SUO: RE: RE: The Story So Far
Dear Ian,
See comments below.
Regards
Matthew
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Matthew West
Operations & Asset Management - Shell Services International
Shell Visiting Professor, The Keyworth Institute
H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
http://www.shellservices.com/
http://www.keyworth.leeds.ac.uk/
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
============================================================
> > Dear Colleagues,
> >
> > It occurs to me that some may be a little confused about what
> > all the fuss
> > is about. There has been a very lively discussion about how
> we should
> > construct an SUO, with a large number of sub-plots, the
> > result being that
> > you could be forgiven for being confused about what the
> discussion is
> > actually about.
> >
> > This at least is my version.
> >
> > There are a number (say about 4-5) of world views that are
> documented,
> > either in natural language, or in a more formal form, with
> a number of
> > possible variations on these.
>
> This is just an aside, but could you list these world views? I think
> philosophers everywhere would rejoice if their diverse and protracted
> debates could be distilled into 4 or 5 statements.
MW: I don't think I am the best person to do this. Still, from what I have
seen:
3D after Guarino and Simons, with continuant and occurrent.
4D after EPISTLE (amongst others)
Peircean - after Sowa
Linguistic
...
Pick some other paradigm that is represented here.
It isn't that there aren't others or variations, but these represent (some)
main themes. Other themes aren't represented here, and in any case could
be added later, if there was demand (i.e. people prepared to do the work).
>
> >
> > Ian and his supporters argue that because all philosophers do
> > not agree on
> > just one of these, we should ignore all of them, giving
> > preference to a
> > process that Ian might describe as pragmatic selection from
> > various sources
> > and merge.
>
> OK, but this sounds like an untenable approach only if you
> assume that the
> sources that I'm trying to merge into a single ontology
> overlap to a large
> extent with the metaphysical and epistemological theories
> that I have argued
> are irrelevant to what we're trying to do here. The formal ontologies
> relating to numbers, measures, organisms, agents, etc. that have been
> incorporated into the merged ontology do not, from what I can
> see, hinge on
> debates about nominalism versus realism or about the source and
> justification of our concepts or etc.
MW: Hardly true, since nominalism would not admit any of these classes
(because they don't exist). However, I'm not a fan of nominalism, so I won't
bother with that, however, you do have both continuant and occurrent, and
some of John's lattice of types, and your whole approach is riddled with a
"linguistic" leaning which you seem unable to perceive.
MW: On the other hand some bits will be (may be) independent. They will be
those bits that relate only to sets ata general level, like numbers.
>
> >
> > I, Pat Hayes, John Sowa, Chris Partridge, Nicola Guarino
> > (please correct me
> > if I am mistaken) and perhaps others would argue that we
> > would be better
> > served by understanding the existing World Viewpoints and
> > relating them to
> > each other.
>
> I think everything here hinges on your notion of "World
> Viewpoints". If, by
> this, you mean formal ontologies relating to mereology, biological
> categories, set theory, etc., then I agree that we are well
> served by trying
> to understand them and relate them to each other (and
> incorporate them into
> a merged ontology). Furthermore, I agree that there are some deep
> theoretical issues that we have to work through, e.g. the
> representation of
> time. If these latter issues prevent us from developing a single,
> monolithic ontology, then I think we should get as clear as
> possible about
> the the different viewpoints in the debate and then formalize
> and package
> these different viewpoints in independent modules. It would
> be unfortunate
> if we didn't end up with a single, overarching, and
> consistent conceptual
> schema, but perhaps this goal is unattainable.
MW: Doing this is expecting to achieve 1) above. I would be deeply grateful
to contribute a small piece to achieving that, though I do not expect to see
it
in my life-time.
> If it is
> unattainable, then
> I think the best we can do is to make clear the various
> representational
> choices and bundle them up in consistent and independent packages.
MW: I think we can do better than that, we can relate the different packages
by mappings
>
> >
> > Discussion
> >
> > As far as I can see there are four possible outcomes to Ian's
> > approach.
> >
> > 1. Ian solves the problem that previous philosophers have
> > failed to solve
> > and creates a single ontology that everyone agrees is how the
> > world is.
> >
> > 2. Ian recreates one of the possibilities that are already
> > known about.
> >
> > 3. Ian creates a new ontology with a different world
> > viewpoint than those
> > already existing, adding one more to the list that
> > philosophers don't agree
> > about.
> >
> > 4. Ian fails to create a consistent ontology.
>
> First of all, the ontology isn't going to be created
> single-handedly by me.
> The merged ontology is the product of a range of formal
> ontologies, and it
> will be refined on the basis of comments and criticisms from
> the SUO WG.
>
> Second, I don't agree that this four-fold set of choices
> exhausts the range
> of possibilities, because I don't see that we're trying to
> get straight
> about "how the world is". As I see it, we're trying to
> create a conceptual
> schema that should, insofar as possible, support every
> conceptual model that
> anyone would ever want to develop.
MW: Now you are putting words into my mouth. I have never said we should or
can get straight about how the world is. I have only said that there are a
number of ways of viewing the world that have been found useful by different
groups and that we should recognise these, and how to get from one to
another where they are incompatible. This is quite different from trying to
determine whether one of them is right (an unlikely outcome, and in any case
the wrong test, utility in a context is the engineers test).
> In other words, we're not
> trying to
> stake claims on the nature of the world;
MW: I think you're the only person who thinks anyone is trying to do this.
> we're essentially
> trying to develop
> the semantic content of a language which can express such
> claims (and many
> other claims as well).
MW: Yes this is my fear. You use the term "semantic content of a language"
which I take to be something of a dictionary or thesaurus, and I don't think
this is what we are about.
MW: By the way, what I infer here is something that could be done, but it is
not what a number of us think we are doing here, but is essentially a
linguistic endeavour.
> To ask after the "World Viewpoint" of
> an ontology
> construed in this way would be analogous to asking after the "World
> Viewpoint" that informs the English language or the Library
> of Congress
> system of subject categories.
MW: And of course English has one, and it is much less snow centric than
Inuit. But again you worry me just by referring to language and the library
of congress. That is not an ontology (as Pat just pointed out) or at least a
very different beast than many of us are thinking of (which would at least
explain the talking at cross purposes).
> A natural language and subject
> categorization
> scheme don't embody a single view about the way the world is;
MW: So why did I put "linguistic" as a viewpoint above (even before I read
this)?
> they provide a
> representational framework for stating and locating views
> about the world.
MW: Well that would be what I was proposing, but stating the viewpoints
rather than just naming the terms teh viewpoint might be expressed in.
> I would argue that we should regard our upper-level ontology
> in a similar
> manner.
MW: I'm getting confused.
>
> >
> > Let us consider these in turn:
> >
> > 1. Included for completeness only. I don't think Ian expects
> > this outcome.
> >
> > 2. One of the two most likely outcomes, in which case it
> would be more
> > efficient to do some homework and make an informed choice (or
> > adopt the
> > counter position above).
> >
> > 3. A remote possibility, and probably the least useful.
> >
> > 4. The most likely short term result, based on what I read
> and my own
> > experience, getting to a consistent universal ontology from
> > scratch takes
> > some 5-10+ years work -- for those few who can claim some measure of
> > success.
> >
> > The alternative approach:
> >
> > - Recognises that there are a (small) number of major world
> > viewpoints that exist and are valid (within some range).
>
> You're going to lose the philosophers here. No nominalist
> philosopher is
> going to admit that Platonic realism is valid within any
> range. No idealist
> philosopher would allow that a perceiver-independent notion
> of matter or
> substance is tenable. No sceptical philosopher is ever going
> to allow that
> we have any knowledge of anything. Really, I think you're vastly
> underestimating the depth and scope of disagreement among
> philosophers, even
> among analytic philosophers (who all subscribe to the same
> logico-linguistic
> orientation).
MW: Most of these issues I don't care about. I don't think there are any
supporters of the more outlandish philosophies you mention in this group.
And even if there were, I do not see our job as settling the argument
between them, but in providing a framework within which their world
viewpoint can be expressed, so that those who are interested can map what
can be said with one viewpoint, to what can be said in another. A much more
limited aim than you would foist upon us.
>
> > - Tries to understand explicitly what are the elements that
> > underpin those viewpoints and the applicable range.
> > - Identifies key choices that are mutually exclusive.
> > - Documents those viewpoints based on that understanding.
> > - Enables interoperation between those viewpoints by
> > mapping between them.
>
> I would embrace an approach that followed these last four steps, if by
> "viewpoint" you mean a set of concepts or axioms that (i.)
> are needed to
> represent something that we would conceivably want to express
> in the context
> of an information system and (ii.) that are incompatible with
> one another or
> the overarching system of categories.
MW: Well that sounds promising.
>
> >
> > We could of course pursue both of these options.
> >
> > Comments?
> >
> > Regards
> > Matthew
> > =============================================
> > Matthew West
> > Operations & Asset Management
> > Shell Services International
> > H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> > Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
> > Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> > E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> > http://www.shellservices.com/
> > http://homepages.rya-online.net/matthew-west
> > =============================================
> > Also:
> > Shell Visiting Professor
> > The Keyworth Institute
> > The University of Leeds
> > http://www.keyworth.leeds.ac.uk/
> > =============================================
> >
> >
>