SUO: Re: Determination
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| Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once; the first is a possible thing,
| the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol. It will be objected
| that the two latter are not properly objects. We have hitherto regarded the symbol
| as 'standing for' the thing, as a concrete determination of its form, and addressing
| a symbol; and it is true that it is only by referring to a possible thing that a
| symbol has an objective relation, it is only by bearing in it a form that it has
| any subjective relation, and it is only by equaling another symbol that it has any
| tuistical relation. But this objective relation once given to a symbol is at once
| applicable to all to which it necessarily refers; and this is shown by the fact
| of our regarding every symbol as 'connotative' as well as 'denotative', and by our
| regarding one word as standing for another whenever we endeavor to clear up a little
| obscurity of meaning. And the reason that this is so is that the possible symbol and
| the possible form to which a symbol is related each relate also to that thing which
| is its immediate object. Things, forms, and symbols, therefore, are symbolized in
| every symbolization. And this being so, it is natural to suppose that our three
| principles of inference which we know already refer to some three objects of
| symbolization, refer to these.
|
| That such really is the case admits of proof. For the principle of inference 'à priori'
| must be established 'à priori'; that is by reasoning analytically from determinant to
| determinate, in other words from definition. But this can only be applied to an object
| whose characteristics depend upon its definition. Now of most things the definition
| depends upon the character, the definition of a symbol alone determines its character.
| Hence the principle of inference 'à priori' must relate to symbols. The principle of
| inference 'à posteriori' must be established 'à posteriori', that is by reasoning from
| determinate to determinant. This is only applicable to that which is determined by what
| it determines; in other words, to that which is only subject to the truth and falsehood
| which affects its determinant and which in itself is mere 'zero'. But this is only true
| of pure forms. Hence the principle of inference 'à posteriori' must relate to pure form.
| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively; that is by reasoning
| from parts to whole. This is only applicable to that whose whole is given in the sum of the
| parts; and this is only the case with things. Hence the principle of inductive inference
| must relate to things.
|
| CSP, CE 1, page 183-184.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
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