ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
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Douglas McDavid wrote (DM):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):
DM: This is a particularly interesting passage, Jon.
What is interesting is the notion of truth as a variable quantity.
Rather than being a binary value, it is a matter of sweeping in more or less
of universe of potential knowledge by turning a sort of intension/extension dial.
This is a very powerful image, especially when it is recognized that behind that
dial is a very complex mechanism of context and history of inquiry on the part
of sign emitters and receivers.
JA, quoting CSP:
| Let us now take the two statements, S is P, T is P;
| let us suppose that T is much more distinct than S and
| that it is also more extensive. But we 'know' that S is P.
| Now if T were not more extensive than S, T is P would contain
| more truth than S is P; being more extensive it 'may' contain
| more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood. Which of these
| probabilities is the greatest? T by being more extensive becomes
| less intensive; it is the intension which introduces truth and the
| extension which introduces falsehood. If therefore T increases the
| intension of S more than its extension, T is to be preferred to S;
| otherwise not. Now this is the case of induction. Which contains
| most truth, 'neat' and 'deer' are herbivora, or cloven-footed
| animals are herbivora?
|
| In the two statements, S is P, S is Q, let Q be at once more 'formal' and
| more 'intensive' than P; and suppose we only 'know' that S is P. In this
| case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the
| increase of intension a chance of error. If the extension of Q is more
| increased than than its intension, then S is Q is likely to contain more
| truth than S is P and 'vice versa'. This is the case of 'à posteriori'
| reasoning. We have for instance to choose between
|
| Light gives fringes of such and such a description
|
| and
|
| Light is ether-waves.
|
| CSP, CE 1, pages 188-189.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
Yes, it seems to be a very natural way of speaking, to talk about the total amount
of information or knowledge conveyed by a sign as the quantity of truth it betides,
but I am guessing that it is most likely a distinct or even higher order sense of
the word "truth" than that contained in our conventional notion of "true values".
Notice, however, that Peirce develops a theory of information
out of logical considerations of a perfectly classical sort.
Information, knowledge, truth are properties that a symbol
holds and keeps in store for us by virtue of its relative
effectiveness in reducing our level of uncertainty within
a process of inquiry. The business of more or less truth
has to do with the domains that are described by a symbol,
not with the range of values in B = {0, 1} = {false, true},
which are merely devices for marking the different sides
of a distinction of significance that is drawn in the
object domain. It is best not to worry too much over
this bit about binary values, as any greater number
of values still depends on drawing dichotomous
distinctions between each pair of their lot.
An equally radical idea in Peirce's discussion here,
one whose critical importance for conceptual framework
design and development I have exerted for a year now to
get across, is the notion that concepts have a definite
rationale for coming into being and passing away in the
ways that they do, and that it would do us some good
to examine the nature of this conceptual evolution,
instead of just continuing to accept its random
mutations willye nillye until the end of time.
Thanks for your thoughts,
Jon Awbrey
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