SUO: Im/material Ir/reverence
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pat hayes wrote:
>
> > Chris Partridge wrote:
> > >
> > > Chris [Menzel],
> > >
> > > I was not intending to suggest that there
> > > should be an axiomatisation of immateriality
> > > (or space) in the 'holes theory'. Merely that its
> > > 'dependence' on immateriality should be noted somehow.
> > > I think we both agree that the upper ontology should
> > > contain the material/immaterial distinction
> > > (if it is going to be anywhere).
> >
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> >
> > Chrises,
> >
> > Is this im/material distinction the same
> > as Aristotle's "form/matter" distinction?
> >
>
> Interjection by Pat:
>
> Probably not. But why did you ask?
> What would depend on the answer?
Oh, My Soul.
> Aristotle wrote:
>
> | a. The theories of the soul (psyche)
> | handed down by our predecessors have
> | been sufficiently discussed; now let
> | us start afresh, as it were, and try to
> | determine (diorisai) what the soul is,
> | and what definition (logos) of it will
> | be most comprehensive (koinotatos).
> |
> | b. We describe one class of existing things as
> | substance (ousia), and this we subdivide into
> | three: (1) matter (hyle), which in itself is
> | not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe) or
> | form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality
> | is directly attributed, and (3) the compound
> | of the two.
> |
> | c. Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
> | realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
> | word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
> | by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
> | exercise of it (theorein).
> |
> | d. Bodies (somata) seem to be pre-eminently
> | substances, and most particularly those
> | which are of natural origin (physica),
> | for these are the sources (archai)
> | from which the rest are derived.
> |
> | e. But of natural bodies some have life (zoe)
> | and some have not; by life we mean the
> | capacity for self-sustenance, growth,
> | and decay.
> |
> | f. Every natural body (soma physikon), then,
> | which possesses life must be substance, and
> | substance of the compound type (synthete).
> |
> | g. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz.,
> | having life, the body (soma) cannot be soul (psyche),
> | for the body is not something predicated of a subject,
> | but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject,
> | i.e., as matter.
> |
> | h. So the soul must be substance in the sense of being
> | the form of a natural body, which potentially has life.
> | And substance in this sense is actuality.
> |
> | i. The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we
> | have described. But actuality has two senses, analogous
> | to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.
> |
> | j. Clearly (phaneron), actuality in our present sense
> | is analogous to the possession of knowledge; for both
> | sleep (hypnos) and waking (egregorsis) depend upon the
> | presence of the soul, and waking is analogous to the
> | exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession (echein)
> | but not its exercise (energein).
> |
> | k. Now in one and the same person the
> | possession of knowledge comes first.
> |
> | l. The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality
> | of a natural body potentially possessing life; and such
> | will be any body which possesses organs (organikon).
> |
> | m. The parts of plants are organs too, though very
> | simple ones: e.g., the leaf protects the pericarp,
> | and the pericarp protects the seed; the roots are
> | analogous to the mouth, for both these absorb food.
> |
> | n. If then one is to find a definition which will apply
> | to every soul, it will be "the first actuality of
> | a natural body possessed of organs".
> |
> | o. So one need no more ask (zetein) whether body and
> | soul are one than whether the wax (keros) and the
> | impression (schema) it receives are one, or in
> | general whether the matter of each thing is
> | the same as that of which it is the matter;
> | for admitting that the terms unity and being
> | are used in many senses, the paramount (kyrios)
> | sense is that of actuality.
> |
> | p. We have, then, given a general definition
> | of what the soul is: it is substance in
> | the sense of formula (logos), i.e., the
> | essence of such-and-such a body.
> |
> | q. Suppose that an implement (organon), e.g. an axe,
> | were a natural body; the substance of the axe
> | would be that which makes it an axe, and this
> | would be its soul; suppose this removed, and
> | it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally.
> | As it is, it remains an axe, because it is not of
> | this kind of body that the soul is the essence or
> | formula, but only of a certain kind of natural body
> | which has in itself a principle of movement and rest.
> |
> | r. We must, however, investigate our definition
> | in relation to the parts of the body.
> |
> | s. If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be
> | its vision; for this is the substance in the sense
> | of formula of the eye. But the eye is the matter
> | of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye,
> | except in an equivocal sense, as for instance
> | a stone or painted eye.
> |
> | t. Now we must apply what we have found true of the part
> | to the whole living body. For the same relation must
> | hold good of the whole of sensation to the whole sentient
> | body qua sentient as obtains between their respective parts.
> |
> | u. That which has the capacity to live is not the body
> | which has lost its soul, but that which possesses
> | its soul; so seed and fruit are potentially bodies
> | of this kind.
> |
> | v. The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the
> | cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the
> | soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of
> | the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its
> | work.
> | w. The body is that which exists potentially; but just as
> | the pupil and the faculty of seeing make an eye, so in
> | the other case the soul and body make a living creature.
> |
> | x. It is quite clear, then, that neither the soul nor
> | certain parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated
> | from the body; for in some cases the actuality belongs
> | to the parts themselves. Not but what there is nothing
> | to prevent some parts being separated, because they are
> | not actualities of any body.
> |
> | y. It is also uncertain (adelon) whether the soul as an
> | actuality bears the same relation to the body as the
> | sailor (ploter) to the ship (ploion).
> |
> | z. This must suffice as an attempt to determine
> | in rough outline the nature of the soul.
>
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>
> Here is a study aid to assist with the reading of
> the text. What I think is especially relevant to
> our purposes -- aside from the content of these
> fundamental categories or "basemental concepts"
> that echo in the everyday constitutions of our
> minds and still support, if a bit contingently,
> the greater parts of our thinking even today --
> is the method that Aristotle uses, working through
> analogy and prototype, or the well-chosen example,
> to articulate, build, construe, derive, and apply,
> in a recursive process, his system of abstractions.
>
> So consider the following "Alignments of Capacities"
> as you read Aristotle's text:
>
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Matter | Form
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Potentiality | Actuality
> Receptivity | Possession | Exercise
> Life | Sleep | Waking
> Wax | Impression
> Axe | Edge | Cutting
> Eye | Vision | Seeing
> Body | Soul
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Ship? | Sailor?
> ---------------------------------------------------
>
> Bon Voyage!
>
> Jon
>
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