ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
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Howard,
I will try to fill in some of the gaps that I did not have
the level of concentration I needed to think about earlier.
Howard Pattee wrote (HP):
Jon Awbrey (JA):
JA: Logic is a normative science concerned with the form of conduct known as "thinking".
Maybe it would be slightly better to say "a normative inquiry into thinking conduct".
A normative inquiry into X is one that goes looking for knowledge about how we ought
to do X, that is, on the charitable assumption that we care about doing X as well as
it can be done by creatures such as ourselves.
HP: I should make it clear that normative principles is not the issue I am worrying about.
All scientific inquiry, as a process, is normative. Looking for objective laws is a
normative activity, since there is no rule that says we must be objective. Hertz's
modelling condition is a normative principle. Invariance (symmetry) principles are
normative. Even natural selection is normative. The issue that interests me is
what types of normative inquiry into how we think are most likely to uncover
those non-normative laws of nature that appear to be inexorable and universal?
JA: I do not quite grasp the normativity of all the items on your list,
as I only apply the conception of a norm to voluntary conduct,
but I think that I had better let this one ride for now.
I probably ought to say just a little bit more about how the questions of
normative inquiry are typically viewed within a pragmatic reference frame.
First and foremost, the classical normative sciences are those whose objects
are the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, namely, Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic.
These are the conventional names -- a more telling rubric might specify their
domains as the "Good in itself", the "Good Ways to get to the Good in itself",
and the "Good Signs of the Good Ways to get to the Good in itself", respectively.
The "pragmatically ordered normative sciences" (PONS) are ordained in this order
from the most independent to the most reflective, where aesthetics sets the aim,
ethics is a concern with the paths from here to there, and logic is an interest
in recognizing the signs along the paths from here to there. Just how I see it.
Some people read "normative" to mean something like this:
A duly appointed authority tells us what we ought to do,
no questions asked. I tend to call that "prescriptive".
Anyway, that is not what I mean by "normative inquiry",
as the word "inquiry" ought to provide a telling clue.
HP: I would call such normative search "heuristics" since the conduct of thought,
especially in scientific inquiry, must be imaginative and not overly constrained
by procedural techniques. I find Peirce's lengthy and complex "logically tight",
sometimes dogmatic, discussions at odds with the evidence that creative inquiry
requires riskier thinking, e.g., exhaustive doubt (Descartes), escape from one's
current abstractions (Whitehead), looking at extremes (Polya), focusing on apparent
paradox (modern physics), and so on. It is not that I see anything really wrong with
what Peirce says. It is more a question of his relevance to the process of inquiry.
He has many solutions, but I just don't see his problem. To change my opinion
I would need some more evidence that Peirce's logical norms have actually
resulted in some successful scientific inquiry.
JA: Okay, I think that I have begun to see how I might have misled you
about the character of Peirce's overall theory of inquiry. I am
currently focussed on "scientific inquiry", and worse than that,
I have to keep my gnosis to the grindstone of what is likely
to be capable of embodiment in recursive partial functions,
to wit, "computable inquiry", if you will. Computation is
my medium and I have to respect the grain of that stone.
It need not place any constraint on anybody else, but,
as it turns out, as I have reason to believe that it
shall turn out, there are much closer connections
between the limits of computation and the method
of science, at least, as it gets carried on in
a community of interacting persons who share
a passel of common objectives, or "pragmata".
JA: But that will take us back to Meno
and his whole tribe of Lost Boys,
so maybe I'll pass on that, too.
From the pew where we summer Peirceans and fairweather pragmatists sometime sit,
inquiry starts with amazement, bafflement, consternation, doubt, startlement, or
uncertainty -- its name is legion, and so it's best not to get too hung up on one --
and it ends with acceptance, belief, certainty, clarity, knowledge, or settlement.
In a sense so broad as to be quite unabashedly ridiculous, whatever happens in the
mean time can be considered an honest example of inquiry. If I face down my doubts
by standing on my head and holding my breath until the feeling subsides, then that,
too, is counted as a method of inquiry, for pragmatic thinking places no ban or bar
of prior constraint on what sort of procedure might be worth a shot. But we all know
by know, having no doubt tried the experiment one or twice early on in our careers as
agents of inquiry, that such a method is likely to lose its attractions, not to mention
its effectiveness, when judged in the light of the due end of inquiry, when averaged out
over the long haul. And it is that post hoc critique of those ad hoc trials that is the
real name of the game here.
HP: How symbols in general refer to objects is the most
difficult conceptual problem of scientific inquiry.
JA: That is why I have been attempting to provide you
with some of the best available help with the task.
HP: Well, this is just the issue, and in spite of your good intentions, I think you beg it.
The issue I worry about is whether any of Peirce's norms for inquiry are better than,
say, Hertz's norm for scientific inquiry.
JA: Based only on Hertz's picture of modeling that you redrew for us,
I would have to say "yes", because Peirce's picture of inquiry
takes in more of the actual landscape and provides a fuller
perspective on all of the other ways that symbolic forms
of representation serve as the catalysts of inquiry
and eventually constitute the products of inquiry.
HP: I am sure Peirce had many great ideas, but do all Peirce disciples
believe that his norms of inquiry are always some of the best?
JA: I only wish that I could be a good disciple.
Unfortunately, I lack sufficient discipline.
JA: All that aside, I have trouble understanding the question,
because I do not see that there is any sort of competition.
Peirce is only trying to analyze, to detect, to reconstruct,
or to reveal the relevant forms, invariants, patterns, shapes,
structures, whatever, that are embodied in what all inquirers
are always doing all the time. This almost sounds descriptive,
but it is a description of deliberate, normed, purposeful conduct,
that is intended to serve the improvement of that form of conduct.
Since an inquiry into inquiry really is, ab initio, just another
inquiry, the hypotheses that arise in it are evaluated in all
of the usual ways.
HP: I'm afraid we probably have irremediable differences of opinions on
whether his logics are a help or a hindrance in scientific inquiry.
Perhaps my problem is that he has too many distinguished and successful
competitors. Where does Peirce think they go wrong? I would like to
know how you conclude that Peirce's logical norms are some of the best
for scientific inquiry? Was this a higher level normative conclusion
or do you have some empirical evidence from your own particular area
of inquiry?
JA: The history of how I came to trust this particular "form of reconstruction" (FOR)
is complex, and maybe not to the purpose. I used to think that I knew a lot about
how the mind works, even how to build a model of one, right up until I got down to
implementing my initial ideas into computational form. Thinks changed after that!
Mostly, Peirce's description is the only one I know that has even a minimal regard
for the complexity of the subject, or that supplies enough detail to get down to
silicon tacks.
Aside from my casual experimentation with the daimon inquiry, my formal empirical domain
is cast under the schematism of "What In The World Has A Tractable Algorithm" (WITWHATA).
An algorithm is not the stripe of demiurge that can work for this or that isolated case --
it has to be generically effective over a moderately extensive set of problem instances.
One cannot pretend an algorithm, or even anything like an approximation to one, without
identifying the systematic pattern of conduct, the form, that goes into the performance.
Jon Awbrey
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