SUO: Re: Ontology, Epistemology, Semiotics
> PG> I wonder if your claim is that we need a social ontology
> > module in SUO.
>
> I don't know what you mean by a "social ontology module".
> I certainly believe that the SUO must be general enough to
> support the categories sufficient for talking about agents
> (human, animal, or robots) that interact and communicate.
> But the notion of purpose is necessary even if you are
> not trying to characterize interacting agents.
The point is that it (SUO) is (ought to be) more general than that. What is
required to support talking about agents and so on is but a putative part of an
upper-level ontology.
[...]
>
> Jon Awbrey has been going through endless online tutorials
'Endless' is the right adjective. Unfortunately, Jon seems to share your
methodological views on unveiling the truth. The problem is that the candle is
in the bushel (remember Mark 4:13).
> about Peirce's triads. But for a brief overview, see
>
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/categories.html
>
I'll perfect my education in the holy scriptures in due course, thanks.
> PG> And there is more than intent and purpose in an ontology
> > of these domains (you seem to black out completely on physical
> > causality).
>
> I am not "blacking out" physical causality. If you want to
> know what I think about causality, read my paper:
>
> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/causal.htm
> Processes and Causality
I'll try to look for the synonyms of 'purpose'. Doens't seem that you make much
use of the term... glad to see that.
> PG> Ontology of chemistry is not a conceptualization of laboratory
> > activity. There are precipitations outside laboratories, everyday
> > in my toilet bowl for instance. And indeed there is more to
> > chemistry than mixing.
>
> Of course. But what distinguishes chemistry from physics is
> the methodology for studying and working with certain aspects
> of physical reality.
I understand your standpoint, you are just a relativist beyond redemption. This
distinction is between scientific practices, not between regional ontologies.
> The categories of chemistry use some
> categories of physics, but they add special categories that
> cannot be defined without considering the purpose of the
> methods, applications, and restriction of the subject matter.
This is an example of what metatheorteical flourish.
> PG> ... Now we have a relativist medicine which has shown
> > death to be normatively bad only from certain perspectives.
>
> Fine. You've proved my point. That just shows that
> different purposes lead to different kinds of medicine.
Sorry, to hear that. You're disproving your point by non sequitur. Different
kinds of medicine maybe, or rather different kinds of ethics. Not different
ontologies of what medical practice and ethical medical judgements are directed
toward.
> PG> Drugs do not have intend nor purpose, unless there is
> > an agent to stick them up their ass. You can talk nearly
> > as much about the relationship of a drug to a disease
> > as you can of the relationship of a disease to its causes
> > without worrying about these.
>
> You're proving my point again. Calcium carbonate is a physical
> substance, which has no purpose in itself. But
There's no 'but' here, John. So it is possible to do ontology, even in a
domain, without worrying about purposes.
> in the pharmacopeia,
> it is listed as a drug with several uses: as an antacid, as a
> dietary supplement, etc. You cannot define it as a drug without
> considering its purpose.
Terminological nitpicking. Webster says the use of the term outside
pharmaceutical context (e.g., chemical context) is obsolete, so I will grant
you the terminological point. Then we are in the domain of social ontology.
Nevertheless, drugs remain chemical reactive in the first place which secures
my claim.
[...]
> PG> Terms are meaningless and concepts completley useless which
> > apply without restrictions. I already made this remark discussing
> > a putative predicate SocialEntity which you would seem to apply
> > to everything and nothing.
>
> I did not propose that term. You did. All I showed is that
> you did not have a clear definition for it.
Let's work with' Entities pertaining to the domain of interaction and
communication between agents'. Your whole line is that this domain is reality.
> PG> Recall that Matthew's vocabulary comes from Process Engineering.
> > My urinary system was not designed and it has no purpose, although
> > it may have a function. Please, don't tell me purpose and function
> > are synonymous, you'll soon break my long lasting belief in the
> > richness of your mother tongue.
>
> I agree: purpose and function are not synonymous. But every
> engineering project, does have a purpose -- and one very common
> purpose is to design something whose function is similar to
> the function of some naturally occurring system.
We are in a ship of fools. So, there are naturally occurring systems which do
not involve purpose. Hence, ontology in these domains is independent from
ratiocination about purpose.
The remark about Matthew's approach was that it comes precisely from a domain
much more restricted than the natural one. Again, whether a particular steel is
deemed as adequate from the point of view of the designer is not the same as
whether it is adequate for sustaining a particular pressure. The latter kind of
considerations may enter into the scope of the inquiry of the former kind but
it doesn't go the other way around.
> But there is a strong similarity, which has raised many
> controversies among biologists.
Similarity is not identity.
> As "objective" scientists,
> they want to formulate their theories purely in terms
> of efficient causes. But biological systems are very
> difficult to explain without using words like "purpose".
Prodige and splendor of analogy. Are you sure you're not French? Anyway,
difficulty of expression is not an argument for conceptual identity.
> Any biologist who said "the purpose of the urinary system
> is to excrete liquid wastes" would be banished as giving
> ammunition to the creationists who are trying to use biology
> to prove the existence of God the Creator who is the Grand
> Designer of the Universe.
I can't find a way to comment this without hurting your religious feelings.
Let's say this is irrelevant.
> And that is why Peirce introduced his category of Thirdness.
> Every instance of purpose or intention is an instance of
> Thirdness, but there are things like biological functions,
> which are also instances of Thirdness without implying the
> existence of some being who had that explicit purpose.
I'll be damned but I think that Peirce was wrong. Analogy may be helpful but it
is dangerous. In that case, the structural analogy seems even completely
gratuitous to me.
> PG> I wish you wouldn't reply that scales can't "be defined
> > independently of the purpose or intentions of some agent".
>
> No, you can have scales for temperature, weight, etc.
Thanks.
> But "significant" is a close synonym for "meaningful",
> and meaning is an example of Thirdness.
You couldn't refrain, could you?
Pierre
> John
>
>