SUO: RE: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
Dear Ian,
See additional comments below.
Regards
Matthew
============================================
Matthew West
Operations & Asset Management
Shell Services International
H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
Mobile: +44 7796 336538
E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
http://www.shellservices.com/
============================================
<snip>
> > > Matthew,
> > >
> > > Please see my replies below - edited for brevity.
> > >
> > > -Ian
> > >
> > > >
> > > > MW: Do you have some things in the merged ontology that are
> > > > not found here?
> > > > (e.g. holes).
> > >
> > > Actually, I would eventually like to make the theory of holes
> > > part of a
> > > single, mereotopological theory ("Whole-Part" in your
> > > scheme). On the other
> > > hand, I don't see a place for the hierarchies of agents and
> > > organisms in
> > > your scheme.
> >
> > MW: They come somewhere under Organisational Level. Organisms
> > are highly
> > organised.
>
> Hmmmm....Since most things are highly organized, it sounds
> like you could
> pack most of the ontology under the category "Organisational Level".
MW: Yes, this is all about how things are put together from atoms and below
up to complex organisms and machines. In EPISTLE we already have some 20,000
classes in this area.
>
> > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Individual
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations for apply to all things that
> > > > > > exists in space time.
> > > > >
> > > > > It sounds like your notion of "Individual" has the same
> > meaning as
> > > > > 'Physical' in the merged ontology, which is a direct subclass
> > > > > of 'Entity'
> > > > > and is defined as follows:
> > > > >
> > > > > (documentation Physical "An entity that has a location in
> > > > > space-time. Note
> > > > > that
> > > > > points of space and time are themselves understood to have a
> > > > > location in
> > > > > space-time")
> > > >
> > > > MW: That looks like a hit to me, though occurrent and
> > > > continuent find no
> > > > place here.
> > >
> > > On the basis of Pat Hayes' and Chris Partridge's comments,
> > the classes
> > > 'Occurrent' and 'Continuant' were replaced with the classes
> > > 'OccurrentType'
> > > and 'ContinuantType', which are classes of classes of
> occurrents and
> > > continuants, respectively. This change was motivated by the
> > > fact that the
> > > distinction between occurrent and continuant is more stable
> > > with respect to
> > > type descriptions than with respect to individual things
> > > themselves. Note
> > > that 'OccurrentType' and 'ContinuantType' are both immediate
> > > subclasses of
> > > 'Entity' in the merged ontology.
> >
> > MW: This does nothing to help. It only means that instances
> > of those classes
> > have no members in any part of the ontology I have presented
> > an outline for,
> > since the members of members of continuent type must be continuents.
>
> The possibility that the merged ontology is broader in scope than the
> outline you presented doesn't strike me as a problem.
MW: You miss the point. Both a 4D ontology and a 3D ontology aim to give a
complete conceptualisation of the world (I could argue that a 4D ontology is
more capable, but that is unimportant for this discussion). In each ontology
a description can be built up of the world that involves different objects.
Overall each (say) is able to describe the same world. So it is not a matter
of the scope being different, it is a matter of how you describe the world
being different.
MW: Let me try to explain by how a famous example is described by the two
approaches.
MW: There are two lumps of clay that are fashioned into two parts of a vase.
The two parts of the vase/piece of clay are put together to make one
vase/piece of clay (this is the object(s) of interest). The vase is fired
and then smashed into small pieces.
Continuant/Occurrant Description
There is a Continuant Vase Object, a Continuant Piece of Clay Object, an
Occurrent Vase Life History object, and an Occurrent Piece of Clay Life
History Object (i.e. 4 different objects and 4 classifications). There are
relations between the life history objects and the continuant objects to
indicate that one is the life history of the other. There could also be a
relation that showed that the piece of clay and the vase were coincident for
both the life history and the continuant.
The rules of the ontology are that continuants and occurrants are disjoint,
so you need one of each. The rules are also such that at each organisational
level (vase, piece of clay) there are separate objects, even if they are
coincident.
4D description
There is a single 4D object that is the spatio-temporal extent of the
vase/piece of clay. It is a member of the class 4D vase, and it is a member
of the class 4D piece of clay.
The rules of the ontology are that if two objects are coincident, then they
are the same object, because spatio-temporal extent is the basis for
identity of individuals.
MW: What you will see from this is that your ontology (although in this case
both convey the same information) actually determines what objects exist,
and also therefore what classes you are interested in. All four objects in
the continuant/occurrent ontology get merged into one object in a 4D
ontology (there are cases where there can be more 4D objects than 3D
objects).
MW: Now I can write down the rules for converting from one ontology to the
other, but if I try to combine the two I just get nonsense, because there is
a basic conflict between the ontologies about what objects exist.
>
> >
> > MW: You may recall that I have said a couple of times that at
> > least the 4D
> > ontology I am working on should be mapped to and not
> combined with the
> > workyou are doing. The reason is that in a 4D ontology there are no
> > individuals that are continuents. That is because the basis
> > for what an
> > object is is different. On the other hand, from a 4D
> > individual, you will
> > always be able to infer an occurrent (it might even be the
> > same object - I'm
> > not sure) and sometimes you will be able to infer a
> > continuent, but this
> > will definitely not be the same thing as the object from which the
> > continuents existence is inferred.
>
> I understand your position. I'm still not convinced that a
> 4D orientation
> cannot be incorporated into the merged ontology, and I think
> the replacement
> of the 'Continuant'/'Occurrent' dichotomy with the
> 'ContinuantType'/'OccurrentType' division is a step in this direction,
> because this division is consistent with the claim that
> things in themselves
> are neither continuants nor occurrents (rather, type descriptions are
> continuant-like or occurrent-like). Furthermore, nothing in
> the merged
> ontology (to my knowledge) is inconsistent with the claim
> that everything as
> a space-time worm. If you disagree, could you cite an axiom
> or subclass
> relationship from the merged ontology that, by your lights,
> is inconsistent
> with this claim.
MW: It is quite straightforward. You will have some classes that are members
of ContinuantType. Anything that is a member of that ContinuantType must be
a Continuant. There are no objects that are continuants in a 4D ontology,
they are not necessary for a complete description of the world. On the other
hand, the existance of a Continuant can be in a continuant/occurant based
view can be inferred from some types of 4D object, but the 4D object itself
is not a member of any ContinuantType.
>
> >
> > MW: The inferences (in both directions) constitute the
> > mapping. A mapping
> > specification may be developed for members of particular classes.
> >
> > MW: The advantage of this approach is that different world
> > viewpoints are
> > respected and kept separate, whilst we learn explicitly of
> > the relationship
> > between them, and we have a basis for challenging the utility and
> > completeness of particular world viewpoints.
>
> Well, in compiling the first few versions of the merged
> ontology, I've done
> my best to avoid adopting a "world viewpoint".
MW: Actually you have a very distinct World View that I would describe as
intuitive. It is a shame you can't see it for yourself. It is actually
impossible not to have a world viewpoint (unless you are in a darkened room
- metaphorically - and that would be even worse). As someone famous once
said, everyone has a metaphysics, the only question is whether it is
implicit or explicit.
> I'm sure that many
> assumptions about the real nature of the world have crept in,
> but the aim
> has always been to create a high-level language that supports
> anything that
> we would ever want to say in a formal context.
MW: I'm just wondering how long it will take you to realise how difficult
that is. As a point of reference it took me about 5 years, so I hope you are
a quicker learner than I am.
>
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > State
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > > that have a non-zero temporal extent.
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't see how "State" differs from "Individual". Since all
> > > > > individuals
> > > > > exist in space/time, wouldn't they necessarily have a
> > > > > non-zero temporal
> > > > > extent?
> > > >
> > > > MW: But you just said above that points in time are
> > > > individuals, whereas
> > > > here we say that these are not states.
> > >
> > > OK, I think I understand now. Your "individual"/"state"
> distinction
> > > corresponds to the 'Object'/'Process' distinction in the
> > > merged ontology.
> > > Is this right? The docu-strings for 'Object' and
> 'Process' follow.
> > >
> > > (documentation Object "A Physical Continuant which retains
> > > its identity over
> >
> > MW: Continuant does not compute in "my" ontology.
>
> If this implies that you are unable to ascribe
> continuant-like properties to
> (what we ordinarily regard as) objects, then that sounds like
> a limitation
> of your ontology.
MW: Not at all, you just have a different way to say the same thing about
the world. As an analogy think about the different logical expressions that
are equivalent, perhaps with different variables in them. The transformation
you can do is teh mapping, and you might get different insights from the
different versions.
MW: By the way, I am being generous here. I really think 4D is a more
precise and accurate view of the world than a 3D view, but again that is not
the point here.
>
> > >
> > > some interval of time. Although no physical entity is ever
> > > permanent, an
> > > object
> > > can have stable properties over its lifespan. The type Object
> > > corresponds
> > > roughtly
> > > to the class of ordinary physical objects.")
> >
> > MW: Anything that has anything to do with continuant might
> > have a related
> > object in a 4D ontology, but it would not be the same abject.
> > Thus all the
> > classes that you are talking about are different classes
> > because they have
> > continuants as members and not 4D object, so they have different
> > memberships.
> > >
> > > (documentation Process "A Physical Occurrent during the
> interval of
> > > interest.
> > > Depending on the time scale and level of detail, the same
> > > actual entity may
> > > be
> > > viewed as a stable object or a dynamic process. Even an
> > > entity as stable as
> > > a
> > > diamond could be considered a process when viewed over a long
> > > time period or
> > > at
> > > the atomic level of vibrating particles.")
> >
> > MW: Now occurants are probably OK as 4D objects, but we
> might discover
> > otherwise.
> > >
> > > > > > Activity
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > > that are something happening to bring about change.
> > > > >
> > > > > As I've mentioned in other emails, the subject of change
> > > > has not been
> > > > > systematically addressed in the merged ontology. I'm
> > > > researching the
> > > > > possibility of incorporating something like the Situation
> > > > > Calculus, and I
> > > > > would welcome any suggestions along these lines.
> > > >
> > > > MW: I think what we have here may be nearer to your event
> > > and process.
> > > > Change is handled by states starting and terminating here.
> > >
> > > OK, sounds good to me.
> >
> > MW: Yes, but what you have presently is not cosistent with it.
>
> I've acknowledged that there is currently no representation
> of change in the
> merged ontology. However, this does not imply that the
> merged ontology is
> inconsistent with any particular representation of change; it
> simply means
> that we have a gap in the scheme that is waiting to be filled.
MW: Can you prove that statement?
>
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Temporal Boundary
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > > that have a zero temporal extent.
> > > > >
> > > > > It sounds like "Temporal Boundary" corresponds to the class
> > > > > of 'Abstract',
> > > > > another direct subclass of 'Entity'. Some axioms regarding
> > > > > 'Abstract' can
> > > > > be found in the section "General Axioms" of the
> merged ontology.
> > > >
> > > > MW: No. These are things that exist in space time, so
> > they cannot be
> > > > classes. They just have a zero extent in the time dimension,
> > > > they are at a
> > > > point in time.
> > >
> > > OK, so the items in this category would be indivisible slices
> > > of space-time
> > > worms?
> >
> > MW: In the sense that anything that has zero thickness is
> > indivisible. On
> > the other hand it is not indivisible spatially. Further the
> > objects that
> > they are slices of do not have to be contiguous either spatially or
> > temporally.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Class of Individual
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all
> classes that
> > > > > > have only individuals as members, e.g. pump, car.
> > > > >
> > > > > One idea that strikes me is that we could make 'Class' a
> > > > > direct subclass of
> > > > > 'Set'. This would allow us to apply all of the set-theoretic
> > > > > definitions/axioms to classes, as well as sets. This isn't
> > > > > the way things
> > > > > are currently structured in the ontology (currently, 'Set'
> > > > > and 'Class' are
> > > > > disjoint siblings of the parent class 'SetOrClass'), but
> > > it may be a
> > > > > convenient way of reusing the set-theoretic apparatus in the
> > > > > context of
> > > > > intensional classes.
> > > >
> > > > MW: yes but some classes, e.g. the proper classes are not sets.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure I follow you here. What do you mean by
> > "proper classes"?
> >
> > MW: See Chris M's recent seminal note on sets and classes.
> > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Information Pattern
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all
> classes that
> > > > > > define a pattern, in one or more individuals, that conveys
> > > > > > information.
> > > > >
> > > > > Currently, we have 'Proposition' as a direct subclass of
> > > > > 'Abstract' in the
> > > > > merged ontology. However, as Pat Hayes has pointed out, it
> > > > > is likely that
> > > > > the composite notion of 'ContentBearingThing' will prove to
> > > > > be more useful.
> > > > > In any case, axioms about these notions have yet to
> be written.
> > > >
> > > > MW: I don't think proposition is the same as information
> > > > pattern, unless you
> > > > think your DNA is a proposition.
> > >
> > > I agree, and the interesting example of a DNA strand fits
> > > into the current
> > > structure of the merged ontology. 'ContentBearingThing'
> is a direct
> > > subclass of 'Abstract' (not 'Proposition') and 'Object'.
> Hence, by
> > > subclassing DNA somewhere under 'ContentBearingThing' we
> capture its
> > > informational quality, without claiming that it states a
> > proposition.
> >
> > MW: That's interesting. So a piece of paper with writing on
> > it is abstract.
> > Now I always thought you could pick a piece of paper up?
> >
> > MW: I think you have a problem. A piece of paper is either
> > abstract or not.
>
> Well, the idea was that things like books are composite
> entites. They have
> an abstract component (the informational content) and a
> physical component,
> since they are chunks of matter with a host of
> spatio-temporal properties.
> Accordingly, a book is, on this view, both an abstract thing
> and a physical
> object. I'm willing to revise this view, if strong
> counterarguments come to
> light, but it doesn't strike me as obviously false.
MW: Not a very good idea in my opinion, but there you go, another difference
between a 3D and a 4D ontology. In 4D, if it is abstract then it is a class,
and the only thing to do is to understand how that makes sense (it always
has so far).
>
> > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Involvement in Activity
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all
> > relations that
> > > > > > indicate that a thing is involved in an activity. The
> > > > > > difference between involvement and participation is
> that the
> > > > > > involved object is a class or not contemporaneous with the
> > > > > > activity, e.g. a discussion today about World War II.
> > > > >
> > > > > I wonder if all cases of what you are calling "Involvement"
> > > > > could be covered
> > > > > by two predicates, viz. one linking a ContentBearingObject
> > > > > with a class that
> > > > > describes a topic of the object and one linking a
> > > > > ContentBearingObject with
> > > > > a particular object that is a referent of the object.
> > > >
> > > > MW: I'm not sure what you mean here by ContentBearingObject
> > > > unless it is
> > > > information. In which case not all things that are involved
> > > > in activities
> > > > are information.
> > >
> > > A 'ContentBearingThing' is simply any physical thing that carries
> > > information, e.g. a book, a CD, a reel of a film, etc.
> >
> > MW: But above you said content bearing thing was a subtype of
> > abstract :-(
>
> That's right. See my previous comment.
MW: So something can be both abstract and physical. Is it just me, or does
that sound like a contradiction?
MW: You could have the information as an abstract object, and the book (a
physical and non-abstract object) as somehow having the information as a
part.
MW: This is pretty much the view we had in the EPISTLE Core Model V2 Issue
1.2 (1998). See:
http://www.stepcom.ncl.ac.uk/epistle/data/HEADER.HTM
We are now at Version 4.0 (just being published) and we do not have that
view any more. I wonder why that might be?
>
> >
> > MW: Let me help. The information on the piece of paper is
> > abstract (it is
> > the class of all those pieces of paper with the same
> > information on it). Now
> > these classes are subtypes of abstract (but of course, they are just
> > classes).
>
> Well, there's another construal of what's going on here.
> Something abstract
> can be either a universal or a particular. If it's a class
> (as in a class
> of pieces of paper), it's a universal. If it's a single chunk of
> informational content (setting aside the question of how such
> content is
> chunked), it's a particular. However, both the class of
> pieces of paper and
> the particular chunk of informational content would be
> instances of the
> class 'Abstract'.
MW: yes, as I said above I've been there, don't much want to go back thanks,
its a quagmire.
>
> > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Regards
> > > > > > Matthew
> > > > > > ============================================
> > > > > > Matthew West
> > > > > > Operations & Asset Management
> > > > > > Shell Services International
> > > > > > H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> > > > > > Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
> > > > > > Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> > > > > > E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> > > > > > http://www.shellservices.com/
> > > > > > ============================================
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>