ONT Re: Logic As Semiotic -- Still Quasi After All These Years
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Mishtu Banerjee wrote (MB):
MB: As far as I can tell, Peirce saw formal logic as incomplete, and saw that
interesting philosophical problems arise from this. Wittgenstein saw formal
logic as incomplete, and insisted no philosophical problems arise from this,
only language puzzles.
There are two kinds of incompleteness in this mix:
1. The rational kind, not being able to prove
all of one's "quasi-observational" truths.
2. The empirical kind, due to the circumstance
that the world of signs was never meant to
be complete unto itself, at least, short of
some GEV in which the "whole universe" (WU)
is the canonical sign of itself, as object,
to itself, as interpretant, making all that
we do in the course of this cosmos tantamount
to the analysis of the elemental sign relation
<WU, WU, WU> -- an image too Daffy to contemplate.
MB: I would agree with John that the younger Peirce and younger Wittgenstein
seem remarkably in synch characters (separated in time as they were), but
the later versions of themselves diverge ... they took different paths
after they hit the ground zero of logic ... recognition of distinctions.
Not sure about this. I have been looking into some papers from the early years
of so-called "analytic" philosophy. The period surrounding the Great War is an
especially critical phase. Russell had actually come to the point of trying to
"analyze" something of real significance, to wit, what it means to accept or to
believe a proposition, but dropped it due to Wittgenstein's devastating remarks.
The rest is hystery. I do not know if I posted this stuff to OCA -- I will see.
Jon Awbrey
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