SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
Matthew,
More comments below.
-Ian
> -----Original Message-----
> From: West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK
> [mailto:Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2001 6:14 AM
> To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> Subject: SUO: RE: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
>
>
>
> Dear Ian,
>
> Please see further comments below.
>
> Regards
> Matthew
> ============================================
> Matthew West
> Operations & Asset Management
> Shell Services International
> H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
> Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> http://www.shellservices.com/
> ============================================
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > Sent: 26 February 2001 21:44
> > To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > Subject: SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline
> >
> >
> >
> > Matthew,
> >
> > Please see my replies below - edited for brevity.
> >
> > -Ian
> >
> > >
> > > MW: Do you have some things in the merged ontology that are
> > > not found here?
> > > (e.g. holes).
> >
> > Actually, I would eventually like to make the theory of holes
> > part of a
> > single, mereotopological theory ("Whole-Part" in your
> > scheme). On the other
> > hand, I don't see a place for the hierarchies of agents and
> > organisms in
> > your scheme.
>
> MW: They come somewhere under Organisational Level. Organisms
> are highly
> organised.
Hmmmm....Since most things are highly organized, it sounds like you could
pack most of the ontology under the category "Organisational Level".
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > Individual
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations for apply to all things that
> > > > > exists in space time.
> > > >
> > > > It sounds like your notion of "Individual" has the same
> meaning as
> > > > 'Physical' in the merged ontology, which is a direct subclass
> > > > of 'Entity'
> > > > and is defined as follows:
> > > >
> > > > (documentation Physical "An entity that has a location in
> > > > space-time. Note
> > > > that
> > > > points of space and time are themselves understood to have a
> > > > location in
> > > > space-time")
> > >
> > > MW: That looks like a hit to me, though occurrent and
> > > continuent find no
> > > place here.
> >
> > On the basis of Pat Hayes' and Chris Partridge's comments,
> the classes
> > 'Occurrent' and 'Continuant' were replaced with the classes
> > 'OccurrentType'
> > and 'ContinuantType', which are classes of classes of occurrents and
> > continuants, respectively. This change was motivated by the
> > fact that the
> > distinction between occurrent and continuant is more stable
> > with respect to
> > type descriptions than with respect to individual things
> > themselves. Note
> > that 'OccurrentType' and 'ContinuantType' are both immediate
> > subclasses of
> > 'Entity' in the merged ontology.
>
> MW: This does nothing to help. It only means that instances
> of those classes
> have no members in any part of the ontology I have presented
> an outline for,
> since the members of members of continuent type must be continuents.
The possibility that the merged ontology is broader in scope than the
outline you presented doesn't strike me as a problem.
>
> MW: You may recall that I have said a couple of times that at
> least the 4D
> ontology I am working on should be mapped to and not combined with the
> workyou are doing. The reason is that in a 4D ontology there are no
> individuals that are continuents. That is because the basis
> for what an
> object is is different. On the other hand, from a 4D
> individual, you will
> always be able to infer an occurrent (it might even be the
> same object - I'm
> not sure) and sometimes you will be able to infer a
> continuent, but this
> will definitely not be the same thing as the object from which the
> continuents existence is inferred.
I understand your position. I'm still not convinced that a 4D orientation
cannot be incorporated into the merged ontology, and I think the replacement
of the 'Continuant'/'Occurrent' dichotomy with the
'ContinuantType'/'OccurrentType' division is a step in this direction,
because this division is consistent with the claim that things in themselves
are neither continuants nor occurrents (rather, type descriptions are
continuant-like or occurrent-like). Furthermore, nothing in the merged
ontology (to my knowledge) is inconsistent with the claim that everything as
a space-time worm. If you disagree, could you cite an axiom or subclass
relationship from the merged ontology that, by your lights, is inconsistent
with this claim.
>
> MW: The inferences (in both directions) constitute the
> mapping. A mapping
> specification may be developed for members of particular classes.
>
> MW: The advantage of this approach is that different world
> viewpoints are
> respected and kept separate, whilst we learn explicitly of
> the relationship
> between them, and we have a basis for challenging the utility and
> completeness of particular world viewpoints.
Well, in compiling the first few versions of the merged ontology, I've done
my best to avoid adopting a "world viewpoint". I'm sure that many
assumptions about the real nature of the world have crept in, but the aim
has always been to create a high-level language that supports anything that
we would ever want to say in a formal context.
> >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > State
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > that have a non-zero temporal extent.
> > > >
> > > > I don't see how "State" differs from "Individual". Since all
> > > > individuals
> > > > exist in space/time, wouldn't they necessarily have a
> > > > non-zero temporal
> > > > extent?
> > >
> > > MW: But you just said above that points in time are
> > > individuals, whereas
> > > here we say that these are not states.
> >
> > OK, I think I understand now. Your "individual"/"state" distinction
> > corresponds to the 'Object'/'Process' distinction in the
> > merged ontology.
> > Is this right? The docu-strings for 'Object' and 'Process' follow.
> >
> > (documentation Object "A Physical Continuant which retains
> > its identity over
>
> MW: Continuant does not compute in "my" ontology.
If this implies that you are unable to ascribe continuant-like properties to
(what we ordinarily regard as) objects, then that sounds like a limitation
of your ontology.
> >
> > some interval of time. Although no physical entity is ever
> > permanent, an
> > object
> > can have stable properties over its lifespan. The type Object
> > corresponds
> > roughtly
> > to the class of ordinary physical objects.")
>
> MW: Anything that has anything to do with continuant might
> have a related
> object in a 4D ontology, but it would not be the same abject.
> Thus all the
> classes that you are talking about are different classes
> because they have
> continuants as members and not 4D object, so they have different
> memberships.
> >
> > (documentation Process "A Physical Occurrent during the interval of
> > interest.
> > Depending on the time scale and level of detail, the same
> > actual entity may
> > be
> > viewed as a stable object or a dynamic process. Even an
> > entity as stable as
> > a
> > diamond could be considered a process when viewed over a long
> > time period or
> > at
> > the atomic level of vibrating particles.")
>
> MW: Now occurants are probably OK as 4D objects, but we might discover
> otherwise.
> >
> > > > > Activity
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > that are something happening to bring about change.
> > > >
> > > > As I've mentioned in other emails, the subject of change
> > > has not been
> > > > systematically addressed in the merged ontology. I'm
> > > researching the
> > > > possibility of incorporating something like the Situation
> > > > Calculus, and I
> > > > would welcome any suggestions along these lines.
> > >
> > > MW: I think what we have here may be nearer to your event
> > and process.
> > > Change is handled by states starting and terminating here.
> >
> > OK, sounds good to me.
>
> MW: Yes, but what you have presently is not cosistent with it.
I've acknowledged that there is currently no representation of change in the
merged ontology. However, this does not imply that the merged ontology is
inconsistent with any particular representation of change; it simply means
that we have a gap in the scheme that is waiting to be filled.
> >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Temporal Boundary
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals
> > > > > that have a zero temporal extent.
> > > >
> > > > It sounds like "Temporal Boundary" corresponds to the class
> > > > of 'Abstract',
> > > > another direct subclass of 'Entity'. Some axioms regarding
> > > > 'Abstract' can
> > > > be found in the section "General Axioms" of the merged ontology.
> > >
> > > MW: No. These are things that exist in space time, so
> they cannot be
> > > classes. They just have a zero extent in the time dimension,
> > > they are at a
> > > point in time.
> >
> > OK, so the items in this category would be indivisible slices
> > of space-time
> > worms?
>
> MW: In the sense that anything that has zero thickness is
> indivisible. On
> the other hand it is not indivisible spatially. Further the
> objects that
> they are slices of do not have to be contiguous either spatially or
> temporally.
> >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Class of Individual
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all classes that
> > > > > have only individuals as members, e.g. pump, car.
> > > >
> > > > One idea that strikes me is that we could make 'Class' a
> > > > direct subclass of
> > > > 'Set'. This would allow us to apply all of the set-theoretic
> > > > definitions/axioms to classes, as well as sets. This isn't
> > > > the way things
> > > > are currently structured in the ontology (currently, 'Set'
> > > > and 'Class' are
> > > > disjoint siblings of the parent class 'SetOrClass'), but
> > it may be a
> > > > convenient way of reusing the set-theoretic apparatus in the
> > > > context of
> > > > intensional classes.
> > >
> > > MW: yes but some classes, e.g. the proper classes are not sets.
> >
> > I'm not sure I follow you here. What do you mean by
> "proper classes"?
>
> MW: See Chris M's recent seminal note on sets and classes.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > Information Pattern
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all classes that
> > > > > define a pattern, in one or more individuals, that conveys
> > > > > information.
> > > >
> > > > Currently, we have 'Proposition' as a direct subclass of
> > > > 'Abstract' in the
> > > > merged ontology. However, as Pat Hayes has pointed out, it
> > > > is likely that
> > > > the composite notion of 'ContentBearingThing' will prove to
> > > > be more useful.
> > > > In any case, axioms about these notions have yet to be written.
> > >
> > > MW: I don't think proposition is the same as information
> > > pattern, unless you
> > > think your DNA is a proposition.
> >
> > I agree, and the interesting example of a DNA strand fits
> > into the current
> > structure of the merged ontology. 'ContentBearingThing' is a direct
> > subclass of 'Abstract' (not 'Proposition') and 'Object'. Hence, by
> > subclassing DNA somewhere under 'ContentBearingThing' we capture its
> > informational quality, without claiming that it states a
> proposition.
>
> MW: That's interesting. So a piece of paper with writing on
> it is abstract.
> Now I always thought you could pick a piece of paper up?
>
> MW: I think you have a problem. A piece of paper is either
> abstract or not.
Well, the idea was that things like books are composite entites. They have
an abstract component (the informational content) and a physical component,
since they are chunks of matter with a host of spatio-temporal properties.
Accordingly, a book is, on this view, both an abstract thing and a physical
object. I'm willing to revise this view, if strong counterarguments come to
light, but it doesn't strike me as obviously false.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > Involvement in Activity
> > > > >
> > > > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all
> relations that
> > > > > indicate that a thing is involved in an activity. The
> > > > > difference between involvement and participation is that the
> > > > > involved object is a class or not contemporaneous with the
> > > > > activity, e.g. a discussion today about World War II.
> > > >
> > > > I wonder if all cases of what you are calling "Involvement"
> > > > could be covered
> > > > by two predicates, viz. one linking a ContentBearingObject
> > > > with a class that
> > > > describes a topic of the object and one linking a
> > > > ContentBearingObject with
> > > > a particular object that is a referent of the object.
> > >
> > > MW: I'm not sure what you mean here by ContentBearingObject
> > > unless it is
> > > information. In which case not all things that are involved
> > > in activities
> > > are information.
> >
> > A 'ContentBearingThing' is simply any physical thing that carries
> > information, e.g. a book, a CD, a reel of a film, etc.
>
> MW: But above you said content bearing thing was a subtype of
> abstract :-(
That's right. See my previous comment.
>
> MW: Let me help. The information on the piece of paper is
> abstract (it is
> the class of all those pieces of paper with the same
> information on it). Now
> these classes are subtypes of abstract (but of course, they are just
> classes).
Well, there's another construal of what's going on here. Something abstract
can be either a universal or a particular. If it's a class (as in a class
of pieces of paper), it's a universal. If it's a single chunk of
informational content (setting aside the question of how such content is
chunked), it's a particular. However, both the class of pieces of paper and
the particular chunk of informational content would be instances of the
class 'Abstract'.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards
> > > > > Matthew
> > > > > ============================================
> > > > > Matthew West
> > > > > Operations & Asset Management
> > > > > Shell Services International
> > > > > H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> > > > > Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
> > > > > Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> > > > > E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> > > > > http://www.shellservices.com/
> > > > > ============================================
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>