ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
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Howard Pattee wrote (HP):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):
JA: The point is that we answer the question about "how a particular symbol refers to an object"
just like we answer the question about "how a pointer-reading refers to an objective event" ...
HP: There are many species of signs and symbols, as Peirce has explained.
I assume by "pointer-reading" you mean the results of a measurement.
I mean looking at a meter and observing the position of the pointer.
This used to be bit of the vernacular that my old physics books used
to describe the phenomenology of instrument reading. I am guessing
that they were trying to make the point that reading a meter was
a certain type of experience of an observer, and that the step
to calling it a "measurement" was actually an interpretation
of that experience in reference to a hypothetical object.
They used to describe the application of tensor calculus
as "correlations among collections of pointer-readings",
and so on.
HP: This is a relatively simple species of symbol.
The images and symbols of physical theory are
not of this simple species.
I'm sorry. When I was talking about theories and such
you expressed a heightened concerned over "data entry".
I guess that all the important stuff, the stuff that
only physicists from their Gev's can truly understand,
will always be at the opposite end of the spectrum from
whatever I happen to be taliking about at the moment.
JA: ... not by trying to get between the sign and the pragma
to discover what brand of cement, glue, magma, sediment,
static or hypostatic electricity, or other sort of sticky
stuff sticks the label not so fast to its object, but by
steeping out the invariants of transformations that arise
from the mass of data, suspend the bridge between the
"piles of numbers" (PON's) and the reality on the
farther shore, and rule the roost over the
"readings of [instruments]" (ROI's).
HP: Such a massive mixed metaphor is difficult to unpack without
leaving wrinkles, especially when "pragma" is an enigma.
pragma = object, objective, interest, concern, purpose.
HP: Many sciences do depend on collecting masses of data
and then searching for relations to compress them, but
physics is exceptional in that an image is often created
(abducted) before crucial measurements are even designed.
["There is no inductive method that could lead to the
fundamental concepts of physics." (Einstein, 1936).
"I think only daring speculation can lead us further
and not accumulation of facts." (Einstein, 1972)].
Here are some greatly oversimplified historical
examples of how Hertz's images and consequents
describe physicist's inquiry.
I said nothing about when the data is collected, before or after
the abductive hypothesis is made. But thanks for transforming me
into a naive empiricist before my very eyes. That's a new one on me!
I was answering the question that you asked about "how a particular symbol
refers to an object". I assumed that you meant how it 'truly' refers to
an object, how its pretense of reference to an object gets established.
If all you meant was these fantasy images -- then what? -- until they
lead to communicable and verifiable results, then I can tell you that
nobody but their fancier gives a hoot. The point of sign relations
involving a development from obscure signs to clearer interpretants
is just so this process can be taken into account. If your idea of
inquiry is that some lucky fella hits on just the right image the
first time that he takes his brain out of the box -- the sort of
regression illusion that you get from fixating your focus only
on famous success stories -- then, of course, you fail to see
the need for any kind of non-trivial process at all. It's
all just a matter of hailing the canonical image whenever
it appears. The fact is that far more of these fancies
bite the dust than any you ever heard about.
| We all form some image for ourselves of how ponderable bodies fall to Earth.
| Many people's image "feel" the force on heavy bodies is greater than on light
| bodies. The logical consequent of their image is that heavy bodies fall faster
| than light bodies. When they then actually measure falling bodies (of similar
| shape and density in viscous media) their image of the consequents of nature
| are the same as the consequent of their image in thought. Maybe Aristotle
| had this image.
| Galileo formed the image of a heavy body rigidly connected to a lighter body.
| Combined with the first image, the logical consequent of this image is an
| apparent paradox. For on the one hand, the lighter, slower body should
| slow the motion of the heavier body, while on the other hand, the two
| connected bodies are heavier still and should fall faster. To remove
| the paradox required dropping the first image. The logical consequent
| of Galileo's new image is that all bodies fall at the same rate. Still,
| Galileo had to observe that the image of the natural consequent of falling
| bodies was the same as the consequent of his image in thought.
| This lead to the image in thought of two types of mass with the consequent
| that the gravitational mass (as defined by Newton's inverse square law of
| gravitation) and the inertial mass (defined by Newton's 2nd law, F = ma)
| are equal. The image of the consequents of nature, under the strictest
| experimental condition known, agreed with the consequents of this image
| in thought.
| Then Einstein had an image that gravitational mass and inertial mass were not
| two equal masses but identical (The morning star and the evening star were just
| Venus looked at differently). After years of struggling with formalization, the
| consequent of Einstein's image was the general theory of relativity. Finding any
| image of the consequent in nature was not so easy this time, but we now know that
| it is the same as the consequent of the image in Einstein's thought.
HP: With very few exceptions (like the fortuitous discovery of X rays),
inquiries into fundamental physics can be most briefly summarized
by Hertz: "We form for ourselves images and symbols ..." I hope
that suggests why Hertz's 40-word sentence is important for any
model of scientific inquiry.
It is not so much a dogma as a pupma
that is yet to learn that its imagos
in mirrors are un-independent pupmas.
Jon Awbrey
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