RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
>Pat,
>
> See my comments below.
>
>-Ian
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: pat hayes [mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu]
> > Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2001 6:49 PM
> > To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Subject: Re: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
> >
> >
> >
> > Ian Niles <iniles@teknowledge.com>, to Matthew West:
> >
> > >I understand your position. I'm still not convinced that a
> > 4D orientation
> > >cannot be incorporated into the merged ontology, and I think
> > the replacement
> > >of the 'Continuant'/'Occurrent' dichotomy with the
> > >'ContinuantType'/'OccurrentType' division is a step in this
> > direction,
> > >because this division is consistent with the claim that
> > things in themselves
> > >are neither continuants nor occurrents (rather, type descriptions are
> > >continuant-like or occurrent-like). Furthermore, nothing in
> > the merged
> > >ontology (to my knowledge) is inconsistent with the claim
> > that everything as
> > >a space-time worm. If you disagree, could you cite an axiom
> > or subclass
> > >relationship from the merged ontology that, by your lights,
> > is inconsistent
> > >with this claim.
> >
> > Oh, come on Ian! All the mereotopology, all the time-interval theory
> > and all the 'holes'; the continuant/occurrent distinction; Virtually
> > any concept that refers to 'ordinary things' (which is a loose phrase
> > for 'continuant' here). Almost the entire upper classification will
> > have to be re-done. Might be worth trying it, though. If I had any
> > spare time I wouldnt mind having a go at it myself.
>
>I agree that the merged ontology makes liberal use of the ordinary notion of
>a physical object,
The very fact that you find this 'ordinary notion' so central and
clear is in itself some of the "light" I referred to below. Is the
coffee in a half-full mug an ordinary physical object (OPO, to put
one of Awbrey's mannerisms to work for a moment)? Is the thread in a
piece of fabric an OPO? Is the paint on my car an OPO? Is a bead of
sweat on my brow an OPO? It is virtually impossible to walk through
the world during daylight without seeing several hundred things every
hour which would be problematic to classify firmly as either OPOs or
non-OPOs.
>but I also think that this notion can be defined in terms
>of the concepts that a 4D ontology would admit. In fact, you described one
>possible way of doing this in your most recent exchange with Matthew West.
No, that was one way that a *continuant* could be mapped into a 4-d
ontology. Ordinary objects are already in the 4-d ontology (anything
that occupies space and lasts for a time is in the 4-d ontology) but
they aren't thought of as continuants there.
>Furthermore, a 4D ontology that could not formalize our talk about ordinary
>physical objects would, it seems to me, be of very limited utility.
Of course; but it can. (Well, Im not sure what you mean by "talk". In
one sense I don't think we should be trying to formalize talk.)
>Most of
>our daily interactions with the world and our speech about these
>interactions crucially involve this notion.
>
>There are really two distinct issues here that I think you're conflating.
>One issue is about the concepts that we admit into our ontology, and the
>other is how we cash out these concepts and/or map them to other conceptual
>schemes. The merged ontology locates physical objects towards the top of
>the hierarchy, but, as much as possible, it leaves open the question of how
>this notion is to be philosophically construed.
I am talking about the concepts used by the axioms which comprise the ontology.
These distinctions are not mere philosophical decorations; they arise
sharply as soon as you try to actually write axioms. The axioms of a
4-d ontology will look very, very different from those of an
endurantist ontology. So as soon as someone wants to start on the
business of creating an actual ontology, they will need to take a
stance on issues like this.
There really is not much point in having a standard upper ontology
which just tells you that you need to talk about everyday physical
objects. We know that before we start. The relevant ontological issue
is, HOW are you going to do that talking? What ontological concepts
are going to be used to refer to the everyday categories of cabbages
and kings? It is those concepts - which might be the apparatus of an
endurantist approach, or of a 4-d approach, or of some other approach
- which are the 'concepts that we will admit to our ontology', not
everyday things.
Let me see if I can make the point with an analogy. Matthew and Chris
P. and myself are like carpenters arguing about whether to use oak,
ash or elm for the legs of chairs, and you are telling us that what
we need are legs. Its not that you are wrong, exactly; but why are
you in the carpenter's shop?
> > > >
> > > > MW: The inferences (in both directions) constitute the
> > > > mapping. A mapping
> > > > specification may be developed for members of particular classes.
> > > >
> > > > MW: The advantage of this approach is that different world
> > > > viewpoints are
> > > > respected and kept separate, whilst we learn explicitly of
> > > > the relationship
> > > > between them, and we have a basis for challenging the utility and
> > > > completeness of particular world viewpoints.
> > >
> > >Well, in compiling the first few versions of the merged
> > ontology, I've done
> > >my best to avoid adopting a "world viewpoint".
> >
> > Ian, it is IMPOSSIBLE to avoid adopting a world view when making an
> > ontology. Your view shines through almost every comment you make like
> > a bright light. It is clear that you think like what might be called
> > an Aristotelian endurantist: you see "ordinary" physical things as
> > real and lasting through time, you find solid physical things as more
> > real than things like spaces and surfaces; you think that things of
> > zero thickness can't be spatiotemporally located; you think that
> > universals exist.
>
>An "Aristotelian endurantist", can I put that on my resume? Honestly, I
>don't know why you think I believe all of these philosophical claims, and
>they certainly have not been incorporated into the merged ontology.
Oh, they indeed have. The mereotopological axioms for example do not
admit surfaces into the domain of quantification.
>I'm not
>a realist about physical objects or universals, and when did I ever say that
>spaces and surfaces are less real than objects or "things of zero thickness
>can't be spatiotemporally located"?
I inferred it from your reactions to some of Matthew's earlier
messages; but the inference was not deductively valid, I confess.
> The merged ontology contains just one
>existence claim, viz. that there is at least one instance of the root node
>'Entity'.
>
>As I see it, what we're trying to do in constructing an upper-level ontology
>is to provide a precisely specified vocabulary that supports anything that
>we would every want to say in a formal context. As paradoxical as it might
>sound, I think we should strive for an ontology that makes as few
>ontological commitments as possible.
It is paradoxical, yes, as you will find out if you try to write any
reasonably dense collection of axioms about almost anything.
>The more philosophical assumptions we
>build into the ontology, the more philosophers are going to be alienated by
>the ontology, and the more engineers are going to shake their heads in
>stupefaction.
It's the engineers who know most acutely why the conceptual
vocabulary is central. Why do you think that the people you are
arguing with here are working for Shell, developing business
ontologies, and in my case worrying about physical reasoning? You are
arguing with the practical guys here, trying to make us swallow a
wierd cocktail distilled from Peirce, Whitehead, Lesniewski and God
knows who else, and you have the brass balls to tell us that
engineers might be too confused by hyperspace??
> >
> > >I'm sure that many
> > >assumptions about the real nature of the world have crept
> > in, but the aim
> > >has always been to create a high-level language that
> > supports anything that
> > >we would ever want to say in a formal context.
> >
> > Anything, ever? That is a very large claim.
> >
>
>That's the aim. I think that the more we approach it, the more successful
>we'll be.
I'm tempted to invoke monkeys, trees and the moon, but I will refrain.
> > <snip>
> >
> > > >
> > > > MW: Continuant does not compute in "my" ontology.
> > >
> > >If this implies that you are unable to ascribe
> > continuant-like properties to
> > >(what we ordinarily regard as) objects, then that sounds
> > like a limitation
> > >of your ontology.
> >
> > Ian, "continuant" is not a natural kind, a term of nature; it is a
> > term which is only meaningful within one philosophical approach to
> > ontology. There are other approaches, and I agree with Matthew that
> > the 4-d one is of considerably greater utility. (It is (still) the
> > only ontological framework within which one can even begin to
> > describe fluids adequately, for example, and it is the basic
> > framework used throughout qualitative physical reasoning, for good
> > reasons: nothing else cuts the mustard.) You may not agree, of
> > course, many people don't. But to say that a rejection of the
> > concept of continuant is a "limitation", is to be blinkered by one
> > world-view. Of course everyone agrees that what we ordinarily regard
> > as objects must be describable in any ontology. But it doenst follow
> > that they must be described as continuants.
>
>I really don't follow you here. To my mind, what we ordinary regard as
>objects are regarded in this way precisely because we ascribe
>continuant-like properties to them.
Well, yes, you do seem to be an endurantist, as Ive said, so one
would expect that your mind would work that way. Nothing personal,
just an observation.
Pat
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