SUO: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
LIS. Discussion Note 52
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
JA = Jon Awbrey
MW = Matthew West
MW: Sweetness is a property that some individuals have.
Within our model that would make it a class which
is abstract. The things that were sweet would be
members of that class.
JA: It is common to recognize distinctions among a number of things:
JA: 1. The word "sweetness", the noun form of the adjective "sweet".
MW: I think this would be placed in the representation part of our model.
Sounds like a fine and proper place for it.
JA: 2. The concept "sweetness", something like a noun in the mind.
MW: Well if we are being really technical, I would have said that
this was a concept of the property or set rather than the word.
I would then have said that everything in our model is strictly
an externalisation of this sort of thing, restricted to those
things that represent the world in a 4D way.
If we want to be really really technical, in our philosophical techne,
then we will have to go back to the way that philosophy was done for
all the years that pre-seeded the 20th Century, when some students
of philosophy got bored with doing their philosophy homework, and
so they cooked up a new philosophy that said it was okay to wipe
the slate clean and make it all up fresh out of their own skulls.
One of the finer bits of intellectual real estate that had long
been common intellectual property, before this lack-of-industry
revolution in philosophy, was the idea of a general denotation
or a plural reference, deriving from Aristotle's equivocal use.
The basic idea is that there is a direct many-to-one relation
between things denoted and things denoting, which we may draw
in a "bigraph" or a bipartite graph like this:
denotee_1 o
\
\
denotee_2 o--o denoter
/
/
denotee_3 o
Notice that only the objects denotee_j, for j = 1, 2, 3,
and the sign that is signed "denoter" are parties to this
transaction, per se, simpliciter. That is, there is no set
that is formally recognized as a co-signatory to the contract.
As you might guess, this is actually a concessionary sop to the
nominal thinker, as in former days it was the only way that you
could get him to do business in philosophy at all. Still, it's
not really all that bad an idea to set out from nominal grounds,
heuristically speaking, just so long as we keep in mind what it
takes to play the idea-game, and when to resign the name-game.
In this respect, then, the term "sweetness" and the concept "sweetness"
are peas of a single species, even if growing in different pods, and so
I used quotation marks to mark them both, instead of resorting to other
ensignia, like the anglish <sweetness> or the italic 'sweetness', just
to name two of the nominal notionalities that might've been recruited
to the service of a United Notion force.
So these ancient devices of the UN general denotation and
the democratic plural reference are really quite amenable
to the task at hand, at least, in a pinch, and they leave
our hands free to amend their rough and ready resolutions
with the introducation of abstract objects like extensive
sets and intensive qualities at any stage we require them.
Jon Awbrey
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o