Re: ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
This is a particularly interesting passage, Jon. What is interesting is
the notion of truth as a variable quantity. Rather than being a binary
value, it is a matter of sweeping in more or less of universe of potential
knowledge by turning a sort of intension/extension dial. This is a very
powerful image, especially when it is recognized that behind that dial is a
very complex mechanism of context and history of inquiry on the part of
sign emitters and receivers.
Doug McDavid
Certified Executive Consultant
Member of IBM Academy of Technology
mcdavid@us.ibm.com -- 916-549-4600
Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>@majordomo.ieee.org on 08/25/2001 09:07:01
PM
Sent by: owner-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
To: Arisbe <arisbe@stderr.org>, Generic Ontology Group
<ontology@ieee.org>
cc: Organization Complexity Autonomy <oca@cc.newcastle.edu.au>
Subject: ONT Re: Inquiry Into Information
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| Let us now take the two statements, S is P, T is P;
| let us suppose that T is much more distinct than S and
| that it is also more extensive. But we 'know' that S is P.
| Now if T were not more extensive than S, T is P would contain
| more truth than S is P; being more extensive it 'may' contain
| more truth and it may also introduce a falsehood. Which of these
| probabilities is the greatest? T by being more extensive becomes
| less intensive; it is the intension which introduces truth and the
| extension which introduces falsehood. If therefore T increases the
| intension of S more than its extension, T is to be preferred to S;
| otherwise not. Now this is the case of induction. Which contains
| most truth, 'neat' and 'deer' are herbivora, or cloven-footed
| animals are herbivora?
|
| In the two statements, S is P, S is Q, let Q be at once more 'formal' and
| more 'intensive' than P; and suppose we only 'know' that S is P. In
this
| case the increase of formality gives a chance of additional truth and the
| increase of intension a chance of error. If the extension of Q is more
| increased than than its intension, then S is Q is likely to contain more
| truth than S is P and 'vice versa'. This is the case of 'à posteriori'
| reasoning. We have for instance to choose between
|
| Light gives fringes of such and such a description
|
| and
|
| Light is ether-waves.
|
| CSP, CE 1, pages 188-189.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'",
(1865),
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1,
1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
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