RE: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
Pat,
See my comments below.
-Ian
> -----Original Message-----
> From: pat hayes [mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2001 6:49 PM
> To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: Re: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
>
>
>
> Ian Niles <iniles@teknowledge.com>, to Matthew West:
>
> >I understand your position. I'm still not convinced that a
> 4D orientation
> >cannot be incorporated into the merged ontology, and I think
> the replacement
> >of the 'Continuant'/'Occurrent' dichotomy with the
> >'ContinuantType'/'OccurrentType' division is a step in this
> direction,
> >because this division is consistent with the claim that
> things in themselves
> >are neither continuants nor occurrents (rather, type descriptions are
> >continuant-like or occurrent-like). Furthermore, nothing in
> the merged
> >ontology (to my knowledge) is inconsistent with the claim
> that everything as
> >a space-time worm. If you disagree, could you cite an axiom
> or subclass
> >relationship from the merged ontology that, by your lights,
> is inconsistent
> >with this claim.
>
> Oh, come on Ian! All the mereotopology, all the time-interval theory
> and all the 'holes'; the continuant/occurrent distinction; Virtually
> any concept that refers to 'ordinary things' (which is a loose phrase
> for 'continuant' here). Almost the entire upper classification will
> have to be re-done. Might be worth trying it, though. If I had any
> spare time I wouldnt mind having a go at it myself.
I agree that the merged ontology makes liberal use of the ordinary notion of
a physical object, but I also think that this notion can be defined in terms
of the concepts that a 4D ontology would admit. In fact, you described one
possible way of doing this in your most recent exchange with Matthew West.
Furthermore, a 4D ontology that could not formalize our talk about ordinary
physical objects would, it seems to me, be of very limited utility. Most of
our daily interactions with the world and our speech about these
interactions crucially involve this notion.
There are really two distinct issues here that I think you're conflating.
One issue is about the concepts that we admit into our ontology, and the
other is how we cash out these concepts and/or map them to other conceptual
schemes. The merged ontology locates physical objects towards the top of
the hierarchy, but, as much as possible, it leaves open the question of how
this notion is to be philosophically construed.
>
> > >
> > > MW: The inferences (in both directions) constitute the
> > > mapping. A mapping
> > > specification may be developed for members of particular classes.
> > >
> > > MW: The advantage of this approach is that different world
> > > viewpoints are
> > > respected and kept separate, whilst we learn explicitly of
> > > the relationship
> > > between them, and we have a basis for challenging the utility and
> > > completeness of particular world viewpoints.
> >
> >Well, in compiling the first few versions of the merged
> ontology, I've done
> >my best to avoid adopting a "world viewpoint".
>
> Ian, it is IMPOSSIBLE to avoid adopting a world view when making an
> ontology. Your view shines through almost every comment you make like
> a bright light. It is clear that you think like what might be called
> an Aristotelian endurantist: you see "ordinary" physical things as
> real and lasting through time, you find solid physical things as more
> real than things like spaces and surfaces; you think that things of
> zero thickness can't be spatiotemporally located; you think that
> universals exist.
An "Aristotelian endurantist", can I put that on my resume? Honestly, I
don't know why you think I believe all of these philosophical claims, and
they certainly have not been incorporated into the merged ontology. I'm not
a realist about physical objects or universals, and when did I ever say that
spaces and surfaces are less real than objects or "things of zero thickness
can't be spatiotemporally located"? The merged ontology contains just one
existence claim, viz. that there is at least one instance of the root node
'Entity'.
As I see it, what we're trying to do in constructing an upper-level ontology
is to provide a precisely specified vocabulary that supports anything that
we would every want to say in a formal context. As paradoxical as it might
sound, I think we should strive for an ontology that makes as few
ontological commitments as possible. The more philosophical assumptions we
build into the ontology, the more philosophers are going to be alienated by
the ontology, and the more engineers are going to shake their heads in
stupefaction.
>
> >I'm sure that many
> >assumptions about the real nature of the world have crept
> in, but the aim
> >has always been to create a high-level language that
> supports anything that
> >we would ever want to say in a formal context.
>
> Anything, ever? That is a very large claim.
>
That's the aim. I think that the more we approach it, the more successful
we'll be.
> <snip>
>
> > >
> > > MW: Continuant does not compute in "my" ontology.
> >
> >If this implies that you are unable to ascribe
> continuant-like properties to
> >(what we ordinarily regard as) objects, then that sounds
> like a limitation
> >of your ontology.
>
> Ian, "continuant" is not a natural kind, a term of nature; it is a
> term which is only meaningful within one philosophical approach to
> ontology. There are other approaches, and I agree with Matthew that
> the 4-d one is of considerably greater utility. (It is (still) the
> only ontological framework within which one can even begin to
> describe fluids adequately, for example, and it is the basic
> framework used throughout qualitative physical reasoning, for good
> reasons: nothing else cuts the mustard.) You may not agree, of
> course, many people don't. But to say that a rejection of the
> concept of continuant is a "limitation", is to be blinkered by one
> world-view. Of course everyone agrees that what we ordinarily regard
> as objects must be describable in any ontology. But it doenst follow
> that they must be described as continuants.
I really don't follow you here. To my mind, what we ordinary regard as
objects are regarded in this way precisely because we ascribe
continuant-like properties to them. There are various ways of cashing out
these properties, and perhaps it can be done in a 4D context.
>
> <big snip>
>
> > >
> > > MW: That's interesting. So a piece of paper with writing on
> > > it is abstract.
> > > Now I always thought you could pick a piece of paper up?
> > >
> > > MW: I think you have a problem. A piece of paper is either
> > > abstract or not.
> >
> >Well, the idea was that things like books are composite
> entites. They have
> >an abstract component (the informational content) and a
> physical component,
> >since they are chunks of matter with a host of
> spatio-temporal properties.
> >Accordingly, a book is, on this view, both an abstract thing
> and a physical
> >object. I'm willing to revise this view, if strong
> counterarguments come to
> >light, but it doesn't strike me as obviously false.
>
> It does if being an abstract thing means what it seems to mean, ie
> membership in a class. Being X and having an X-ish 'component' are
> not quite the same thing, are they? And just what do you mean by
> being 'composite' and having a 'component', in any case?
I agree that there are problems in speaking this way. I think subclassing
'ContentBearingObject' under 'Object' only and then formulating an axiom to
the effect that every 'ContentBearingObject' has an 'Abstract' component
will do the trick.
>
> Pat Hayes
>
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