RE: SUO: RE: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology, Epistemology, Semiotics
Cathy Legg wrote:
> Again, I agree that Peirce has a system, and a lot of his own
> terminology,
> which is off-putting and must seem to expose his thought to
> the danger of
> sealed-off self-verifying-ness.
>
> However, I would urge that Peirce breaks the hermeneutic circle
> (better than most current analytic philosophers) with his pragmatism.
>
> The best explication of this is in his early paper 'How to
> Make Our Ideas
> Clear":
>
> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html
>
> Here he describes 3 'levels of clarity' to which our ideas
> may be taken:
>
> 1) I know it when I see it, though can't necessarily say why
> (e.g. famous
> judge's remark re. pornography)
>
> 2) I can give a verbal definition, of the kind found in a dictionary.
> However it is possible to 'define' terms in terms of other terms one
> doesn't understand, which are then defined in terms of the original
> terms...
>
> 3) The idea allows me to generate specific *expectations* in specific
> concrete situations. (e.g. by using the idea 'hard' I can
> come to expect
> such things as that if I kick a rock I will damage my foot,
> the earth will
> hold me up, etc.) These expectations may then be tested.
>
> Peirce thought that most philosophy was stuck on level 2) of
> clarity of
> its ideas, whereas the great lesson of the C17th scientific
> revolution and
> the development of the art of scientific experiment was 3).
>
> To get back to the topic of this list, what kind of clarity
> is appropriate
> for the nodes of a 'standard upper ontology'? Are we stuck
> with 2), or
> could we proceed to 3? I think we could - how? Applications,
> applications, applications...
>
> Cathy.
I thought Jon's references to Anticipatory Systems headed
in that direction. The intro paper identified two subsystems
in one application:
S : the operational subsystem that does its normal thing in
real time;
P : the predictive subsystem (faster than real time) which S uses
to simulate the effects of its intended actions.
If P predicts an undesireable outcome, then S uses it to change
S's strategy or tactics, and steer the S system to a different
state.
If P predicts a desireable outcome, S proceeds with its normal
functions, with the happy outcome anticipated.
Your 3) above functions like the P subsystem that can generate
these expectations.
HTH,
Rich
> On Tue, 9 Sep 2003, Tom Johnston wrote:
>
> > Richard:
> >
> > I applaud your attempt to clarify some of these Peircean
> concepts, and
> > especially your way of going about it. What I mean by that
> latter point is
> > that, having read at least a good handful of the passages
> from Peirce that
> > Jon has provided us with, I have concluded that Peirce is
> like Whitehead (in
> > whose metaphysics I was deeply immersed for about two years) in this
> > respect, that both systems (in the grand system-building
> sense of the word
> > used of such philosophies as those of Aristotle, Aquinas,
> Kant and Hegel)
> > are hermeneutic. By "hermeneutic", I mean that they tend to
> explain one
> > technical expression in terms of other technical
> expressions, producing a
> > semantic web of technical expressions that are tightly knit
> to one another,
> > but only loosely connected (relatively speaking) to either
> ordinary language
> > or to the technical lingua franca of the current
> philosophical community.
> >
> > "So much the worse for the current philosophical
> community", I can hear Jon
> > (and John) saying. But the point is that systems of thought
> which are
> > strongly hermeneutic are, sociologically speaking, like
> systems of religious
> > belief. The cost of entry to the belief system is high
> (because of (a) the
> > greater emphasis on the internal linkages among the
> technical terms of the
> > system, and (b) the lesser emphasis on linkages to the
> containing language
> > (ordinary language, the language of current academic
> philosophy, etc)). But
> > once you've paid the entry fee and crossed the barrier,
> i.e. once you have
> > grokked the system and not only interpret the world in its
> terms, but also
> > directly experience the world in its terms, then provided
> that the system is
> > a good one (internally consistent, broad range of
> application, and "rich"
> > (in a sense I would like to elaborate on someday, having to
> do with the
> > subjective sense that in explaining one particular thing,
> one is also
> > providing strong support for the system's explanations of many other
> > particular things)), as I am sure Peirce's is, one becomes
> more than a
> > scholar familiar with the system, or even a researcher
> hanging it on his
> > conceptual toolbelt. One becomes a true believer....
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> ------------
> Cathy Legg, Phd Cycorp, Inc.
> Ontologist 3721 Executive Center Dr., ste 100
> www.cyc.com Austin, TX 78731-1615
>
> download OpenCyc at http://www.opencyc.org
> --------------------------------------------------------------
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>
>
> ai
>