RE: SUO: The Story So Far

[Chris Partridge <chris_partridge@csi.com>]

John,

You are right that people are using 3-D and 4-D - and by association
E(ndurantist) and P(erdurantist) - to cover a wide variety of things.
However, I think you would be wrong to dismiss the terms - however ugly they
are. They are terms of art in philosophical ontology and, while related to
the points you make below, are not these points.

It is plain that commonsense objects *persist* through time. The question is
how to explain this (and so, at least partly, explain a number of other
things). One answer is that these objects *perdure* through time - so only a
(temporal) part is present at any one time. Another answer is to say they
*endure* through time - where they are wholly present (whatever that means)
at any time at which they are present. This is the *only* question that the
E and P words deal with. It seems to me that this is a legitimate question -
even if we think the answer is obviously that objects *perdure* - getting
agreement on this would be a substantial step forward.

[I have attached (again) my note where this is explained in more detail]

It seems to me sensible to stick with the already established meaning -
rather than mix in a number of related things. This will make it easier to
communicate with and assimilate work done by other in this area.

However, I think you are quite correct in pointing out that the answer to
the *persist* question is influenced by ones position regarding the nature
of time and causality. Perhaps, even more strongly, that one cannot answer
the question without developing a view on the nature of time and causality.
As Pat has said in another email, for the Perdurantist there seems to be no
real distinction between process and object - so the question of which is
more fundamental only arises for the Endurantist who has to explain the
relationship between his category of continuant and occurrent. The question
of 3-D and 4-D co-ordinate systems seems to me to be a red herring. Any
system should be able to accommodate either.

On the question of identity, I think philosophers (and Nicola) are right to
ask the question. And it seems to me that adopting an extensionalist
viewpoint (for both objects and properties) enables one to have a formal
principle of identity. I am not sure how any real ontological analysis can
proceed without some consideration of principles of identity. Though I think
this is more a question - as your quote from Wittgenstein a long time ago
said - of determining when two 'words' refer to the same 'object'.

To summarise - I think the meanings of the E and P words are quite clear and
simple - and well established. And that despite their ugliness, we should
stick with them as they are established in the literature.

Regards,
Chris

-----Original Message-----
From: sowa@bestweb.net [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
Sent: 09 March 2001 04:30
To: Chris Partridge; John F. Sowa; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: The Story So Far


Chris,

As I said in my earlier notes, I believe that there are multiple
points involved in this discussion.  And it is misleading to
lump them all under the terms "endurantist" or "perdurantist":

 1. 3D or 4D coordinate systems.

 2. Processes or objects as the fundamental entities.

 3. Causality or time as the fundamental foundation.

 4. Interpretation of identity and identity conditions.

The most "weird" position that Nicola seems to promote is
his interpretation of identity.  That is separable from the
other points.

>I know Pat has already mentioned Barry Smith and Peter Simons. Can I also
>suggest Michael Loux (see his introductory book on Metaphysics -
>particularly the sections on Endurantism and Perdurantism  :-) and E. J.
>Loux (Possibility of Metaphysics).

I believe that the first step toward resolving the disputes
is to get rid of those two terms.  They lump too many separate
issues under two umbrella terms.  I refuse to use them, and I
strongly suggest that we stop using them in these email
discussions.

> I will name more if it would make any
>difference. There are lots of people who seriously take this position.

That is another reason why I want to get rid of the terms.
Peter Simons, for example, has done a great deal of work with
Whitehead's process philosophy.  I can't believe that he is
fully devoted to anything as weird as what Nicola was proposing.

>You say:
>The view that the statue and the clay are the "same thing"
>can be safely held in either a 3-D or a 4-D poin of view.
>I really don't know how to classify Nicola's position,
>since it seems to be inconsistent with the way ordinary
>human beings talk, with the way that scientists talk, and
>with the way that most philosophers talk.

>This seems to me false. On the face of it our language is 'Endurantist'.

Again, I don't know what you mean by that, since ordinary
English is perfectly well suited to being used on all
sides of the four issues I mention above.  See, for example,
Whitehead's essay, which is written in ordinary English:

   http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/anw_obj.htm

>I do not say 'my life went to the cinema last night' - or 'I am
long (in the
>same sense as 'I have had a long life'). We certainly do not say 'a
temporal

>stage of me went to the cinema last night'.

Of course not.  We use ordinary English terms, which can be
formally defined in many different ways.  And the simplest way
I can see to define them makes them perfectly consistent with
Whitehead's process philosophy.

>As you can see, I think, as a matter of fact, you are incorrect in the way

>you characterize 'Nicola's' position.

The main thing that I object to in Nicola's position is his
interpretation of identity and his claim that the statue
and the clay are two different things.  That is not something
that either scientists or the proverbial T. C. Mits would say.

John

Ontological_Architecture_01-03-01.doc