebra of distinctions.
But, it presumes a ground, that ground is the
process of something becoming distinct.
MB: This is what Stan is going on about, when he talks about Development and Vagueness.
MB: The distnguishable units of a material system can act as a symbol set.
The possible combinatorial arrangements, as a grammer. The physical
constraints and boundary conditions define the basic set, and their
combinatorial arrangements. A with T, C with G. However, once the
basic lego grammer is realized, aggregates of great complexity can
be created, which can be placed into correspondance with other
physical symbol sets (and their aggregates). A section of DNA
coding for A protein. The relationship between the two symbol
aggregates is no longer dependant on just the physical and
boundary conditions.
MB: This is what both Howard and Rosen seem to be getting at when they decouple the
physical and functional descriptions of a system. The functional description is
the form of the relationships. It can be invariant, even if the actual material
engaged in the relationships changes. The form is preserved. And that is what
gives us identify.
MB: Finally, functional relationships assume cohesion.
Without cohesion, the form of relationships can not
be used to transfer meaning.
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