RE: SUO: RE: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology, Epistemology, Semiotics
Cathy,
I was struck by your point,
CL> Are we stuck with 2), or could we proceed to 3? I think we could - how?
Applications,
applications, applications...
I agree wholeheartedly with your suggestion.
However it seems to me that your 3) can be interpreted in two ways.
One is using an ontology for an application such as text analysis where we
then, by inspection of the results, decide whether the results are correct.
Another is where the application is operational - it actually does
something - pays bills etc. If the bills do not get paid someone complains.
It seems to me that the first 'interpretation' is in some ways has a 2)
flavour and the second a 3) flavour. If we accept Pierce's distinctions this
would give the second 'interpretation an edge - rightly so, in my
experience.
So if we are looking for applications - I suggest, other things being equal,
we prefer operational ones.
Regards,
Chris Partridge
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of
Cathy Legg
Sent: 11 September 2003 19:38
To: Tom Johnston
Cc: SUO
Subject: Re: SUO: RE: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology,
Epistemology, Semiotics
Again, I agree that Peirce has a system, and a lot of his own terminology,
which is off-putting and must seem to expose his thought to the danger of
sealed-off self-verifying-ness.
However, I would urge that Peirce breaks the hermeneutic circle
(better than most current analytic philosophers) with his pragmatism.
The best explication of this is in his early paper 'How to Make Our Ideas
Clear":
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html
Here he describes 3 'levels of clarity' to which our ideas may be taken:
1) I know it when I see it, though can't necessarily say why (e.g. famous
judge's remark re. pornography)
2) I can give a verbal definition, of the kind found in a dictionary.
However it is possible to 'define' terms in terms of other terms one
doesn't understand, which are then defined in terms of the original
terms...
3) The idea allows me to generate specific *expectations* in specific
concrete situations. (e.g. by using the idea 'hard' I can come to expect
such things as that if I kick a rock I will damage my foot, the earth will
hold me up, etc.) These expectations may then be tested.
Peirce thought that most philosophy was stuck on level 2) of clarity of
its ideas, whereas the great lesson of the C17th scientific revolution and
the development of the art of scientific experiment was 3).
To get back to the topic of this list, what kind of clarity is appropriate
for the nodes of a 'standard upper ontology'? Are we stuck with 2), or
could we proceed to 3? I think we could - how? Applications,
applications, applications...
Cathy.
On Tue, 9 Sep 2003, Tom Johnston wrote:
> Richard:
>
> I applaud your attempt to clarify some of these Peircean concepts, and
> especially your way of going about it. What I mean by that latter point is
> that, having read at least a good handful of the passages from Peirce that
> Jon has provided us with, I have concluded that Peirce is like Whitehead
(in
> whose metaphysics I was deeply immersed for about two years) in this
> respect, that both systems (in the grand system-building sense of the word
> used of such philosophies as those of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant and Hegel)
> are hermeneutic. By "hermeneutic", I mean that they tend to explain one
> technical expression in terms of other technical expressions, producing a
> semantic web of technical expressions that are tightly knit to one
another,
> but only loosely connected (relatively speaking) to either ordinary
language
> or to the technical lingua franca of the current philosophical community.
>
> "So much the worse for the current philosophical community", I can hear
Jon
> (and John) saying. But the point is that systems of thought which are
> strongly hermeneutic are, sociologically speaking, like systems of
religious
> belief. The cost of entry to the belief system is high (because of (a) the
> greater emphasis on the internal linkages among the technical terms of the
> system, and (b) the lesser emphasis on linkages to the containing language
> (ordinary language, the language of current academic philosophy, etc)).
But
> once you've paid the entry fee and crossed the barrier, i.e. once you have
> grokked the system and not only interpret the world in its terms, but also
> directly experience the world in its terms, then provided that the system
is
> a good one (internally consistent, broad range of application, and "rich"
> (in a sense I would like to elaborate on someday, having to do with the
> subjective sense that in explaining one particular thing, one is also
> providing strong support for the system's explanations of many other
> particular things)), as I am sure Peirce's is, one becomes more than a
> scholar familiar with the system, or even a researcher hanging it on his
> conceptual toolbelt. One becomes a true believer....
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cathy Legg, Phd Cycorp, Inc.
Ontologist 3721 Executive Center Dr., ste 100
www.cyc.com Austin, TX 78731-1615
download OpenCyc at http://www.opencyc.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------