Re: Natural Language, Thought, and Ontology -- RE: SUO: Proposed Changes to Merged Ontology
Phil,
In my 1984 book, Conceptual Structures, I spent more time and
effort on Chapter 2, in which I surveyed all of cognitive
psychology and psycholinguistics, than I did on any of the
other chapters. In that chapter I tried to put together
whatever evidence there might be for whatever might be called
"natural logic" or "natural knowledge representation" or
"natural reasoning". I learned a lot while studying the
literature during the preparation time, but precious little
of it gave any hard evidence that would guide the knowledge
representation. The study of linguistics, however, was a much
richer source of insights. During the past 17 years, I have
continued to keep an eye on what the psychologists have been
doing, and there still isn't any hard evidence. But I still
find linguistics to be a rich source of ideas.
For some idea of the rate of progress in psychology, I recommend
the "Principles of Psychology" by William James (1890), which is
available as a Dover reprint. Or you can get the text online:
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/index.htm
Although it's 111 years old, the blurb on the back of the
Dover edition says "Reading James brings a sense of perspective
and even a little humility to our regard for more modern
achievements."
James and Peirce were lifelong friends, who discussed many of
their ideas about language, thinking, the nature of signs, and
thought, language, etc. I recommend the following article by
Peirce, which he wrote early in his career (age 29):
"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities Claimed For Man",
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868), pp. 140-157.
Available online at:
http://www.door.net/arisbe/menu/LIBRARY/bycsp/conseq/cn-main.htm
Following are the "four incapacities", which he discusses in
further detail:
1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the
internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from
our knowledge of external facts.
2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is
determined logically by previous cognitions.
3. We have no power of thinking without signs.
4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable.
He was writing this in criticism of Decartes, but it has
a lot of relevance to the study of thinking in general.
John Sowa