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SUO: RE: A proposed SUO content outline




Matthew,

	Please see my replies below - edited for brevity.

-Ian

> 
> MW: Do you have some things in the merged ontology that are 
> not found here?
> (e.g. holes).

Actually, I would eventually like to make the theory of holes part of a
single, mereotopological theory ("Whole-Part" in your scheme).  On the other
hand, I don't see a place for the hierarchies of agents and organisms in
your scheme.

> > > 
> > > Individual
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations for apply to all things that 
> > > exists in space time.
> > 
> > It sounds like your notion of "Individual" has the same meaning as
> > 'Physical' in the merged ontology, which is a direct subclass 
> > of 'Entity'
> > and is defined as follows:
> > 
> > (documentation Physical "An entity that has a location in 
> > space-time.  Note
> > that 
> > points of space and time are themselves understood to have a 
> > location in
> > space-time")
> 
> MW: That looks like a hit to me, though occurrent and 
> continuent find no
> place here.

On the basis of Pat Hayes' and Chris Partridge's comments, the classes
'Occurrent' and 'Continuant' were replaced with the classes 'OccurrentType'
and 'ContinuantType', which are classes of classes of occurrents and
continuants, respectively.  This change was motivated by the fact that the
distinction between occurrent and continuant is more stable with respect to
type descriptions than with respect to individual things themselves.  Note
that 'OccurrentType' and 'ContinuantType' are both immediate subclasses of
'Entity' in the merged ontology.

> > 
> > > 
> > > State
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals 
> > > that have a non-zero temporal extent.
> > 
> > I don't see how "State" differs from "Individual".  Since all 
> > individuals
> > exist in space/time, wouldn't they necessarily have a 
> > non-zero temporal
> > extent?
> 
> MW: But you just said above that points in time are 
> individuals, whereas
> here we say that these are not states.

OK, I think I understand now.  Your "individual"/"state" distinction
corresponds to the 'Object'/'Process' distinction in the merged ontology.
Is this right?  The docu-strings for 'Object' and 'Process' follow.

(documentation Object "A Physical Continuant which retains its identity over

some interval of time. Although no physical entity is ever permanent, an
object 
can have stable properties over its lifespan. The type Object corresponds
roughtly
to the class of ordinary physical objects.")

(documentation Process "A Physical Occurrent during the interval of
interest. 
Depending on the time scale and level of detail, the same actual entity may
be 
viewed as a stable object or a dynamic process. Even an entity as stable as
a 
diamond could be considered a process when viewed over a long time period or
at 
the atomic level of vibrating particles.")

> > > Activity
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals 
> > > that are something happening to bring about change.
> > 
> > As I've mentioned in other emails, the subject of change 
> has not been
> > systematically addressed in the merged ontology.  I'm 
> researching the
> > possibility of incorporating something like the Situation 
> > Calculus, and I
> > would welcome any suggestions along these lines.
> 
> MW: I think what we have here may be nearer to your event and process.
> Change is handled by states starting and terminating here.

OK, sounds good to me.

> > 
> > > 
> > > Temporal Boundary
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all individuals 
> > > that have a zero temporal extent.
> > 
> > It sounds like "Temporal Boundary" corresponds to the class 
> > of 'Abstract',
> > another direct subclass of 'Entity'.  Some axioms regarding 
> > 'Abstract' can
> > be found in the section "General Axioms" of the merged ontology.
> 
> MW: No. These are things that exist in space time, so they cannot be
> classes. They just have a zero extent in the time dimension, 
> they are at a
> point in time.

OK, so the items in this category would be indivisible slices of space-time
worms?  

> > 
> > > 
> > > Class of Individual
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all classes that 
> > > have only individuals as members, e.g. pump, car.
> > 
> > One idea that strikes me is that we could make 'Class' a 
> > direct subclass of
> > 'Set'.  This would allow us to apply all of the set-theoretic
> > definitions/axioms to classes, as well as sets.  This isn't 
> > the way things
> > are currently structured in the ontology (currently, 'Set' 
> > and 'Class' are
> > disjoint siblings of the parent class 'SetOrClass'), but it may be a
> > convenient way of reusing the set-theoretic apparatus in the 
> > context of
> > intensional classes.
> 
> MW: yes but some classes, e.g. the proper classes are not sets.

I'm not sure I follow you here.  What do you mean by "proper classes"?

> > > 
> > > Information Pattern
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all classes that 
> > > define a pattern, in one or more individuals, that conveys 
> > > information.
> > 
> > Currently, we have 'Proposition' as a direct subclass of 
> > 'Abstract' in the
> > merged ontology.  However, as Pat Hayes has pointed out, it 
> > is likely that
> > the composite notion of 'ContentBearingThing' will prove to 
> > be more useful.
> > In any case, axioms about these notions have yet to be written.
> 
> MW: I don't think proposition is the same as information 
> pattern, unless you
> think your DNA is a proposition.

I agree, and the interesting example of a DNA strand fits into the current
structure of the merged ontology.  'ContentBearingThing' is a direct
subclass of 'Abstract' (not 'Proposition') and 'Object'.  Hence, by
subclassing DNA somewhere under 'ContentBearingThing' we capture its
informational quality, without claiming that it states a proposition.

> > > 
> > > Involvement in Activity
> > > 
> > > Contains axioms and relations that apply to all relations that 
> > > indicate that a thing is involved in an activity. The 
> > > difference between involvement and participation is that the 
> > > involved object is a class or not contemporaneous with the 
> > > activity, e.g. a discussion today about World War II.
> > 
> > I wonder if all cases of what you are calling "Involvement" 
> > could be covered
> > by two predicates, viz. one linking a ContentBearingObject 
> > with a class that
> > describes a topic of the object and one linking a 
> > ContentBearingObject with
> > a particular object that is a referent of the object.
> 
> MW: I'm not sure what you mean here by ContentBearingObject 
> unless it is
> information. In which case not all things that are involved 
> in activities
> are information.

A 'ContentBearingThing' is simply any physical thing that carries
information, e.g. a book, a CD, a reel of a film, etc.

> > > 
> > > Regards  
> > >       Matthew
> > > ============================================
> > > Matthew West
> > > Operations & Asset Management
> > > Shell Services International
> > > H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> > > Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929 
> > > Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> > > E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> > > http://www.shellservices.com/
> > > ============================================
> > > 
> > 
> > 
>