RE: SUO: Proposed Changes to Merged Ontology
Aldo,
I think we maybe talking at cross purposes.
My original point is quite simple. It is that in an oral culture, when we
say something it is rooted in the here and now (3-D) - we say things here
and now, and they are heard here and now. So speaking in a 3-D, particularly
a Presentist, way is easy.
In a culture with access to writing, particularly printing, technology this
is no longer so. We typically write, and re-write meaning the writing
'happens' at a number of time, and possibly places (4-D). Also it is
typically read (and re-read) at a number of different times and places.
Writing in a 3-D way requires a number of conventions (that we imagine the
'speaker/writer' as being in/at a particular here and now). It is easier to
write in a 4-D eternalist way. (I think Olson has an extended analysis of
this point.)
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: gangemi@saussure.irmkant.rm.cnr.it
[mailto:gangemi@saussure.irmkant.rm.cnr.it]
Sent: 21 February 2001 15:41
To: mail@ChrisPartridge.net
Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: Proposed Changes to Merged Ontology
Sorry for slow reaction Chris .. really busy
>Chris Partridge wrote:
>Ciao (again) Aldo
>
>I like (and agree with) your comments on language/culture etc (copied
>below). But there is one point that seems to be missed. This is the
>difference in context between spoken and written language.
>
>You mention law and commerce in relation to ordinary language. As I
>understand it law and commerce are related to written language - indeed,
one
>thesis is that the needs of commerce led to the creation of written
>language - the first writing was accounting. Modern law (see for example
>Clancy - From Memory to Written Record) and commerce are closely tied into
>written text. And written text has a 4-d rather then 3-D context. I speak
>and you hear here and now (ignoring modern technology for the moment) but I
>can write something over a period, revising it many times - and it can be
>read is several different times and places.
>
>Of course, language evolved to be spoken here and now - and for most of its
>history it was used in that way. So there is a 3-D bias built into it.
3-d bias of language (if any) comes from a 3-d bias in the way humans
formed their cognitive structures during the interaction with their
ecological niches. This has little to do with the fact that written
language could be better described in a 4-d context. On the contrary,
it seems that oral cultures have more event-oriented forms of mind
(read for example the works of Ong, Goody, Cardona): stories are
preserved through countless narrations, with adjustments that make
them both unique and templates for future narrations.
>However, I think this explains the early 17th century scientists (at least
>in England) distrust of ordinary language as a useful tool for science. It
>also explains why various communities developed other forms of storing
>knowledge. Scientists and mathematics, engineers and their drawings,
>accountants and their balance sheets and maybe knowledge engineers and
their
>logic (?).
While it's true that distrust of ordinary language enormously
enhanced scientific progress (as well as the use of written
communication enhanced most medium-term structured activities), it is
also true that writing and fixing meanings is a form of
'reification'...
BTW, Galileo Galilei's wonderful and extremely precise scientific
books are written in one the most beatiful Italian proses of his time.
But let's stay focused. The real problem with linguistic heuristics
in ontology is, like John (Sowa) wrote some messages ago, that
>I don't think that it is at all "obvious" in what way it might be relevant
and IMO one way is inducing conceptual distinctions from lexical
structures. This can be done in all domains if they have a structured
lexicon.
Hypothesis: the more the lexicon is applied with the intended meaning
of everyday life, the more the possible 3-d bias of Western languages
is to be taken into account.
>You wrote:
>2) body/event (better object/event?) is a VERY intuitive distinction,
>but intuition is not magic and it is not simply a linguistic
>convention: it is a naturalistic and cultural product, derived from
>perception and interaction habits that our species developed (none
>familiar with Gibson's 'affordances'?). No walker will pay attention
>to stumbling over an event like 'running', but he probably would to
>stumbling over a 'running rabbit' as well as an astonished 'static
>rabbit';
>3) language structure depends on such intuitions. Nominalisation does
>not destroy the underlying conceptualization. It is only a way of
>making language more flexible in order to meet the needs of complex
>abstract thinking. Indeed, more 'practice-oriented' languages like
>early Latin do not show frequent nominalizations. Most 3-d
>ontologists keep naming events with nominalizations ..
>
>4) maybe in areas of human culture that heavily commit on everyday
>language assumptions (including (e-)commerce, law, and even
>biomedicine), would a strong 4-d perdurantist ontology have hard
>times?
>
--
*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*;*
Aldo Gangemi
Ontology and Conceptual Modeling Group
ITBM-CNR (National Research Council)
Viale Marx 15, 00137
Roma Italy
+3906.86090249
mailto://gangemi@saussure.irmkant.rm.cnr.it
http://saussure.irmkant.rm.cnr.it