ONT Re: Inquiry Into Inquiry
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Stan Salthe wrote (SS):
Jon Awbrey wrote (JA):
JA: On third reading, I begin to notice the theme of "perspective,
viewpoint, POV", a topic that is of considerable interest to me,
as one of the aims of my own inquiry is to look into the question:
What is the geometry of spaces whose points are views?
SS: ... it seems to me that POVs are distinct from the generalized triad, O-S-I, ...
JA: I do not know why I have to keep explaining that I do not use
this form of language about "triads" to mean any thing other
than a single 3-tuple of the form <o, s, i>, which is only
a single element of a sign relation, properly conceived.
Any particular sign relation, from the extensional POV
that I am currently developing, is a whole SET of such
3-tuples, and it is as pointless to let onself become
fixated on a single 3-tuple, however generic, as it
would be to try and grasp the nature of a geometry
by fixating on a single triangle.
SS: By "triad O-S-I", I just mean the general object-sign-interpretant form.
If you mean something else ...
I have already described in detail my use of sign relations in extension.
Incidentally, this way of working with relations was developed in Peirce's
logic of relatives from the very beginning of his researches in the field.
Speaking about the "general object-sign-interpretant form" is like
speaking about the "general A-B-C form of a triangle". It does make
a bit of sense, in a vaguely general and a generally vague sort of way,
but when one gets down to the point of trying to speak sensibly about the
particular geometry that one needs for a real application, then there are
a few futher questions that one needs to ask before one can get to work
on anything practical. That is the point to which I have been down for
a while now, and if others are happy to remain at the phase of general
vaguity, then I will be happy for them, but must get moseying along.
SS: ... it seems to me that POVs are distinct from the generalized triad, O-S-I,
which is movable from one to another POV, and so this triad is either just an
analytical technique, or, (I just realized), more interestingly, a kind of
structure (a deep structure in the sense of the erstwhile structuralists)
that can be accesssed at many, perhaps most, locales.
JA: Consequently, when you say something like "POVs are distinct from the
generalized triad, O-S-I, which is movable from one to another POV",
I simply do not have a clue how to interpret what you say, whether
you are referring to a whole sign relation L c OxSxI, which has
a lot to do with formaliszing POV's, at least, from my POV, or
whether you are talking about an isolated 3-tuple of the form
<o, s, i>, which is only one element of such a sign relation.
SS: I am not talking about one single, particular s-tuple,
but about the general form, as above.
SS: One SI may interact with an object quite differently than another does,
and the signs used in mediating these interactions will be different. Put
(more importantly) another way, the mediation is not done by the sign, but
by the SI, which helped to create the sign.
JA: I guess I could say that the sign relation L c OxSxI is the "medium" of
whatever "mediation" is going on.
SS: NEW RESPONSE BY SS: Your "medium" here could be my 'structure'.
In any case, the locale or POV locates a SI, which co-constructs
the signs and constructs fully the local interpretants -- guided
by the triadc structure.
JA: I just do not understand this way of talking.
SS: Well, neither do I understand your way of talking,
so I guess we might as well pack it up.
Since I am using the language of logic and set theory,
which I guess makes "all the usual suspects" to you,
I suspect that this may be an impassable impasse.
JA: I have not found that Peirce fits very well onto either side
of these imposèd and supposèd 2-alities and 2-chotomies.
SS: One reason may be that the major -isms in play today in the cognitive
world were different from those in play when Charlie was playing.
JA: A remark like this is the distinguishing mark of "modern" thinkers,
with all of their progressive fallacies intact, who imagine that
they can turn a dead eye with impunity to the modulus of their
own cyclic rhythmatic, and it is the predominant reason that
our culture keeps running in the same old circles, without
even knowing how old the wheels are. Vide "tele".
SS: Well, it is difficult to transcend, or escape from, the place where
discourse has arrived. And if you do succeed, then no one will be
able to communicate with you. Incidentally, a culture IS the same
old circles!
Hence my allusion to the etymology of "telos".
SS: In principle, even the latest puzzlement from quantum physics has cultural roots.
That is, any observation from their contrived experiments that would not have a
cultural palimpsest would not be recognized.
SS: Basically, my 'formal' derives from Aristotle's formal cause.
JA: Perhaps we will find time to explore that.
SS: I doubt it, since we seem unable to communicate.
SS: What I do, if I choose to notice ... diversity [of definitions] instead
of just using my own version, is to seek the intersection (which I create)
among the various usages as one most likely to be close to what a discourse
itself means.
JA: Just go right on in that direction --
I'll meet you at the intersection
of Homer and Plato and Aristotle,
at the Cafe Bistro of Old Lao Tzu.
SS: The intersection is the locus of just the most general properties that
all the definitions have in common, distinguishing what is most basic
from what reflects POV. Characteristically, in my developmental style
of thinking, I see these generals as being explicit models of the vague
beginnings of the concept, out of which the various versions developed,
acquiring idiosyncratic historical dress along the way.
JA: I imagine that the intersection of "all" definitions will turn out be empty --
it is most likely asking too much to think that we can make everybody happy --
and so it becomes necessary to choose. I tend to try and preserve anything
that is capable of making some kind of sense, but I tend to hold off those
positions that do not respect the grounds of their own project to meaning,
as they tend to whither themselves away in time.
SS: I fail to understand this. "ALL" definitions together may well have an empty
intersection, but, then, the Big Bang came from a kind of emptiness did it not?
I wasn't there.
JA: Another thought. I just recognized that the type of question being asked here
is closely related to a standard question in pragmatic hermeneutics, as to the
status of the interpreter vis a vis the interpretant, in deed, as it stands in
regard to the entire sign relation in question. Peirce's answer, which I take
to be a critical insight, is that the full sign relation is the primary entity
of our study, its bearing on interpretants being the next in importance, while
the agent of the interpretive activity is what such agents proto-typically are,
a hypostatic abstraction hypothesized to explain the phenomena of experience.
SS: Well, I think this places your understanding here well within idealism.
SS: In light of the structuralist interpretation (above),
I have little problem with this now.
JA: YAI (yet another ism).
It is a curious habit
for a person who does
not trust 2-ary logic.
SS: When I refer to an -ism, it is my usual experience
that the intellectual I am communicating with has
a store of knowledge about them. If you don't,
then we will find it hard to communicate.
I have rather a large store of experiences talking with people who go on
about "ism too" and "ism not" as a substitute for thinking about what is,
and instead of thinking critically to examine whether the unreflectively
adopted coordinate systems and presumptive frames of reference that they
seek to construct from their purported oppositions of modism versus nodism
really do manage to cut up what may well be a non-orientable space or knot.
What my store of knowledge on the-isms tells me is that any ism worth its
salt probably reflects some interesting and useful facet of what is, but
by no means exhausts the core solidity of what is and stays in question.
So if somebody is proselytizing an ism in a spirit of enthusiasm about one
aspect, one face, one view of a subject, then I think that's great, but if
that one turns to telling me that no other perspective is worth the candle,
then that is where I start to feel that I have heard that kinda line before.
SS: I may be making an oversimple reaction to this statement.
In science we are used to looking at systems. We habitually
imagine them to be composed of, AND to be precipitated BY entities.
Here you seem to opt for relations as being primary. I think scientists
tend to see relations as relating pre-existing entities. Here instead you
seem to see entities fitting into, or even coming into existence under the
guidance of, pre-existing relations.
JA: Your view strikes as a very ancient notion of science --
not that there's anything wrong with that, of course,
but for the danger of a methodological inconsistency --
but hey! we are many, we contain multitudes. All of
this "stuff" about fundamental constituents of matter
being construed out of stuff like relational invariants,
group-theoretic symmetries, and conservation principles,
is the kind of "stuff" that I learned in my physics books
and courses, in the last century, not from H & P & A, if
maybe a little from LT.
SS: Well, leaving aside from quantum phsicists and cosmologists (who might harken
to your triads for all I know), as a biologist with some knowledge of chemistry,
climatology and geology (all those -gys!), my statement does characterize thinking
in these disciplines. So, with free floating forms (which I take it you reject as
possibly being structures), you will not communicate with scientists (as in these
listed) who look for mechanisms (who also reject the notion of structures).
Ok, I'm positive that you can keep whittling the
variety of scientists down until you end up with
the righteous ones, the one who sees it your way.
SS: If semioticians wish to talk to scientists, these issues will have to
be cleared up. (I am not saying either way is incorrect, of course.)
SS: Most scientists are offended by structuralist talk as well.
They acknowledge the behavior of structural attractors in
dynamical equations, but do not, for the most part, imagine
structural attractors as being of importance in the actual
world. This is because they want to see a mechanism (perhaps
some physicists transcend this, basically pragmatic, limitation).
I no longer have any idea what counts as a true scientist in your eyes,
but I myself know of many counter-examples to each of your caricatures.
SS: No mechanism, no phenomenon.
JA: Another oldie but goodie from Aristotle.
SS: I hope you are able to afford all these snide putdowns.
Otherwise you may go the way of Peirce himself (and
probably like it too!).
I cannot imagine how "oldie but goodie" can be taken as a put-down,
but then, how could know what's in my record collection? Anyway,
I was only remarking on Aristotle's fundamental insight about
the demarcation of science from many other things with which
it might be confused. It's an all important idea, one that
marks the limit of scientific method, "limit" here being
a good thing, as it is the limit that makes it a method.
Jon Awbrey
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤