RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
Doug,
I think I should reply to your point personally - though Matthew has
actually answered most of the points.
You say:
What concerns me is language such as "I
hope you are not dismissing the difference between Endurantists and
Perdurantists". This appears to go beyond the discussion of concepts and
architectures into the realm of classifying people into various camps based
on their understanding, use of, or comfort with, these concepts.
Firstly, as Matthew has pointed out I am trying to be inclusive - whereas it
seems to me that the 'approach' described in your mail below, while
well-intentioned is actually exclusive - i.e. has the property you were
attributing to my approach.
For the record - I have been careful to say that the different ontologies
can be considered as points of view - with questions as to which is better
in which situation left till later. I have not suggested that people have to
subscribe to one - though they are free to do so - explicitly, as in the
case of Matthew and Pat, or implicitly in the case of many other people. So
you are free to subscribe to as many or as few ontologies as you like.
However, if you want to build a single ontology that encompasses all these
views, you need to explain how you are going to do this without
contradiction - and the best of luck!!!
I think you may have misunderstood, the very important point, I was making.
This is that if we are producing ontologies we are going to have to produce
a modularized (not fragmented) product - we have no choice. Once one starts
trying to produce the kind of accurate representations of the world required
by computer systems, one finds that one is faced by choices.
Let me give a non-4-D/3-D example (we have had a plethora of 4-D/3-D
examples).
We can take:
* the 'immaterialist' view of space-time as positing an immaterial object
space-time with spatio-temporal regions as parts, distinct from material
physical objects.
* the 'materialist' view of space-time as regarding material physical
objects as filled space-time.
(Of course. assuming that we have been careful about how we define all the
terms.)
I am now writing this email at my desk. Under the immaterialist view there
'exist' two things - my desk and the region it occupies. Under the
materialist view there only 'exists' one. It seems to me difficult to build
an ontology that can say that it is true both that 'there is one thing' and
'that there are two things', with ending up with a contradiction - and I
would be *very* interested in knowing how this can be done.
You wrote:
I am going on record to say I
will resist any attempt to classify me in such a way, and will work to
maintain an inclusive rather than a fragmenting posture for any product
that emerges from our collective efforts.
If by 'inclusive posture' you mean a single ontology - you need to explain
how this can be done. I would also be interested in what your posture is on
the Endurantist/Perdurantist position. Taking the classical statue/clay
example described by Matthew, what is your ontic commitment - what objects
do you think exist and why?
One can, of course, aim for a collection of ontologies, with these two views
as members. Or an ontology generator, which takes the choices you make and
builds an ontology.
Everything I have been saying up to now is consistent with the notion of
building a collection of ontologies - with translation mechanisms between
them.
What it seems to me you are suggesting (and it seems to me Ian Niles is
actually doing) is to presume that there is a single 'good-enough' ontology.
This implies that there is no need to consider the different ontologies, and
so by implication the motivation that underlies them. This is a bit like
saying 'we want to include everyone, as long as everyone is of the same
type'.
There is also a very important practical point. No-one has yet get very far
towards getting a reasonable statement on even just one ontology - so asking
for a system encompassing all (or even many) is a tall order. It seems to me
(and Matthew, to judge from his most recent emails) sensible to start by
trying to outline some of the major ones, and how they fit together. To
(mis)quote Ian Niles - if the philosophers have had some difficulties in
getting a single ontology, then perhaps we should try not to fall into the
same trap.
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org]On Behalf Of Douglas McDavid
Sent: 05 March 2001 18:26
To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
Chris --
I would like to make an observation here that just struck me as a point of
discomfort. I suppose it is an interesting and valid thing to explore at
length the ontological architecture that you have articulated - both
earlier and in your revised Word document version over the last several
days. I have to admit that I don't really get the distinction that is
being labored so mightily between a 4-D world and a 3-D world plus time. I
say this having read your book very thoroughly, which you were kind enough
to send me in electronic form. I annotated it heavily, with the intent of
pursuing a detailed conversation with you, because it seems to be very
fundamental in the minds of several people here, but I haven't had the
time, then or now to really engage at the level I would like.
The point of discomfort for me, though, goes beyond the architecture, or
issues ontological relativism. What concerns me is language such as "I
hope you are not dismissing the difference between Endurantists and
Perdurantists". This appears to go beyond the discussion of concepts and
architectures into the realm of classifying people into various camps based
on their understanding, use of, or comfort with, these concepts. This
reification of concepts in the form of competing groups of people, and
labeling human beings in this way, will tend to create a polarizing effect
that is antithetical to the work at hand. By this I am not simply whining
"Can't we all just please get along ...". I am going on record to say I
will resist any attempt to classify me in such a way, and will work to
maintain an inclusive rather than a fragmenting posture for any product
that emerges from our collective efforts.
Doug McDavid
Certified Executive Consultant
Voice of the Practitioner Initiatives
Professional Development - BIS, Americas
Member of IBM Academy of Technology
mcdavid@us.ibm.com -- 916-549-4600
Chris Partridge <chris_partridge@csi.com>@ieee.org on 03/05/2001 05:49:04
AM
Please respond to Chris Partridge <chris_partridge@csi.com>
Sent by: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
To: sowa@bestweb.net, standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
cc:
Subject: RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
John,
I think we might be agreeing - at least in part.
I was not arguing for one ontology being right - merely for understanding
what choices one faces when trying to make a consistent 'collection of
signs'.
I agree that there are different world views - which one can characterize
as
collections of signs. It is probably true that some of the different
collections of signs are better for one purpose, and some for others. And
that, in some sense, it is better to have a collection of collections.
However, it seems to me that making a consistent 'collection of signs' or
'world-view' is difficult. So producing even one consistent view would be
an
achievement. Also, that the process of producing the one view helps to
establish how each choice influences/constrains the others.
Other comments below: CP>
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: sowa@bestweb.net [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
Sent: 05 March 2001 02:00
To: Chris Partridge; John F. Sowa; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
Chris,
Although I am a realist (in the sense that I believe that there
are fundamental laws of the universe, which science is slowly
approaching, but never quite capturing completely), I
also believe that any representation we use is at best an
approximation for a particular purpose. My main point is that
I don't consider any representation to be absolutely correct.
CP> The ontological relativity is different from the increasing accuracy of
empirical theories - as what distinguishes the different ontological
positions is not a matter for empirical observation.
>Of course, I if was going to be exact, I should have written - "In a
>Perdurantist (Eternalist) Ontology ..." - but everyone seems to have taken
>4-D and 3-D as short-hand for this.
I don't even like terms like perdurantist as qualifiers on the
ontology. I consider them (like 3-D and 4-D) to be qualifiers
on a particular collection of signs that may be useful for one
purpose and not quite so useful for others. I don't consider
either 3-D or 4-D to be "more fundamental" than the other.
CP> I do not remember arguing that one or other was more fundamental (I am
not sure how one would measure fundamental) - however I do believe (along
with Matthew and Pat) on the basis of experience, that the 4-D (or
Perdurantist) view has significant advantages for the semantic integration
of commercial systems (e-commerce etc.). I also think that if someone were
to document this view in detail, this would be a big step forward.
>the position is really about
>the nature of change and time and - as you have pointed out a number of
>times - the closely related notion of cause.
I agree.
>However, I hope you are not dismissing the difference between Endurantists
>and Perdurantists as 'artifact[s] of
>the notation'.
As I have said, each view emphasizes some aspects of reality
that may be more difficult to state in the other. They each
have their place. I would consider them important for the SUO,
but there are an enormous number of very serious issues that
are more important than either one.
CP> It seems to me that if we are going to produce a 'collection of signs',
it is useful to understand what constraints there are on these. And that
producing a 'collection of signs' is one of the starting points to
producing
a collection of collections of signs.
CP> What other issues would you regards as more important?
>.... It seems to me
>that you are assuming an ontological absolutism that cannot be supported.
No, not at all. I consider all axiomatizations as collections
of signs that are used to express some particular view of
the reality. But I don't think that any one collection can ever
be complete by itself. The totality of all such views would be
better, but even that would probably be incomplete in many ways.
CP> I am not sure what you mean here by complete. Surely one can produce a
'complete' world view? Of course, you could argue a collection of world
views would be better - but is 'complete' a good word to use for this
collection - as it probably has an infinite number of members and the
chance
of us getting a 'complete' collection of them is small - and the chance of
us proving it is complete even smaller.
>The key point about ontological relativity is that is forces on us
>architectural choices when building our ontology - and the need for
>translations between alternative choices.
I agree. I just want to keep all choices in the ontology
instead of saying that each choice leads to a different
ontology.
CP> I do not see how you can do this technically - but even if one could,
then surely this makes the ontological architecture exercise even more
valid - as it highlights the constraints each choice places upon the other
choices.
John