Re: Peirce's semeiotic as a foundation for ontology
John,
It is a good summary of our brief discussion
on the nature, properties and classes of signs and symbols. But to have a full
picture, let me remind for the SUO members as well my basic points of the
traditional (3A, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas) theory of signs, according to
which <any sign makes one term of a relationship of meaning or
signification, serving to indicate or signify its correlative>.
The AAA account of signs is essentially based on
the threefold partition of things (such as objects, states, changes and
relations). Namely:
I. There are things that are merely things,
all acting as the ultimate source of meanings, like studied in Real
(Ontological) Semantics;
II. There are things that are also signs of other
things, which are causally related natural signs of the physical
world and mental signs of the realm of the mind, like studied in
Cognitive and Pragmatic Semantics;
III. There are things that are always signs, as
words and other cultural symbols, like studied by Linguistic and Social
Semantics.
In all, there are things which MAY have meanings
(the things of the external world, as all sorts of indications, evidences,
symptoms, and physical signals), there are signs that ALWAYS have senses and
meanings (the entities of the mind); and there are signs that HAVE to get
their meanings (as cultural symbols and linguistic entities).
As a consequence, the process of perception
consist in knowing through the senses of the being and properties of entities;
while cognition consists in transformation of natural signs into verbal
signs or cultural symbols through the mediation of mental signs; and while
thinking involves causal ordering of mental signs. At last, conventional and intentional symbols (as words) signify things
via the agency of mental signs (thoughts, ideas, concepts, feelings,
images); or words have two semantic faces: one to signify the real entities
which meanings they denote (or connote) and the other is to express the ideas
whose senses they designate.
Regards,
Azamat Abdoullaev
EIS Encyclopedic Intelligent Systems
Ltd
Pafos, CYPRUS
Moscow, RUSSIA
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2005 11:09
PM
Subject: Fw: Peirce's semeiotic as a foundation for
ontology
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
From: "John F. Sowa" <sowa@BESTWEB.NET>
> To: <cg@CS.UAH.EDU>; "'SUO
WG'" <standard-upper-ontology@listserv.ieee.org>
> Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2005 7:28 PM
>
Subject: Peirce's semeiotic as a foundation for ontology
>
>
>> In many messages, I have claimed that Peirce's writings
>>
are fundamental to the problems of ontology. These remarks
>>
triggered several responses in another forum, and I have
>> excerpted,
revised, and assembled my replies in the
>> following
summary.
>>
>> John Sowa
>>
__________________________________________________________
>>
>>
Everything that is perceived is perceived by means of a sign,
>> which
may be just a sign of itself. But more likely it is
>> a sign of
just some aspect of the thing, such as an image,
>> a feeling, a change
in temperature, pressure, sweetness,
>> salinity,
etc.
>>
>>> But there are things that are merely
things.
>>
>> That may be true, but they cannot be *known*
unless they are
>> (a) perceived by their signs, (b) interpreted by
means of
>> other signs (e.g., percepts, concepts, words, sentences,
etc.),
>> and (c) tested by means of actions to determine their
nature.
>> See Section 7 of the theories.htm
paper:
>>
>> http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm>> Theories, Models, Language, Reasoning, and
Truth
>>
>>> There are things that are also signs of other
things.
>>
>> That requires further qualifications. When
the Mayan ruins
>> were first explored, the symbols that represented
words could
>> not be distinguished from mere decorations, which are
signs
>> of a different sort. And even when writing is recognized
as
>> writing, it can also be interpreted in many different
ways,
>> including decoration (calligraphy). Even when the
writing
>> is known to be writing, its meaning may be ignored for
many
>> purposes, such as transmission across a
network.
>>
>> What we are fundamentally dealing with are
signs. There is
>> no question that there does exist something
independent of our
>> minds, but what it is can only be experienced
through signs,
>> analyzed by means of signs, and classified by means
of signs.
>>
>>> "Is your definition of "sign" stipulative,
lexical,
>>> theoretical, precising, or
what?"
>>
>> I base my discussion on Peirce's semiotics (or
semeiotic as he
>> called it). Following are two slides from
another talk, which
>> summarize the terminology:
>>
____________
>>
>>
*Peirce's Semiotics*
>>
>> Any perceptible configuration of
the universe may be
>> interpreted as a sign by someone or
something.
>>
>> Basic classification of
signs:
>>
>> * Mark — any pattern in any modality
that someone
>> or something is capable of
perceiving.
>>
>> * Token — a classification of
some mark as an instance
>> of some
type.
>>
>> * Type — a general pattern associated
with some schema
>> or rule for classifying and
relating the marks in the
>>
environment.
>>
>> Example: A mark may be a pattern of
green and yellow in
>> the lawn. The mark may be interpreted as a
token of type
>> Plant, Weed, Flower, SaladGreen, Dandelion,
etc.
>>
_____________
>>
>>
*Icon, Index, Symbol*
>>
>> All living organisms from bacteria
to humans process signs.
>>
>> A sign may be characterized by
the way the mark determines
>> the
referent:
>>
>> * Icon — according to some
similarity of image, pattern,
>> or
structure.
>>
>> * Index — according to some
physical relationship;
>> e.g., immediate
presence, pointing to something remote,
>> or
causally indicating something not directly
perceptible.
>>
>> * Symbol — according to some
convention; e.g., spoken words,
>> written
words, money, flag, uniform...
>>
>> Communication, memory,
learning, and reasoning depend on signs,
>> but most signs are not
symbols.
>> _________
>>
>>> Should we not, in
this forum, stick to the "immediate" facts
>>> and arguments, rather
than appealing to historical positions
>>> or other
papers?
>>
>> What immediate facts? Our only immediate
facts are that our
>> senses can very easily be deceived when we only
have one look.
>> But if we have a chance to check and test our first
impressions
>> by repeated study -- using multiple senses, coming back
repeatedly,
>> etc. -- then we have a much better chance of getting an
accurate
>> picture. That indicates that we need multiple *signs*
preferably
>> from different modalities in order to form a sound
judgment.
>>
>> Psychological studies have provided abundant
evidence of how
>> children and young animals require multiple sensory
modalities
>> in order to form an accurate model of reality.
Sensory deprivation
>> studies on children are unethical, but such
studies have been
>> performed on cats and other animals to demonstrate
that sight
>> alone without confirmation by touching is insufficient to
enable
>> the animal to form an accurate model of 3-D
relationships.
>>
>> To separate the entangled points in a
more extended summary,
>> let me start with a description of the
processes of perception
>> along the lines that cognitive psychologists
have been discussing
>> for the past 40 years or so. This
position, by the way, is very
>> different from the behaviorist views
in the first half of the
>> 20th century, but it is not very far from
the position that
>> William James presented in
1895.
>>
>> 1. Incoming signals that impinge on our
nerve endings are signs.
It is rather the energy phenomena, the bearer
of signs, as light, acoustic waves, chemical energy, thermal phenomena,
mechanical forces, which are acting on the nerve endings.
>>
>> 2. Perception involves
the interpretation of those signs by
>> a
process of retrieving one or more chunks of
previously
>> experienced signs (traditionally
called _percepts_) that
>> are assembled into a
pattern that matches the new signs.
>>
>> 3. The process
of perception is rarely an exact match of
>>
old percepts to new signs. Instead, the assembly
of
>> percepts has the nature of a hypothetical
construction,
>> which may involve a
considerable amount of deformation
>> and
adjustment. The process is definitely fallible
and
>> possibly ambiguous, in the sense that
several different
>> selections of percepts
could be adapted to match the
>> any given
incoming pattern of signs.
>>
>> 4. Peirce called the
process of perception a kind of abduction,
>>
and that term has been applied by computational
linguists,
>> such as Jerry Hobbs, to the
process of parsing natural language
>>
sentences (which are usually processed by methods similar
to
>> the steps outlined in #2 and #3
above).
>>
>> 5. Not all percepts are associated with
words in a natural
>> language, but many of
them are. A natural language
description
>> of the perceived experience
could be generated by assembling
>> the words
that correspond to the percepts in an NL
sentence
>> according to the syntax of the
language and with the help of
>> auxiliary
morphemes, such as function words and inflections.
>>
>>
Assuming a process of perception of this sort (which is a common
>>
hypothesis in cognitive psychology), I would expand my earlier
>>
summary thus: the process of perception involves the matching
>>
of incoming signs to a hypothetical construction from stored
>>
percepts. The pattern matching process is fallible, and any
>>
particular construction is a hypothesis that could be, and
>> often is,
falsified or at least corrected by future experience.
>>
>>
What we call "objects" are the external projections of our
>> internal
constructions that have proved to be useful over long
>> periods of
time. Peirce said that a great many of our beliefs
>> that have
survived extensive testing are probably true within
>> the limits of
our ability to perceive and verify. We can
>> probably be sure
that our cherished beliefs will survive tests
>> that are similar to
our past experiences, but we can never
>> be certain how far they can
be trusted.
>>
>> Note the ubiquitous signs: the
original signals from the nerve
>> endings, the store of percepts in
the brain, the assemblies of
>> percepts used to interpret the new
signs, the stable constructions,
>> which we call "objects", and the
words and sentences we use to
>> describe them. They're all
signs.
>>
>>> But what are the signs just before they
impinge on our
>>> nerve endings?
>>
>> Anything
that does not impinge, has not yet impinged, or is
>> not capable of
affecting our nerve endings is an undetected
>> part of the
environment. Using telescopes, microscopes, and
>> other
instruments, we can detect aspects of the environment
>> that are
beyond the reach of our senses.
>>
>> When I said "someone or
something", I intended the something
>> to be an organism that could be
as lowly as a bacterium or
>> some sort of humanly designed instrument
that serves as an
>> extension or a surrogate for our nervous
system.
>>
>> As soon as those environmental features are
detected by the
>> nerves or instruments, they may be called "marks",
which are
>> the most basic signs. A mark does not become a token
until
>> it is interpreted as an instance of some
type.
>>
>> JS>> What we call "objects" are the external
projections of our
>>>> internal constructions that have proved
to be useful over long
>>>> periods of
time.
>>
>>> Were the unicellular organisms existing
billions of years ago
>>> already then
objects?
>>
>> The organisms are the things that are doing the
perceiving. The
>> things that are perceived could be called by
many different terms,
>> including objects, processes, stimuli,
etc. Since bacteria don't
>> have language, they don't call them
anything, but they classify
>> the marks as tokens according to types,
which we may call food,
>> nourishment, poison, danger, threat,
etc. By their behavior,
>> we can observe the responses that
indicate how they classify
>> various stimuli according to the types
that we identify.
>>
>> JS>> Different psychologists may
have different theories and
>>>> different terminology for the
processes of perception, but
>>>> what they're discussing is
still signs and signs of signs.
>>
>>> Did we evolve from
signs and signs of signs?
>>
>> Our bodies evolved from other
bodies, but our minds evolved
>> from more primitive sign-processing
minds or quasi-minds of
>> simpler organisms. A few million years ago,
they were apes,
>> which are extremely human-like except for linguistic
ability.
>> A few billion years ago, they were some sort of
unicellular
>> organisms, for which Peirce coined the term
"quasi-mind".
>>
>> Peirce made the point that every thought,
idea, concept, or
>> percept is a sign and that the mind is a complex
sign composed
>> of the totality of all the simpler signs that flow
through it.
>>
>> That, in short, is Peirce's solution to the
so called mind-body
>> problem: Instead of postulating an
unbridgeable gap between
>> an abstract mind and a physical body,
Peirce developed a theory
>> of the way physical sign tokens are
classified by abstract
>> sign types. The mind and its contents
can be classified
>> according to abstract sign types, but it and its
contents
>> are embodied in tokens of those types.
>>
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