RE: SUO: The Story So Far
John,
Can I defend Nicola (and his position) here - despite disagreeing with it. I
think you may have exaggerated the situation.
You say:
. I don't
know anybody, except perhaps Nicola, who would seriously
consider any other position.
I know Pat has already mentioned Barry Smith and Peter Simons. Can I also
suggest Michael Loux (see his introductory book on Metaphysics -
particularly the sections on Endurantism and Perdurantism :-) and E. J.
Loux (Possibility of Metaphysics). I will name more if it would make any
difference. There are lots of people who seriously take this position.
Though, like you, I think the position very odd. This is why I like to think
of them as paradigms (see Kuhn on the difficulty of understanding other
people's paradigms).
You say:
The view that the statue and the clay are the "same thing"
can be safely held in either a 3-D or a 4-D poin of view.
I really don't know how to classify Nicola's position,
since it seems to be inconsistent with the way ordinary
human beings talk, with the way that scientists talk, and
with the way that most philosophers talk.
This seems to me false. On the face of it our language is 'Endurantist'. We
do not say 'my life went to the cinema last night' - or 'I am long (in the
same sense as 'I have had a long life'). We certainly do not say 'a temporal
stage of me went to the cinema last night'.
Nicola's position (in so far as it is Endurantist) is well
classified/described in the literature. The problem is not that it is
inconsistent or consistent with the way people talk - it is one of the
consistent ways of interpreting the way people/scientists and philosophers
talk.
As you can see, I think, as a matter of fact, you are incorrect in the way
you characterize 'Nicola's' position.
Regards
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org]On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 07 March 2001 18:50
To: Chris Partridge; John F. Sowa; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: The Story So Far
Chris,
>Under what I understand the Whiteheadain process position (a form of
>mereological extensionalism), when we apply the names 'statue' and 'clay'
to
>a particular spatio-temporal extent - we say that this spatio-temporal
>extent - this particular instance of a "recurring event type" - is both a
>statue and clay. I happen to think this makes sense.
>
>NB - the example is not about the general terms 'clay' and 'statue' - but
>about a particular clay statue.
Yes, that is the point of view that Whitehead would take,
it is the point of view that Peirce would take, and it is
also the point of view that Aristotle would take. I don't
know anybody, except perhaps Nicola, who would seriously
consider any other position.
>I am not sure how you saying you want people to take a Whiteheadian view
>differs from Pat and Matthew saying they think people should have a '4-D'
>view. in both cases, you leave the Endurantist view out in the cold. I
agree
>this makes life simpler for you (and me), but it seems a bit hard on the
>Endurantist.
The view that the statue and the clay are the "same thing"
can be safely held in either a 3-D or a 4-D poin of view.
I really don't know how to classify Nicola's position,
since it seems to be inconsistent with the way ordinary
human beings talk, with the way that scientists talk, and
with the way that most philosophers talk.
>You say:
>But there is no inconsistency. We can use the ordinary English
>words without any trouble and relate them to various formal
>definitions, which can also be stated without inconsistency.
>
>This does not seem to me (or the people who work in this area) to be true.
>We loosely use the ordinary English words, just as people used to less
>loosely use the words 'phlogiston' without any trouble. We can also relate
>particular words to two different sets of formal definitions - which are
>inconsistent, if we follow ordinary usage. For example, assume that there
is
>a desk here in front of me (rather than a desk(1) and a desk(2)). As you
>yourself have pointed out, the problem comes when formalizing.
>
>I have had innumerable (heated) discussions with Nicola (as no doubt you
>have) where, when discussing the clay/statue example, he insists there are
>two things (a statue and a lump of clay) and I (as Pat, Matthew and - it
>seems - you) would say there are one. How can this be if ordinary English
>gives us a straight-forward answer - and the two views are not
inconsistent.
Many philosophers tend to let there theories lead them to
conclusions that their common sense would tell them are crazy.
Wittgenstein considered his philosophy to be "therapy" that
could be used to cure such ideas. I suggest that Nicola go
back and read more Wittgenstein (especially his later works).
>If Nicola asks me to pass the continuant statue, I do
not say 'I
>cannot as I do not know what or where it is'.
Nobody has ever asked me to pass a "continuant". They ask me
to pass "a statue". And if I ask them, you mean this lump
of clay? They would say "yes".
>This is an important point, as it seems to me that you are suggesting an
>answer - we take a particular route (Whitehead), with all its implications,
>while at the same time saying that there is no choice. Effectively blocking
>out a choice about world-views.
No, Nicola can have his ontology. It just won't have many
points of correspondence with the way most people talk.
It would fit in the infinite lattice of all theories, but
I wouldn't recommend that anyone use it.
John Sowa