Re: SUO: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D
>Pat,
>
>I don't believe that the difference between these points of
>view is based on the 3D vs. 4D coordinate system. I think the
>main problem with Nicola's point of view is his dogmatic view
>of identity. He seems to have picked on the term "identity
>condition" and made it a cornerstone of his religion.
Yes, I tend to agree; not that I would want to disparage anyone's
religion, of course, but it does lead to an awful lot of entities
having to be in the same place at once.
>I had many arguments with Nicola about that. In particular,
>I maintained that identity was only well defined for formal
>systems, where you could decide identity by fiat. For the
>real world, identity is far more difficult to determine than
>similarity, and similarity itself is extremely problematical.
Well now I dont really agree with that, as you know. Seems to me that
I do make identifications all the time. Every time I go home I
re-identify my house, and so on, not to mention my cat-process. It
would be hard to manage if one didnt do this rather a lot, with
rather a lot of success: I imagine that being in such a condition
would result in prompt institutionalisation, at the very least.
>If you don't have a formal system, then the only reliable claim
>you can make about identity is that everything is identical
>with itself. But somehow, Nicola has managed to deny that
>as well.
It seems that way to a, er, perdurantist, but not to an E-type like Nicola.
> >I like the 4-d but not the idea of 'sense objects'. But you also know
> >what Peter, Nicola and others have said about continuants being more
> >fundamental than processes.
>
>Re sense objects: I think that W. dropped that term later.
>
>Re continuants more fundamental than processes: That claim
>is incompatible with modern physics, chemistry, and biology.
>I can imagine that some people might believe it, but I don't
>believe that anyone can make a serious case for it.
I think one could make such a case, even in science. But I really
don't think we - the SUO - should be trying win this debate one way
or the other; rather, we need to recognise how to transcribe between
such differences.
> >For example, Nicola has often said that
> >the individuation criteria for a continuant must presuppose other
> >continuants; something must 'endure' from one moment to the next in
> >order to stitch the flickerbook together into a real continuant. (For
> >humans he suggests we might use same-DNA, for example.) One could
> >hardly find a clearer summary of the fundamental split involved here
> >than to contrast this view with Whitehead's idea of an object as a
> >recurring event.
>
>Whitehead, Peirce, and I have a simple answer to what endures:
>the laws of physics, which determine certain conservation
>principles, such as conservation of energy, momentum, charge,
>spin, etc. That is the reason why certain aspects of processes
>remain stable from one moment to the next.
Nah, come on. You arent the same bloke from one day to the next
because of any fundamental conservation laws, but because the largish
chunk of meat that knows its name to be 'John Sowa' has a certain
critical kind of spatiotemporal continuity (which among other things,
preserves your narrative memory, probably in some pattern of
connections in your neurons.) When you snuff it and John Sowa is no
more, no physical conservation laws will be violated, but you will
still be a goner.
Pat
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