Re: SUO: Re: The Story So Far
Chris and Jon,
I agree with Jon that Peirce's pragmatism shows the way
to find an answer to Chris's question.
Chris Partridge wrote:
>> You are right that people are using 3-D and 4-D -- and by association
>> E(ndurantist) and P(erdurantist) -- to cover a wide variety of things.
>> However, I think you would be wrong to dismiss the terms -- however
>> ugly they are. They are terms of art in philosophical ontology and,
>> while related to the points you make below, are not these points.
If they are terms of art in phil. ont., then we should start
by asking what problems that have practical consequences they
were designed to solve.
>> It is plain that commonsense objects *persist* through time.
>> The question is how to explain this (and so, at least partly,
>> explain a number of other things). One answer is that these
>> objects *perdure* through time -- so only a (temporal) part is
>> present at any one time. Another answer is to say they *endure*
>> through time -- where they are wholly present (whatever that means)
>> at any time at which they are present. This is the *only* question
>> that the E and P words deal with. It seems to me that this is a
>> legitimate question -- even if we think the answer is obviously
>> that objects *perdure* -- getting agreement on this would be
>> a substantial step forward.
Jon Awbrey wrote:
>I am wondering about the notions
>of "explanation" and "legitimacy"
>that you have in mind when you say:
>
>> The question is how to explain this (and so,
>> at least partly, explain a number of other things).
>
>and
>
>> It seems to me that this is a legitimate question --
>
>For instance, do you have in mind any sort of experiment that
>would conceivably distinguish the "ostensible options" (OO's)?
>
>In other words, can you name any effects that might conceivably have
>practical bearings and actual consequences that you can conceive the
>options of these two conceptions to have?
Those "terms of art" that you mention were coined by people
who had not read the literature. Please look at their indexes
and bibliographies. If you don't find any reference to Peirce,
that is a clue that perhaps they didn't read Peirce. That may
suggest that they were groping in the dark to try and reinvent
some wheels that had already been well greased and running.
After checking the indexes, then try Peirce's suggestion.
What effects do the terms "perdure" and "endure" have?
As I pointed out, the questions about objects persisting
through time, can be answered quite nicely by Whitehead's
solution that there are "forms of definiteness" that are
recognizable in recurring event types. To refer to those
forms, we use signs, as Peirce explained in quite some detail.
This discussion we have been having has suggested a good
topic for a paper that I plan to write. The working title is
Signs and Processes: The Cure for Logical Atomism
The basic theme is that logical atomism, as inflicted by
Bertrand Russell on poor old Ludwig W., was the disease that
Ludwig spent the second half of his life trying to overcome.
Frank Ramsey, who had read Peirce, is the person that Ludwig
credited with the beginning of the cure that led him to see
the grave errors in his earlier philosophy. An equally bad
case of influenza came from the logical positivism of the
Vienna Circle. I consider those two sources the primary
causes of the downfall of logic in the 20th century. And
any philosopher who uses logic, but doesn't refer to Peirce
is probably still in the grip of the disease.
John Sowa
PS: For a brief overview of the state of logic in 1909, the
year before the Principia Mathematica was published, I recommend
Peirce's manuscript MS 514, to which I added some commentary:
http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/peirce/ms514.htm