RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
John,
I think we might be agreeing - at least in part.
I was not arguing for one ontology being right - merely for understanding
what choices one faces when trying to make a consistent 'collection of
signs'.
I agree that there are different world views - which one can characterize as
collections of signs. It is probably true that some of the different
collections of signs are better for one purpose, and some for others. And
that, in some sense, it is better to have a collection of collections.
However, it seems to me that making a consistent 'collection of signs' or
'world-view' is difficult. So producing even one consistent view would be an
achievement. Also, that the process of producing the one view helps to
establish how each choice influences/constrains the others.
Other comments below: CP>
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: sowa@bestweb.net [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
Sent: 05 March 2001 02:00
To: Chris Partridge; John F. Sowa; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline - roles
Chris,
Although I am a realist (in the sense that I believe that there
are fundamental laws of the universe, which science is slowly
approaching, but never quite capturing completely), I
also believe that any representation we use is at best an
approximation for a particular purpose. My main point is that
I don't consider any representation to be absolutely correct.
CP> The ontological relativity is different from the increasing accuracy of
empirical theories - as what distinguishes the different ontological
positions is not a matter for empirical observation.
>Of course, I if was going to be exact, I should have written - "In a
>Perdurantist (Eternalist) Ontology ..." - but everyone seems to have taken
>4-D and 3-D as short-hand for this.
I don't even like terms like perdurantist as qualifiers on the
ontology. I consider them (like 3-D and 4-D) to be qualifiers
on a particular collection of signs that may be useful for one
purpose and not quite so useful for others. I don't consider
either 3-D or 4-D to be "more fundamental" than the other.
CP> I do not remember arguing that one or other was more fundamental (I am
not sure how one would measure fundamental) - however I do believe (along
with Matthew and Pat) on the basis of experience, that the 4-D (or
Perdurantist) view has significant advantages for the semantic integration
of commercial systems (e-commerce etc.). I also think that if someone were
to document this view in detail, this would be a big step forward.
>the position is really about
>the nature of change and time and - as you have pointed out a number of
>times - the closely related notion of cause.
I agree.
>However, I hope you are not dismissing the difference between Endurantists
>and Perdurantists as 'artifact[s] of
>the notation'.
As I have said, each view emphasizes some aspects of reality
that may be more difficult to state in the other. They each
have their place. I would consider them important for the SUO,
but there are an enormous number of very serious issues that
are more important than either one.
CP> It seems to me that if we are going to produce a 'collection of signs',
it is useful to understand what constraints there are on these. And that
producing a 'collection of signs' is one of the starting points to producing
a collection of collections of signs.
CP> What other issues would you regards as more important?
>.... It seems to me
>that you are assuming an ontological absolutism that cannot be supported.
No, not at all. I consider all axiomatizations as collections
of signs that are used to express some particular view of
the reality. But I don't think that any one collection can ever
be complete by itself. The totality of all such views would be
better, but even that would probably be incomplete in many ways.
CP> I am not sure what you mean here by complete. Surely one can produce a
'complete' world view? Of course, you could argue a collection of world
views would be better - but is 'complete' a good word to use for this
collection - as it probably has an infinite number of members and the chance
of us getting a 'complete' collection of them is small - and the chance of
us proving it is complete even smaller.
>The key point about ontological relativity is that is forces on us
>architectural choices when building our ontology - and the need for
>translations between alternative choices.
I agree. I just want to keep all choices in the ontology
instead of saying that each choice leads to a different
ontology.
CP> I do not see how you can do this technically - but even if one could,
then surely this makes the ontological architecture exercise even more
valid - as it highlights the constraints each choice places upon the other
choices.
John